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A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
IN IRAQ’S ECONOMIC GROWTH PROCESS (1970 – 2010) 
JWAN SAEED HUSSEIN 
Abstract 
Since the 1980s, there has been growing recognition among developing countries that an 
essential foundation for sustainable growth is capital investment, both public and private. 
While Iraq is an oil-rich country, with substantial oil revenue, only a small proportion of it 
has been allocated to importing the capital that is most needed, while the rest has mainly been 
used for consumption purposes. The effects of the oil-driven state development, conflicts, 
sanctions, high unemployment and delayed reforms have significantly shaped Iraq’s economy 
and limited the potential for private-sector-led growth over the past 40 years. This conclusion 
is worrying for a country like Iraq, which has shown some downward trends in private and 
public investment, both in the total amounts and relative to GDP. 
 
This study, the first of its kind, empirically assesses the pattern of domestic private 
investment in Iraq and its key determinants over the past four decades. It also examines the 
issue of the complementarity (crowd-in effect) or substitutability (crowd-out effect) between 
public capital and private investment in the trend in economic growth. Finally, it evaluates 
the determinants of public investment, to reveal the indirect impacts oil revenue has on 
private investment through the increasing of public investment. The thesis employs time-
series data and annual datasets covering 1970-2010. Both the ADF and the PP unit root tests 
are employed to test for the stationarity of the data. Johansen’s cointegration is used to 
establish the long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables in the models. The 
VECM is also utilized to examine the short-run dynamics between the variables. The main 
empirical results support the accelerator principle hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between GDP and private investment. The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is, however, not 
verified in the case of Iraq but there is some evidence that private investment is crowded in 
by public investment, and that oil revenue has an indirect effect on private investment. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Research Background 
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition among developing countries 
that one of the most essential foundations of sustainable and healthy growth is 
capital accumulation, with the main source of capital accumulation being capital 
asset investment. Investment plays a crucial role in economic growth and 
development, as it enhances technological progress, productivity, and 
employment rates.  
Conventionally, this view was reflected in the 1950s and the 1960s when 
developed economies enjoyed the so-called ''golden age'', when it was believed 
that higher investment would move the economy on to a higher growth path, with 
a higher capital-output ratio and higher productivity, associated with higher levels 
of output and consumption per capita. According to the Solow growth model, the 
essential role of investment is limited to the short run, which indicates that, 
although investment increases growth during the transition to the steady state, this 
increase is correlated with its effect on the capital-output ratio. However, long-run 
growth is determined only by the rate of technological change, which is assumed 
to be exogenous (Solow, 1956).  
The issue of relevance here is the significant role of capital accumulation for the 
economic growth and development prospects of an economy. A substantial debate 
has emerged in the economic literature regarding what determines investment. It 
has been a central theme for a long time; a number of models have been 
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developed by economists to explain this phenomenon. These models have been 
subjected to empirical testing, eventually giving rise to a large body of literature 
on both developed and developing countries. Indeed, the literature provides a 
number of sophisticated models of investment determination, with great 
theoretical credibility; yet the empirical evidence seems to have done very little to 
clarify which are the more accurate representations of the investment determinants 
of an economy. Even less explanation is offered regarding the restrictive 
assumptions, and the difficulties faced when applying the theoretical models 
empirically. 
Initially, the existing literature focused on industrial countries in the theoretical 
and the empirical context, with very little attention given to investment 
determinants in developing countries. It is only in recent decades that increased 
attention has been paid to the private investment phenomenon in developing 
countries. This has mainly been due to the change in economic strategy in many 
developing countries moving from direct intervention and state-led economies to a 
new approach based on a free market with liberalization and privatization 
programmes (Blejer and Khan, 1984). 
Great emphasis was placed by policy makers on private investment as a powerful 
instrument for economic growth, innovation and poverty reduction. As structural 
adjustment efforts continued along these lines, however, it became clear that an 
understanding of private investment behaviour and of its responses to various 
market and policy incentives related to fiscal, exchange rate, regulatory, and 
financial reforms was important in designing efficient applications of structural 
adjustment programmes for which the existing literature appeared to provide little 
explanation (Ghura and Goodwin, 2000). 
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Furthermore, in the late 1980s many developing countries were confronted with 
severe slowdowns in economic growth and levels of investment (Oshikoya, 1994). 
This led researchers and policy makers to pay further attention to the determinants 
of private investment in developing countries.  
Many approaches, strategies and recommendations have been proposed by 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB), and by empirical studies, aimed at enhancing the role of 
private investment as an engine of economic growth. Besides that, the important 
subject of the relative impact of public and private investment on economic 
growth has also received significant attention in the academic literature. There is a 
general consensus that these two elements of investment have differing impacts 
on economic growth and social conditions (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991). Since the distinction between public and private investment 
matters for economic growth, it is essential to understand the linkages between 
these two components. 
The investment pattern in oil-producing countries has also received great attention 
in studies on developing economies. The general proposition made regarding 
investment patterns in oil-rich countries is that the substantial oil revenue in these 
countries could motivate high rates of public and private investment and therefore 
essential capital accumulation. Though most of the oil-exporting countries 
experience steady streams of foreign exchange earnings, these earnings have only 
allowed these countries to import a part of the most needed capital goods and 
services, and helped them to respond to increased demand for international goods 
for consumption purposes. Thus, in many oil-exporting countries such as Iraq, 
investment rates are still too low, motivations for innovation are insufficient and 
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returns on investment are not very predictable, which are some of the main 
reasons for slow growth in developing countries. 
Indeed, Iraq needs to diversify its economic base and grow through increased 
levels of international trade, and this will require increased private investment. 
Over the past four decades, the Iraqi economy has endured costly militarization, 
three devastating wars, pervasive state intervention, and more recently over a 
decade of international sanctions. As a result, the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita declined from over US$3,600 in the early 1980s to 
US$1,000 in 2001 (Looney, 2004). However, since 2003 there has been a 
significant post-war economic and financial recovery, and Iraq's GDP has 
rebounded very quickly following the conflicts, albeit not to pre-1980 levels 
(White, 2012). 
The main challenge for the Iraqi economy is diversification. The oil sector 
dominates Iraq's economy and the ratio of oil to total exports is among the highest 
of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Oil exports make up over 90% 
of government revenues, 80% of foreign exchange earnings and about 75% of 
GDP. In comparison, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait oil production is around 50-
55% of GDP, and in Iran it is 25% (Benson, 2012). Iraq’s very high dependency 
on oil makes the economy vulnerable. Although the oil sector continues to 
provide the basis for growth and stability in the medium term, economic 
diversification is important in the long term. A sustainable future requires the 
development of a more diversified economic base and employment opportunities, 
which can only be achieved through increased rates of gross investment, both 
private and public, in the country (Foote et al., 2004; Tadlock, 2004). 
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Macroeconomic indicators in Iraq have shown poor performance and low levels 
of investment since the 1970s, worsened by the several wars. During 1970-2010, 
average annual gross fixed investment rate was barely 3% of GDP and has not 
even exceeded 8% in good times (Hussein & Benhin, 2015). The share of private 
investment in GDP declined from 5.2% in 1970 to 3% in 1975, and then to 2.11% 
in 1987 during the first Gulf War, but experienced an increase to about 7.5% in 
1989 and 1990. Since then there has been a decreasing trend and it has been as 
low as 0.5% in 2007 after the second Gulf War. Moreover, successive wars have 
acted as significant obstacles that have drained the government budget, drastically 
affecting infrastructure services in the last three decades, and in turn critically 
influencing private investment. It is evident that Iraq is too far behind the 
minimum investment rate of about 30% of GDP that is needed to attain the 
required levels of the key macroeconomic indicators of growth, employment, and 
low inflation, as well as to reduce the level of violence in the country (Alnasrawi, 
1994). 
Despite several structural reforms carried out by the Iraqi government to enhance 
private investment in recent times, economic growth is still low for an oil-rich 
country. Iraq continues to be confronted with a number of economic constraints. 
Among these problems are a high rate of inflation, political instability, a low level 
of investment and an inability to generate sufficient productive employment. 
Instead of an economic recovery, the situation continues to deteriorate. In Iraq, the 
expected role of private investment as an engine of growth seems never to have 
materialized. A major expansion in private investment, needed to sustain 
economic growth, is yet to be attained. 
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Given this background, the purpose of the present thesis is to examine, within a 
realistic framework and using best-practice testing techniques, the key economic 
and social factors influencing private investment, and also to assess private 
investment’s impact on economic growth and the role of public investment in this 
relationship. Iraq is the specific case of interest. Focusing on a single country is 
more convenient and should lead to greater success since it provides a unifying 
focus by allowing one to draw on different aspects in the literature. This will 
provide a particularly useful study on Iraq, given the deficiencies in the existing 
literature. 
1.2 Research problems  
There has been growing recognition among researchers in developing countries 
that private investment plays a significant role in economic wealth and job 
creation, and thereby the achievement of macroeconomic stability. Iraq, an oil-
rich country with substantial oil revenue, has experienced a steady stream of 
foreign exchange earnings. Part of these earnings has been used to import the 
capital that is most needed, while the rest has mainly been used for consumption 
purposes. The effects of the oil-driven state development, conflict, sanctions and 
delayed reforms have significantly shaped Iraq’s economy and limited the 
potential for private-sector-led growth over the past 40 years. On the other hand, 
according to a World Bank report in 2010, Iraq has one of the youngest 
populations in the world, with 30-40% under the age of 15 years, and a high 
unemployment rate, at close to 30%, almost twice the average in MENA 
countries.   
Certainly, the levels of both private and public investment are far below those 
needed to create wealth or job opportunities. Aggregate investment has remained 
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stagnant for a prolonged period of time, motivations to innovate are insufficient, 
and due to political and macroeconomic instability the expected return on 
investment is unpredictable. Worryingly, both private and public investment has 
shown downward trends in amount and relative to GDP. The situation needs to be 
addressed carefully in order to identify key factors to enhance these two elements 
as the engine of Iraq’s long-term growth. In terms of the diversification of Iraqi’s 
economy, there is strong evidence that the agriculture and manufacturing, building 
and construction, and transport, communication and storage sectors all have very 
strong potential. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The thesis attempts to address five key objectives: 
(i) To review the historical trends in key macroeconomic indicators and 
evaluate the role of private and public investment in Iraq’s economic 
performance over the period 1970-2010 in order to provide an in-depth 
understanding of country’s economic environment as a basis for the later 
empirical analysis (see Chapter 4). It also contributes to the existing 
empirical literature on private investment in developing countries. 
(ii) To comprehensively evaluate the impacts of private and public investment 
on economic growth by examining whether public investment crowds in 
(complementary to) or crowds out (substitute for) private investment. The 
outcomes help to assess what policies are needed to enhance the 
complementary relationship and therefore economic growth (see Chapter 
6). 
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(iii)To assess empirically the impact of macroeconomic variables on private 
investment as proxied by private fixed capital formation, based on the 
modified neoclassical flexible accelerator theory and several investment 
studies dealing with developing countries, to clarify the picture regarding 
domestic investment in Iraq. The analysis is extended to assess the impact 
of the political instability and international sanctions on private investment 
over the last four decades (see Chapter 7).  
(iv) To examine key factors influencing public investment, such as per capita 
income, current government expenditure and oil export revenue. Although 
a few studies have been conducted on determinants of public investment in 
developing countries, this study considers a public investment model in 
the context of Iraq. This is, again, important for policy and the country’s 
future. The other purpose is to examine the indirect effect of the oil sector 
on private investment in Iraq (see Chapter 8). 
(v)  To make appropriate policy recommendations for encouraging and 
sustaining private investment and economic growth in Iraq (see Chapter 
9).      
1.4 Research questions  
To achieve the objectives set out for this thesis in Section 1.2, and to examine the 
topic empirically, this thesis attempts to find an answer to several main research 
questions, based on an identified gap in the literature regarding whether and how 
domestic private and public investment affects economic growth in developing 
countries like Iraq, and the significance of these effects. It has only been in recent 
decades that increased attention has been given to the private and public 
investment phenomenon in developing countries. This study considers the 
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interaction between private and public investment, namely whether there is 
complementarity or substitutability between the two elements, to be important for 
economic growth. The outcomes could differ among countries and the debate can 
only be settled with country-specific evidence. Accordingly, three models are 
modified to fit Iraq’s economic structure, and are tested empirically.  
As regards to the tested hypotheses regarding the relationship between private and 
public investment and economic growth, they can be broken down into the 
following specific questions: 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 6) attempts to answer the following: 
a. How does private and public investment influence economic growth in 
Iraq? 
b. Do public-sector investment and domestic private-sector investment have 
different impacts on Iraq’s economic growth?  
c. Why is private investment not more efficient and productive than public 
investment in Iraq? 
d. What is the impact of the oil export revenue on economic growth? 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 7) attempts to answer to the following 
questions; 
a. Is GDP positively associated with private investment ? 
b. Are private sector investments crowded out or crowded in by public-
sector investment in the case of Iraq? 
c. Is there evidence as to whether the real interest rate supports the 
McKinnon–Shaw hypothesis (has a positive impact on private 
investment) or the neoclassical hypothesis (has a negative impact on 
private investment) in the case of Iraq? 
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d. Do macroeconomic instability and uncertainties have an adverse effect on 
private investment?  
e. To what extent are both war and political uncertainty severe obstacles to 
the attraction of private investment? 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 8) answers the following: 
a. What are the main determinants of public investment? 
b. Is public investment crowded out by public current expenditure?  
c. Is there an indirect impact of oil revenue on private investment? 
d. Which key areas should be targeted when it comes to public 
investment so as to enhance its impact on private investment and 
economic growth? 
1.5 Research contributions  
The outcomes of this study contribute to the economic literature and policy 
making on investment and economic growth in the developing world in the 
following ways: 
(i) This study contributes to the empirical literature on economic growth 
through the adoption of a neoclassical framework that includes various 
theoretical determinants of growth, such as oil revenue, human capital and 
macroeconomic instability. The purpose of adopting this model is to 
examine the determinants of economic growth in Iraq from 1970-2010, 
and to determine whether there is a complementary or substitution effect 
of public investment on private investment.   
(ii) Following from (i), the thesis establishes how public investment could 
enhance private investment so as to facilitate sustainable economic growth 
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in Iraq. The outcomes could also be useful for other oil-rich developing 
countries aiming for long-term sustainable growth.  
(iii)It adopts an appropriate analytical framework to identify the key 
macroeconomic factors affecting private investment in the context of Iraq. 
This is believed to be particularly important for providing key 
recommendations on how government policies can stimulate private 
investment that will in turn boost economic growth. So far, no systematic 
empirical study has been conducted with regards to the determinants of 
private investment in Iraq. 
(iv) Another significant contribution of the current thesis is its adoption of a 
simple analytical model for analysing the determinants of public 
investment and for identifying the indirect effect of oil revenue on private 
investment. 
(v) This thesis also contributes to the literature by providing a historical 
overview of Iraq’s economic performance in the last forty years, with 
emphasis on the evaluation of private investment vis-a-vis public 
investment, oil and non-oil sectors, and macroeconomic policies including 
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate.   
(vi) A database for private investment in Iraq is built, which would also be 
very useful for future analyses in this area. Gathering a long span of data 
from reliable resources was a great challenge in working on this thesis. 
The data set used in this study is based on annual, seasonally adjusted 
observations, covering 1970-2010, and concerted efforts were required to 
compile it and check its reliability.  
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1.6 An Overview of the Thesis 
The theoretical literature on investment is reviewed in the next chapter. Various 
mainstream theories of investment are considered, including classical and 
neoclassical, Keynesian,, the Q theory of investment, the neoliberal approach and 
the disequilibrium investment approach. Furthermore, the increasing consensus 
among researchers on the importance of investment theories in developed 
countries and the potential for applying these theories in developing countries are 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. By pointing out the theoretical weaknesses of these 
models, and the need for further understanding of investment behaviour, the 
survey also includes a critical discussion of recent developments attempting to 
address the investment phenomenon from different perspectives. Overall, this 
chapter provides an understanding of the theoretical background upon which a 
specific theoretical model of investment determination can be built, and tested 
empirically, in the case of developing economies. 
Chapter 3 complements the review of the theoretical literature on private 
investment behaviour provided in Chapter 2 by reviewing relevant and current 
studies of the investment process in the developing world. This chapter covers a 
variety of variables so as to identify the most important factors influencing private 
investment in the context of developing countries. In general, most of the 
empirical studies relevant for modelling private investment are based on what is 
called the neoclassical flexible accelerator model, indicating that most of the 
conventional investment theories cannot be applied in the context of developing 
countries. This is due to the fact that developing countries do not always operate 
in a competitive environment, and often face constraints that are not accounted for 
in the theoretical model. Thus, there have been notable challenges to the 
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development of an analytical model of investment tailored to developing 
countries. 
The chapter further examines the effectiveness of various policies, including 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, in stimulating private investment in 
developing countries. Increasing attention has been given to non-economic 
factors, including poor governance, political instability and economic security, 
which play a complementary role along with traditional factors in determining 
private investment. These factors essentially influence substantial investment 
decisions based on the rational evaluation of risks and potential profits. Finally, 
the potential effect of oil revenue and foreign direct investment (FDI) on private 
investment is also investigated in this chapter.  
The Iraq’s economy in its historical context is presented in Chapter 4, based on 
the proposition that history and institution are vital to understanding the way 
capital is accumulated in an economy. A historical overview of Iraq’s economy, 
with emphasis on the evaluation of the oil and non-oil sectors and macroeconomic 
policies including fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate, are provided at the outset. 
This is followed by an evaluation of the private sector vis-a-vis the public sector 
and an assessment of the labour force and employment in Iraq. In analysing 
macroeconomic trends, the study mainly focuses on the three phases that the 
economy has experienced in the last four decades. The first is referred to as the 
prosperity period, due to the oil boom of 1970-1980 that allowed the country to 
adopt a development plan focused on the expansion of its industrial base. The 
second was 1980-2003, when the economy confronted three long wars and severe 
international sanctions, which effectively destroyed the positive achievements of 
the 1970s. In the third phase, 2003-2010, the Iraqi state faced particular 
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challenges in terms of reconstruction and development, with not only economic 
but also fundamentally political and social transition. The government managed to 
increase investment in the oil and non-oil sector. However, violence that resulted 
from internal conflict and limited administrative capacity, along with poor 
infrastructure, prevented growth in aggregate investment. 
Taken together, the theoretical background on investment behaviour provided in 
Chapter 2, and the empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 3, provide a very 
useful guide for developing a more realistic macroeconomic model of private 
investment for Iraq in Chapter 5. Here, three empirical models are adopted in line 
with the economic structure in Iraq as discussed in chapter 4. First, a simple 
growth model is formulated based on the neoclassical framework and empirical 
studies, distinguishing between the effects of private and public investment so as 
to enable the study to examine the issue of complementarity and substitutability 
between public and private investment, that is whether public investment crowds 
in or crowds out private investment. Second, the neoclassical flexible accelerator 
model is adopted to estimate the pattern of domestic private investment and to 
examine key variables explaining it. Third, based on the empirical studies, a 
public investment model is developed to analyse the determinants of public 
investment and to evaluate the indirect effect of oil revenue on private investment.  
For estimation purposes, annual data from 1970-2010 are used in this study to 
examine the behavioural equations of the model. With regard to the method of 
analysis, first, two common tests are used, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the 
Phillips-Perron, to test for stationarity and the order of integration of the time-
series data. Then, the Johansen cointegration test is applied to each model to 
examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. Finally, as 
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also discussed in Chapter 5, once the cointegration among the variables has been 
confirmed, a vector error correction model (VECM) is used to estimate the short-
run dynamic relationship between the variables.  
Chapter 6 is the first of three empirical analysis and it focused on the determinants 
of economic growth in Iraq over 1970-2010. The key purpose is to investigate 
how public and private investments affect economic growth and to determine the 
complementary or substitutive effect of public investment on private investment. 
The simple analytical model applied includes other theoretical determinants of 
growth, such as human capital proxied by the labour force, macroeconomic 
instability, and the exchange rate policy, all of which have received a significant 
amount of attention in recent literature and have to be taken into account when 
assessing this issue.  
The macroeconomic model of the private investment function, within the context 
of Iraq, is tested econometrically in Chapter 7. This chapter focuses on key 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, real public investment, the real exchange 
rate, the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and social indicators such as political 
instability, as the most important variables influencing private investment in Iraq 
over the period 1970-2010. 
Chapter 8 presents an empirical analysis of determinants of public investment. It 
is well known that, in most developing countries, the public sector now accounts 
for a noticeable share of total production and investment. Thus, this chapter 
contributes to the existing empirical literature by assessing the determinants of 
public investment in the context of Iraq. This empirical model identifies key 
factors influencing public investment over the period 1970-2010. Oil revenue is 
included in the public investment model so that its indirect impact on private 
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investment can be examined. This study suggests that oil revenue could boost 
private investment indirectly through its effects on public investment. 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the thesis, the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further studies.  
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CHAPTER 2 THEORITICAL LITERATURE ON INVESTMENT  
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted in economic theory that one of the most essential 
foundations of sustainable and healthy economic growth and development is 
capital accumulation, and that the main source of capital accumulation is capital 
asset investment. It plays a significant role in economic wealth creation. It is an 
element of aggregate demand and a significant determinant of the general level of 
economic activity. Investment expenditure provides the basis for economic 
growth and improves national capacity and productivity (Aysan et al., 2006; Khan 
and Kumar, 1997). Thus, the consumption of goods and services increases with 
the growth in income that is stimulated by capital accumulation (Anwer and 
Sampath, 1999). 
An enormous theoretical literature on investment in developed countries has been 
produced over the last century, aiming to understand the determinants and relative 
importance of the investment process. The classical approach was one of the 
earliest models developed for this purpose. It is based on three main foundations: 
markets are highly competitive, wages and prices are completely flexible, and 
saving is always equal to investment. According to this model, market economies 
would be in equilibrium and would operate efficiently with no government 
intervention. However, Keynes was one of the first to call attention to the 
existence of an independent investment function in the economy, and made the 
assumption that investment decisions rely on the prospective marginal efficiency 
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of capital relative to the interest rate, reflecting the opportunity cost of invested 
capital.  
Following Keynes, the evaluation of investment theory was associated with the 
development of neoclassical theory. In its simple form (simple accelerator model) 
this was the other early model developed for this purpose. Although this model 
has been applied widely, it is believed to be too simple and restrictive to define 
the complete process of investment determination. The implications and 
unrealistic hypotheses of the simple accelerator theory led researchers to devote 
renewed attention to the investment model. The most prominent of the 
neoclassical flexible accelerator theories of investment behaviour was further 
developed by Jorgenson (1967), as an alternative to the simple accelerator theory. 
The neoclassical flexible accelerator model was the first in which the investment 
function was derived from an optimization model of the firm, indicating that 
enterprises continue to invest when there is a divergence between the marginal 
product of capital and the marginal cost of capital. This has been a starting point 
for many studies analysing investment decisions.  
In spite of the advancements in the intellectual understanding of investment 
determination provided by the various theories, most of the work has been 
focused on old industrialized countries, while less attention has been given to how 
investment is determined in developing countries. Along with the development of 
the above theories, some other theoretical literature has developed to provide a 
better understanding of the investment phenomenon, particularly in relation to 
developing economies. 
The neoliberal approach pioneered by economists such as McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973), who advocated for financial liberalization, provided an alternative 
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explanation for investment decisions in the developing world. The core argument 
in the neoliberal approach is that investment is positively affected by the real 
interest rate. In the sense of optimal solutions for the model of investment, the 
disequilibrium investment approach is among the theories that have emerged 
recently. This model was initially based on the belief that investment depends on 
profitability and output demand conditions, and was later developed through the 
argument that net investment is positively related to the gap between actual and 
long-run equilibrium capacity. 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a renewed interest in private investment 
models in the context of developing countries. This has partially been due to 
major shifts in economic strategy in developing countries, from direct government 
intervention and a state-led economy to one based on a free market implemented 
through liberalization and privatization programmes. A lot of criticisms have 
emerged regarding the applicability of the abovementioned theories of investment 
to developing countries, because of a number of deficiencies in the characteristics 
of developing countries that hinder the adoption of the models in their entirety. 
Since then, international organizations such as the IMF and the WB have taken an 
interest in the determinants of private investment in developing countries. As a 
result, the modelling of private investment has further developed to include 
important features of investment decisions such as irreversibility, uncertainty and 
timing, which are highly associated with developing countries but neglected by 
conventional approaches.  
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of 
investment, with a focus on developing countries such as Iraq. The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the classical investment theory 
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and its limitations are reviewed. Section 2.3 provides an explanation of Keynes’ 
investment theory and summarizes the main assumptions of this theory. Relevant 
models of neoclassical theory, such as the simple and flexible accelerator, are 
summarized in Section 2.4. The neoliberal approach that considers the 
characteristics of financial markets in developing countries is described in Section 
2.5. The disequilibrium investment approach, which is based on the idea that 
investment depends on profitability and output demand conditions, is discussed in 
Section 2.6, with Section 2.7 providing a brief discussion on investment theories 
in the context of developing countries. The last section presents the main 
conclusions derived from this chapter and identifies an appropriate theory 
underpinning investment decisions in Iraq as a developing and oil-rich country. 
2.2 Classical Investment Theory  
Classical economics can trace its roots to Adam Smith following his book 
published in 1776 and notably referred to as, “The Wealth of Nations.” Smith 
provided a broad analysis of economic phenomena based on the concepts of free 
markets and actions guided by individual self-interest under a non-intervening 
government. The classical approach is based on three key assumptions. The first is 
"flexible prices", under the argument that, with prices unrestricted by the 
government, markets can efficiently and quickly achieve equilibrium by reaching 
a balance between the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied. The second is 
Say’s law, "supply creates its own demand", meaning that aggregate production of 
goods and services in the economy will generate sufficient income to purchase the 
entire output. The last assumption is "saving–investment equality", which implies 
that the wealth of a nation is a result of savings and investment in fixed capital 
and that savings via changes in the rate of interest can be translated into more or 
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less investment (Baumol, 1999). Peterson (1988) illustrated that the interest rate, 
in the classical perspective, is a dynamic tool that determines the relationship 
between investment and saving, and proposed a link between the decision to 
refrain from consumption (savings) and the decision to provide for future 
consumption (investment). This perspective is still the core of investment theory.  
David Ricardo is considered to be one of the most prominent classical economist. 
Ricardo made a number of contributions to the study of international trade, the 
labour markets, and the distribution of income in the early 1800s that remain 
fundamental to the modern study of economics. Ricardo explained the labour 
theory of value, as a traditional classical assumption, arguing that the value of a 
good is determined by the labour hours. Ricardo also claimed a relation between 
profit and wages in the context of the labour theory of value, and that profit and 
wages are often in conflict. Thus, he argued that an inverse relationship existed 
between wages and profits, and that the capital stock and technical progress were 
limited, so that when wages increased, profits should decrease and vice versa. The 
substitutability of labour and capital as factors of production has also been 
proposed by Todaro and Smith (2009). 
Alfred Marshall in 1890 was the first to develop the standard supply and demand 
curves and a number of other economic fundamentals including market 
equilibrium, the relationship between quantity and price with regards to supply 
and demand, the law of marginal utility, the law of diminishing returns, and the 
idea of consumer and producer surpluses (Rittenberg, 2009). Marshall has been 
called the founder of marginalist economics, having explained how each extra unit 
of capital accumulation increases output, but that the rate of increase has a 
diminishing nature. In a perfectly competitive factor market for capital, Marshall 
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argues that firms should employ capital in production up to the point at which the 
marginal cost of capital is equal to the value of output generated by one unit of 
extra capital investment. It has also been shown that the demand for capital goods 
will continue as long as the return on capital exceeds the market interest rate 
(Castle, 1991). From the marginalist perspective, investment is mainly determined 
by two factors: the cost of capital, which can be measured by the interest rate, and 
the value of output that can be added by making one unit of new capital 
investment, otherwise known as the marginal return of capital investment. 
It can be concluded that the classical theory of investment and the marginalist 
approach mainly focused on the optimal amount of capital stock rather than how 
to increase its contribution to the economy (Eisner and Nadiri, 1970). The 
classical economists showed that aggregate income is equal to aggregate 
investment plus aggregate consumption, and in turn that aggregate income is 
identical to output. According to Say's law, the economy is always in equilibrium 
and has full employment, with investment always equal to savings. According to 
this perspective, inequality between saving and investment can be adjusted by 
changing the interest rate, through the mechanism of market forces. 
2.3 Keynes’ Investment Approach 
The theories of investment behaviour can be traced back to Keynes’ (1936) 
''General Theory'', which first called attention to the existence of an independent 
investment decision function in the economy (King, 2003). In contrast to the 
classical assumption, Keynes (1936) assumed that investment was a function of 
the marginal efficiency of capital in relation to a given level of interest rate that 
reflected the opportunity cost of the invested capital. According to Keynes’ 
theory, investment should be made when the marginal efficiency of capital is 
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greater than or equal to the market rate of interest. Then, the demand for capital 
goods will increase and new investments will be profitable. Therefore, according 
to this theory, the rate of investment is determined by the gap between the 
marginal efficiency of capital and the interest rate.  
From Keynes’ perspective, expected future income, the main determinant of the 
marginal efficiency of capital, depends on a number of predicted factors. Price 
and the potential demand for output are two important factors that affect the 
marginal efficiency of capital and the demand for capital stock. An increase in 
aggregate demand raises the future expected return on investment and the 
marginal efficiency of capital. In this situation, surplus demand for output, as well 
as expectations of an increase in demand, positively encourage investment 
decisions. Therefore, expectations about future events have an important effect on 
the marginal efficiency of capital and investment behaviour. Moreover, the type 
and quantity of the stock of capital can also change the marginal efficiency of 
capital during the lifetime of the capital asset. A large volume of capital stock 
requires a large quantity of replacement investment and therefore diminishes net 
investment, and vice versa. Finally, wage changes and psychological expectations 
are the other factors that affect the marginal efficiency of capital and the demand 
for capital stock. 
Keynes believed that, often, economies did not operate at full employment and did 
not fully utilize resources and capacities. He advocated the use of government 
fiscal and/or monetary policies to intervene in the economy in recessionary 
periods so as to increase aggregate demand and alleviate economic depression. 
Such policies, he argued, could be implemented through a government budget 
deficit funded by an increase in the money supply, bonds or other financing 
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instruments, including foreign borrowing. Keynes held the view that income 
redistribution, as a part of fiscal policy, increased aggregate demand as well as 
investment expenditure.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that investment decisions could be highly 
unpredictable owing to the uncertainty related to the expected returns on 
investment (Evans, 1969). Keynes postulated that the decision to invest capital 
was mainly associated with what he called the ''animal spirits''
1
 of the investors 
(Dow and Dow, 2011), referring to investment decisions taken despite the 
uncertainty involved. According to this, the decision to invest is deemed to be 
mostly affected by the level of optimism or pessimism held by investors regarding 
the overall situation within which the investment will be undertaken. For example, 
when investors are pessimistic about the future of the economy, i.e., when the 
marginal efficiency of capital is predicted to decline, a very low rate of interest is 
not sufficient to ensure that aggregate demand for investment will exceed total 
savings. Producers who are not confident of selling their excess supply of goods at 
reasonable prices will not speculate on any interest rate (Montiel, 2003). This 
means that the investment decision relies on the individual investor’s expectations 
regarding the potential returns of the investment project.  
Based on Keynes’ theory, the demand for capital goods in an individual firm 
depends upon a number of other factors besides the interest rate. Individual firms 
maximize the expected profits from their capital assets. Expected profits depend 
upon present and future prices, sales and the cost of factors of production. 
Individual firms can demand excess capital as long as the average price of capital 
                                                 
1
Animal spirits is a term formulated by the economist John Maynard Keynes. The term was chosen 
to emphasize the importance of the confidence of businessmen in their future business prospects. 
Animal spirits may also refer to the inevitable risk involved in investment decisions (Dow and 
Dow, 2011). 
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goods is less than the discounted value of their anticipated future earnings stream. 
Furthermore, an improvement in technology will increase the marginal efficiency 
of capital, thereby increasing capital investment demand (Kaldor & Trevithick, 
1981).  
2.4 Neoclassical Accelerator Model of Investment 
The initial perspective of the neoclassical model emerged from the simple 
accelerator model. The accelerator theory was the dominating theory of 
investment in the 1950s and early 1960s, and is widely used even today in 
practical growth models. Originating from Clark’s (1917) work, this is the 
simplest investment model and postulates that the investment level is a function of 
a constant proportion of the change in output. In order to set the fixed ratio 
between capital stock and output, the model posits a constant returns to scale. 
Another assumption of this theory of investment is that relative prices of inputs 
are not important since there is a unique optimal level of capital and labour 
required to produce each level of output (Crotty, 1992). A further assumption of 
this model is that substitutability between capital and labour is impossible. 
Alternatively, the possibility of substitution between capital and labour could be 
allowed in the case where relative prices matter. However, the only way to 
maintain a unique relationship between investment and output is to assume that 
relative prices remain constant. 
Due to its unreasonable hypotheses, the simple accelerator has been criticized on a 
number of grounds. The first limitation stems from its very simplistic 
assumptions, such as the fixed ratio of desired capital stock to output. The second 
is its assumption that there is sufficient investment to ensure the desired amount 
of capital stock. Finally, in this model, factors such as investors’ expectations, 
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profitability and the cost of capital play no role in determining investment 
behaviour (Jorgenson and Siebert, 1968).  
Early implications of the simple accelerator model motivated a number of 
researchers, such as Goodwin (1951), Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954), to 
formalize a flexible accelerator model. This version of the accelerator model was 
based on the optimal accumulation of capital and retained the output factor as the 
sole determinant. Jorgenson (1967) developed the most prominent of the 
neoclassical flexible accelerator theories of investment behaviour. This 
neoclassical approach was mainly based on the assumption of market competition, 
and that credit and information are perfectly competitive, while enterprises have 
perfect expectations and can adjust their capital stock costlessly in all markets. In 
contrast to earlier theories, Jorgenson (1971) postulated decreasing returns to 
scale in the production function, where capital and labour are continuously 
substituted.  
Similar to classical theory, Jorgenson’s neoclassical theory assumed, enterprises 
continue to invest when there is a divergence between the marginal product of 
capital and the marginal cost of capital. Entrepreneurs, therefore, respond 
instantaneously to relative changes in prices in order to maintain their 
optimization condition. Based on that, the net investment is the gradual 
adjustment of the actual capital stock to its desired level, which is derived from 
the maximization of profit (Aysan et al., 2005). The investment model, from the 
neoclassical flexible accelerator perspective, can be determined by the expected 
aggregate demand (the accelerator), the user cost of capital, the wage rate and the 
initial capital stock.  
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Furthermore, according to Jorgenson and other studies, profits can work as a 
guide to businesses by helping them to make judgments about the possibility of 
future profits. The major motivation for undertaking investment expenditure is 
based on the anticipation that the investment project will be profitable in the 
future. In cases where there is no access to investible funds through financial 
institutions (as is the case in developing countries), firms basically depend on 
financing their investments out of retained profits. The greater are the levels of 
profits, the better are the possibilities of self-financing the business (Eisner and 
Nadiri, 1968; Jorgenson, 1971; Kuh, 1963).  
However, others (Aysan et al., 2005; Greene and Villanueva, 1991) have argued 
that, although the flexible accelerator model has been the most widely applied 
general theory of investment, and empirical tests of the model have shown some 
success in developed countries, firms in developing countries face constraints that 
are not accounted for in the conventional neoclassical theory (Agénor and 
Montiel, 2008; Shafik, 1992). The model puts forward that the risk, uncertainties 
and expectations related to future output and input prices are not vital in making 
optimal investment decisions. Also, unrealistic assumptions are made, including 
the existence of perfect capital markets, and little or no government intervention, 
which contradict the structural and institutional factors prevailing in developing 
countries. Costless adjustment of capital stock (i.e., the market is free of tax and 
transaction costs) is scarcely applicable in the real world of firm behaviour. The 
issue of how prices of capital goods are determined is ignored in this theory. 
Finally, certain variables, such as capital stock, real wages and real financing for 
debt and equity, are normally either unavailable or inadequate in developing 
countries. 
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2.5 Neoliberal Approach to Investment 
Due to the absence of well-functioning financial markets in developing countries, 
the neoclassical assumption of the flexible accelerator model regarding the 
availability of credit supply from the banking sector cannot be taken for granted. 
A contradiction with the aforementioned model also arises because of the public 
deficit and debt, which can lead to financial repression and a reduction in private 
investment. With these concerns in mind, “liberal” economists such as McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) have advocated financial liberalization and provided an 
alternative explanation of the investment decision in the developing world.  
The core argument in the neoliberal approach of McKinnon and Shaw (1973) is 
that the level of investible funds is achieved by a rise in the interest rate, through 
what McKinnon (1973) called the “conduit effect”. In a real-world situation, 
while it is true that the demand for investment is negatively affected by the real 
interest rate, in the case of developing economies where financial repression is 
widespread, realized investment actually increases as a result of the greater 
availability of funds made possible through increases in the real rate of interest. 
According to the McKinnon and Shaw (1973) viewpoint, savings are necessary 
for investment and consequently for growth and economic development within a 
country. In developing markets, savings resources or mechanisms exist but are 
often poorly managed. Emerging economies tend to be fragmented, leading to a 
greater possibility of investments being less productive. Capital accumulation is 
discouraged due to the fact that, under a high inflation rate, nominal interest rates 
are set too low and thus real interest rates could be negative. As the capital supply 
of the banking sector is limited and banks only engage in specialized credit 
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activities, private investors have to finance their investment projects themselves or 
go to the informal sector, where interest rates are often high or even usurious.  
This line of argument is based on the fact that the liberalization of interest rates 
will not only motivate savings and hence loanable funds, but will also provide a 
more efficient mechanism for the allocation of available funds, with the ultimate 
target of achieving a higher growth rate for the economy. Thus, financial 
repression in developing countries needs to end, and such countries need to 
develop their financial spheres so as to increase the real growth of the economy. 
This view is in direct contrast to the neoclassical approach, which posits a 
negative relationship between private investment and interest rates. The key  
limitation of this model is that it neglects the negative effect of higher real interest 
rates on private investment, through the increases in users’ cost of capital that 
normally follow higher interest rates.  
2.6 Disequilibrium Investment Approach 
As the search for an optimal model of investment continued, another set of 
alternatives, known as the “disequilibrium models of investment”, emerged. The 
origin of these models can be traced to the works of Malinvaud (1982) and 
Sneessens (1987). They are based on the idea that investment depends on 
profitability and output demand conditions. Malinvaud (1982) posited that 
investment decisions could be separated into two major phases. The first included 
decisions relating to the expansion of the level of productive capacity, which in 
turn would depend on the level of capacity utilization in a given economy. The 
second phase comprised decisions relating to the capital intensity of the extra 
capacity, which would also be dependent on the cost of capital and labour input. 
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This theory was further developed by Sneessens (1987), who proposed that net 
investment was positively related to the gap between actual and long-run 
equilibrium capacity. This gap was perceived as reflecting the divergence between 
actual and equilibrium rates of capacity utilization (sales constraints), and actual 
and equilibrium mark-up rates (profitability). It was thus assumed that this 
situation of disequilibria was what impacted investment behaviour. The simplistic 
assumptions of disequilibrium models are based on rational expectations and 
market disequilibrium existing side by side. Therefore, the market disequilibrium 
model and rational expectations can be combined to explain the determination of 
investment. 
The theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, in establishing 
investment models for developed countries, different approaches are usually 
integrated in what has been called a neoclassical flexible accelerator model 
(Catinat et al., 1987; Sakr, 1993). 
2.7 Investment Theory and Developing Countries 
The aforementioned theories provide a basis for an econometric analysis of 
investment determinants in developed countries, with flexible accelerator models 
being the most widely applied and empirically supported. However, a lot of 
criticism has emerged in the last few decades regarding the applicability of the 
abovementioned theories to investment in developing countries. They appear to be 
less successful in modelling the case of developing countries, whose economies 
operate considerably differently from those of developed countries. A number of 
deficiencies in the characteristics of developing countries deter the application of 
such models in their entirety.  
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The key factors that limit successful application of these models to developing 
countries are as follows:  
(i) The absence of well-functioning financial markets: active stock exchanges 
are rare in developing countries and distortions arise from foreign 
exchange constraints. The free exchange of domestic and foreign 
currencies is usually restricted, thus the domestic currency is maintained at 
an overvalued level by the government in order to slow down the inflation 
rate (Aysan et al., 2005).  
(ii) The strong role of the government in the economy: with the aim being to 
increase the level of private investment in manufacturing, the interest rate 
is often kept much lower than the market rate (Khan and Khan, 2007b; 
Wai and Wong, 1982). 
(iii) Economic data, such as on international debt, the capital stock, nominal 
wages, and the marginal efficiency of capital , along with other data and 
information, do not exist, or are irrelevant or difficult to calculate.  
(iv)  There are many conceptual differences between the economies of 
developed and developing countries, such as expected returns, optimal 
profit and marginal efficiency for cost and product (Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991; Majeed and Khan, 2008; Malik et al., 2012). 
Since the 1980s, the IMF and the WB have been examining the determinants of 
private investment in developing countries, aiming to make the private sector the 
engine of growth. A fundamental question has been raised: "How does private 
investment respond to changes in government policy, not only in designing long-
term development strategies, but also in implementing short-term stabilization 
programs?" (Blejer and Khan, 1984). Another question raised is the following: If 
it can be supposed that increasing private investment will increase output, what 
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factors most influence private investment in developing countries? Economists 
from these international organizations have further studied the restrictions on 
investment in such countries and have suggested several economic policies aimed 
at stimulating the private investment decision (Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001).  
In recent times, another stream of theoretical literature, focusing on the rather 
complex issue of irreversible investment under uncertainty, has led to an adjusted 
and extended account of the determinants of investment. In contrast to the 
traditional theories, this approach has led to the emergence of a new view of 
investment, emphasizing three important features of most investment decisions 
that are neglected by the conventional approaches (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
First, most capital investments are partly or completely irreversible: the initial cost 
of investment is at least partly a sunk one. This means that the initial cost of 
investment cannot be retrieved completely by selling the capital once the 
investment decision has been taken (Pindyck, 1991). That is, disinvestments are 
very costly as alternative uses for such firm-specific capital goods are hard (if not 
impossible) to find. Examples of such costs include expenditure on major 
infrastructure such as buildings, roads, and bridges, and the purchase of certain 
types of machinery. Second, investment decisions might face an element of risk 
that arises from uncertainty about the future returns on an investment project. This 
indicates that the best investors can do is to attach probabilities to the potential 
outcomes associated with profits or losses. Third, investors can decide on the 
timing of their investment. This implies that investors have the choice to postpone 
an investment while they assemble accurate information about the future 
outcomes.  
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The theoretical expectations about how the element of uncertainty affects 
investment differ but most studies assume a negative relationship. Various forms 
of uncertainty have been used, such as economic, social and political instability 
(Pindyck, 1991; Serven, 2002; Campos and Nugent, 2003). In the case of 
developing countries, uncertainty can be measured in terms of volatility of 
inflation, the exchange rate, output, and terms of trade.  
Therefore, empirical studies of the determinants of private investment in 
developing countries have used a much more eclectic model of private 
investment, initially based on the neoclassical flexible accelerator model, in order 
to capture the characteristic institutional and structural features of those 
economies, in which uncertainty often prevails (Asante, 2000; Atukeren, 2005; 
Aysan et al., 2005; Blejer and Khan, 1984; Serven and Solimano, 1992; 
Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 1982).  
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to shed light on the most relevant investment models 
in the context of the developed countries, with consideration of the issues 
surrounding investment theory and developing countries. The theoretical literature 
on private investment is quite rich and diverse. Based on what has been discussed 
above, investment is an important factor affecting economic growth. Reviewing 
the main investment theories, namely classical, Keynesian, neoclassical (simple 
and flexible accelerator), and disequilibrium, which relate to old, industrialized 
countries, allows this study to identify the most important factors that can 
influence investment aimed at the achievement of optimal growth.  
The classical economists believed that investment was a function of profit, and 
was in turn affected by the interest rate. Keynes argued that the marginal 
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efficiency of capital determined investment. He emphasized that government 
intervention increased aggregate demand and encouraged investment, even if the 
economy did not operate at full employment and/or full capacity. Keynes also 
believed that the expectations of investors about the marginal efficiency of capital 
or the capital rate of return in the future were the key element in this regard. 
Meanwhile, the neoclassical economists observed that the maximization of profit 
could be the most important determinant of investment. The neoliberal approach, 
in contrast to the conventional theories, argued for the existence of a positive 
relationship between private investment and the interest rate, indicating that a high 
interest rate would not only motivate savings and hence loanable funds, but would 
also promote a more efficient mechanism for the allocation of available funds, 
with the ultimate target of achieving a higher growth rate for the economy. 
Disequilibrium models of investment were also included in the review. They are 
based on the idea that investment depends on profitability and output demand 
conditions. Finally, due to irreversible investment, especially in the case of 
developing countries, more recent literature has introduced an element of 
uncertainty into investment theory. In general, based on the aforementioned 
theories, private investment depends on broad categories of variables, such as the 
growth rate of GDP, internal funds (e.g., a change in the credit provided to the 
private sector), capacity utilization, the real interest rate, the user cost of capital, 
public investment, and finally uncertainty variables, which will be detailed in the 
next chapter.  
A surprising feature of the investment literature is that little attention has been 
paid to understanding investment behaviour in the context of developing 
countries. The models are almost exclusively adapted to old industrialized 
countries with an acceptable degree of success (Bischoff, 1971; Clark, 1979). 
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However, as yet, empirical studies have not clarified which of these models is the 
most accurate representation of the way that capital formation occurs in developed 
countries. In the case of such countries, the assumptions underlying the standard 
optimizing investment models are usually not applicable since investment 
decisions in developing countries face certain constraints that are not accounted 
for in these conventional investment theories. Thus, a modified version of the 
neoclassical model has been proffered to analyse investment behaviour in 
developing countries, in order to capture the characteristic institutional and 
structural features of these economies.  
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CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL LITERATUE ON INVESTMNET  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical and empirical literature on investment in the context of developed 
countries is enormous. In contrast, the literature concerned with the determination 
of investment in developing countries is sparse. Undoubtedly, since it has been 
recognized, as discussed in chapter 2, that most of the investment theories are not 
applicable to the context of developing countries, there have been notable 
challenges to developing an analytical model of investment tailored to such 
countries. Overall, a common feature of the empirical studies in the last two 
decades is that they have been limited and based on the simple adoption of one of 
the traditional models, such as the neoclassical accelerator, the Keynesian 
approach, or a combination of one or two of these relevant theories. Some other 
empirical studies have relied on simple equations that comprise a number of 
variables believed to be relevant to the investment decision. Although these 
studies have some limitations, they have introduced a somewhat valuable view of 
the process of capital formation in the case of developing countries.  
Although the significance of private investment for achieving sustained economic 
growth has been widely confirmed in the empirical literature, less is known about 
what induces private firms to invest in developing countries. In fact, developing 
countries do not always operate in a competitive environment and they often face 
constraints that are not accounted for in the theoretical models. This partially 
explains why economists do not generally agree on the determinants of 
investment in the developing world (Aizenman and Marion, 1993, 2003; Faini and 
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De Melo, 1992; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Serven 
and Solimano, 1992; Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 1982).  
Since the 1980s, there has been a broad consensus that private-sector-led growth 
has a stronger positive impact on economic growth than public-sector investment, 
owing to the fact that the former is relatively more efficient (Frimpong and 
Marbuah, 2010). Since then, as socialist regimes have collapsed one after another, 
the economic activities of the private sector have increased in developing 
countries, while the public sector has regressed, and the general conviction has 
been that the private sector can lead the way to economic development (Ouattara, 
2004). In these countries, in order to develop the private sector as a basis for 
sustainable economic growth, structural adjustment programmes and sectoral 
reforms have been adopted. 
The question of how developing countries can promote sustained growth by 
stimulating private investment has become important. Hence, policy makers have 
put great effort into determining how private investment responds to changes in 
government policy – not only in terms of long-term development strategies, but 
also in response to short-term stabilization programmes (Blejer and Khan, 1984; 
Serven and Solimano, 1989). Even if there is agreement among economists that an 
increase in private investment has a clear positive effect on economic output, it is 
still essential to clarify the determinants of private investment, in developing 
countries in particular. Therefore, one of the significant contributions of this study 
is its attempt to extend the existing empirical literature on private investment in 
developing countries by examining the main determinants of private investment in 
countries such as Iraq.  
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This chapter aims to determine the factors that influence private investment in 
developing countries and to examine the most effective policies for stimulating 
private investment in such countries. It attempts to cover a variety of topics 
relevant in modelling private investment. The chapter is organized as follows: The 
next section provides an empirical review of determinants of private investment in 
developing countries, the relationship between private and public investment, and 
how they impact on economic growth. Section 3.3 deals with the overall trend in 
private investment in developing countries, while Section 3.4 examines the impact 
of macroeconomic policies on private investment, which includes the impact of 
monetary and credit policies, fiscal policy, and the exchange rate, along with other 
factors such as irreversibility and uncertainty. In Section 3.5, the effects of non-
economic factors on private investment are considered. The relationship between 
oil revenues and private investment is investigated in Section 3.6. Private 
investment and FDI are studied in Section 3.7. The final section provides 
concluding remarks.  
3.2 Empirical Review: Determinants of Private Investment in Developing 
Countries 
This section attempts to examine the enormous number of theoretical and 
empirical studies of the investment process in the developing world. Most of the 
empirical studies have used single-equation models based on the neoclassical 
flexible accelerator model of investment (Khan and Kumar, 1997; Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Wai and Wong, 1982). These studies have 
also tended to incorporate specific investment determinants, including, most often, 
financing availability and the role of government investment. Some other factors, 
such as the inflation rate, external inflows, the size of external debt, market 
structures, the level of protection, the degree of price distortion, the real exchange 
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rate and uncertainty, have also been explored. Thus, a number of empirical studies 
have argued that, once modified to accommodate these considerations, the 
classical models of investment are applicable to developing countries (Blejer and 
Khan, 1984; Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 1982). In these 
studies, however, the degree of modification required has varied from minimal to 
fundamental. The following discussion aims to provide a general overview of 
several of these studies, focusing briefly on the major factors affecting investment 
in developing countries.  
3.2.1 Private and Public Investment Relationship 
In the last few decades, one of the most important issues in macroeconomic and 
development economics has been the impact of public and private investment on 
economic growth. This has been the subject of renewed consideration in the 
academic literature. There is a general consensus that these two elements of 
investment have differing impacts on economic growth and social conditions. 
Since the distinction between public and private investment matters for economic 
growth, it is essential that we understand the linkages between these two 
components.  
In an early study, Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) examined the relationship 
between public and private investment in two developing countries, India and 
Korea, as part of a growth model, through the application of the neoclassical 
investment model. The empirical results confirmed that public investment 
crowded out private investment by limiting the availability of financial resources 
for private investment. The results further showed that, because the availability of 
financial resources was lower in India than in Korea, the crowding-out effect was 
much higher in India than in Korea. Dynamic simulations of the model produced 
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different response patterns of private investment in the two countries, with the 
effects of interest rate volatility on investment and savings different, but 
significant in both countries. 
Naqvi (2002) examined the relationship between public and private investment 
and economic growth in Pakistan by adopting a cointegrated VAR (vector 
autoregressive) based approach over the period 1964-2000. The annual change in 
the real exchange rate was used as a proxy for uncertainty, and was also utilized in 
short-run VECMs under the hypothesis that investment decisions are likely to be 
affected by recent uncertainty. A model based on the accelerator model hypothesis 
suggested that economic growth generated both public and private investment; 
however, investment by itself did not appear to have a significant influence on 
economic growth. The empirical results suggested that past public investment 
exerted a positive impact on future private investment. However, uncertainty was 
shown to have a greater significantly negative impact on private investment than 
public investment.  
Cavallo and Daude (2011) examined the relationship between public and private 
investment using panel data from 116 developing countries over 1980-2006. The 
empirical results suggested that the crowding-out effect was smaller in countries 
with more developed institutions, and when the marginal productivity of public 
investment was considerably higher. The study also argued that the magnitude and 
sign of the estimated coefficient of public sector investment relied on a number of 
factors, such as institutional quality and the implementation of policies associated 
with market access, in terms of both trade and finance. However, Erden and 
Holcombe (2006) used several pooled specifications of a standard investment 
model and a panel of developing countries over 1980-1997 and confirmed that 
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public investment complemented private capital formation and that, on average, a 
10% increase in public-sector investment was associated with a 2% increase in 
private capital formation. 
Based on Namibian data, Kandenge (2007) adopted the endogenous growth 
framework to examine the impact of public and private investment on economic 
growth over the period 1970-2005, using cointegration and error correction 
methods. The empirical results showed evidence of a crowding-in effect between 
private and public investment, although private investment showed a much 
stronger impact on economic growth than public investment, which was 
consistent with earlier empirical results (Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Serven and 
Solimano, 1993). The empirical results further suggested that – in addition to 
public and private investment – export volumes, economic freedom, labour size 
and human capital all positively influenced economic growth in both the short and 
the long run. In contrast, the real exchange rate and terms of trade were found to 
have an adverse effect on economic growth in the short and the long run.  
Khan and Reinhart (1990) examined the relative effects of private and public 
investment on economic growth, indicating that private investment had a larger 
positive impact on growth than public investment. The authors also argued that, 
despite the growing support for market-oriented strategies, and for a greater role 
of private investment, the empirical growth models for developing countries 
typically made no distinction between the private and public elements of 
investment. They proposed that private and public investment should be 
separated, and that economic growth should be assumed to be a function of the 
ratio of private investment to GDP, the ratio of public investment to GDP, and the 
growth rates of the labour force, exports and imports. Their empirical results 
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showed private and public investment to have different effects on long-run 
economic growth, with private investment playing the dominant role, in 
developing countries. The only shortcoming of the study was that it failed to show 
the complementary effect of private and public investment in terms of public 
infrastructure investment in elements such as electricity, roads, communications, 
the education system etc.  
Baghebo and Edoumiekumo (2012) developed a Solow neoclassical growth 
model to examine the effect of macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, the 
interest rate, the size of domestic capital accumulation and public investment, on 
economic development in Nigeria between 1970 and 2010, using a Johansen 
cointegration test and error correction models. The empirical results showed that 
economic growth in Nigeria was positively affected by all of the macroeconomic 
variables in the model, consistent with the theorized effects of both private and 
public investment, while the results for inflation and the real interest rate 
contradicted the a priori expectations of the study. Similarly to Kandenge (2007), 
this study showed positive signs for the effects of both public and private 
investment, confirming the crowding-in effect between these two variables, 
although the later has found that private investment have larger and more effective 
impact than public investment in the long run.  
Accordingly, many empirical studies have examined the interaction between 
public investment, private investment and economic growth, and the results on the 
effect of public investment on private investment have been mixed. Some research 
demonstrates a crowding-out effect in some countries, whereas other research 
show a crowding-in effect in other countries. Even when considering the same 
country, studies show conﬂicting results, but this could be because of different 
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methodological approaches and time periods. It can be concluded from the earlier 
discussions that the interaction between private and public investment and their 
effects on economic growth could differ among countries, and that the debate can 
only be settled with country-specific evidence.  
3.2.2 Determinants of Private Investment  
In an early study, Wai and Wong (1982) estimated a model of the determinants of 
private investment for five developing countries (Malaysia, Greece, Thailand, 
Mexico and Korea). The model was based on a modified version of the flexible 
accelerator model of investment. The empirical study revealed that private 
investment in those countries largely depended on government investment, the 
change in bank credit provided to the private sector, and the inflow of foreign 
capital to the private sector. The study further found that the net effect of 
government expenditure on private investment was positive for three of the 
countries (Greece, Korea and Malaysia). 
A formal framework for studying private investment in developing countries was 
first developed by Blejer and Khan (1984). Their study made a significant 
contribution to the empirical literature by making notable progress towards 
deriving an aggregate investment function under an optimizing framework. The 
authors argued that the assumptions underlying the standard optimizing 
investment models were not applicable in the context of developing countries 
because of institutional and structural constraints such as data problems, the 
absence of well-functioning financial markets, the relatively strong role of the 
government in capital formation, foreign exchange shortages, a heavy dependence 
on imported capital goods, economic and political instability, deficiencies in 
infrastructure, a lack of skilled labour, and deficiencies in structural reform. Due 
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to the above constraints, they developed a flexible accelerator version, taking into 
account the relevant data problems and structural features, to specify private 
investment behaviour precisely for 24 developing countries over the period of 
1971-1979.   
Blejer and Khan (1984) argued that the neoclassical investment theory was 
significantly supported by the data from developing countries. However, the 
estimation results contrasted with the neoclassical assumptions, and the study 
failed to prove that public investment crowds out private capital formation, 
showing instead that public investment has a positive impact on private 
investment due to the latter being highly constrained in developing countries by 
the availability of finance, monetary policy and the flow of credit to the private 
sector. Furthermore, the study assumed that the response of private investment 
could be influenced by three main factors: the stage of the economic cycle, the 
availability of financial funds, and the level of public investment. The study was 
extended to make a distinction between government investment associated with 
the development of infrastructure and government investment of other kinds. The 
estimation results of the study revealed that public-sector infrastructure 
investment was complementary to private investment, while other kinds of public 
investment would tend to compete with private investment’s share of total 
investment and the ratio of total investment to income. The results also indicated 
that the larger was the share of private investment, the higher would be the 
average growth rate of the economy. The results called for the testing of formal 
models of private capital formation in individual countries. 
Similarly, Chhibber et al., (1988), studied public policy and private investment in 
Turkey. Their study revealed that changes in the composition of public 
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expenditure, towards the provision of major infrastructure facilities, had a positive 
and significant effect on private investment. This result appears reasonable, 
especially in the case of developing countries where certain types of 
infrastructure, such as good roads, transportation, communication facilities, the 
electricity supply etc., are limited, and thus the development of such facilities by 
the public sector is essential for accelerating the necessary growth. 
Another important study on developing countries was carried out by Greene and 
Villanueva (1991), who examined the effect of various macroeconomic factors on 
private investment in 23 developing countries over the period 1975-1987. Their 
study also supported other empirical studies in showing that the original version 
of the neoclassical flexible accelerator model was not applicable to the case of 
developing countries due to its main assumptions of perfect capital markets and 
little or no government economic intervention. According to their empirical 
evidence, private investment has a positive relationship with real GDP growth, but 
is negatively related to domestic inflation, the real interest rate, and the ratio of 
debt to GDP. They concluded that adopting efficient economic policies was 
highly important for promoting and sustaining private investment in developing 
countries. Their model has some shortcomings: First, there is an issue with the 
level of economic growth studied, with the majority of countries in the sample 
relatively more advanced in economic growth than most developing countries. 
Second, some of the variables in the model, such as inflation and external debt, 
have a correlation misspecification. Third, the model is a single-equation model of 
investment that cannot be applied to all developing countries. Fourth, the model is 
ad hoc and there is insufficient theoretical explanation to support the results. 
Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to all developing countries. 
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In line with earlier studies, Serven and Solimano (1992) were the first to bring 
attention to the effects of different macroeconomic policies, for example monetary 
and fiscal exchange rate policies, and uncertainty over private investment in 
developing countries. They mainly considered the interaction of public and 
private investment and the effects of exchange rate policy in their study. They also 
analysed the significance of financial constraints, the imperfection of capital 
markets, and the effect of political instability on irreversible investment decisions. 
They argued that aggregate economic activity and political and macroeconomic 
instability had the potential to influence private investment.  
A study conducted by Oshikoya (1994) is also considered a prominent early study 
in the empirical literature explaining investment behaviour in developing 
countries. The study investigated macroeconomic determinants of private 
investment using a sample of seven African countries for the period 1970-1988. 
Four were middle-income countries (Cameroon, Morocco, Mauritius and Tunisia) 
and three low-income (Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania). The estimation procedure 
used was the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. The explanatory variables 
assumed to explain private investment in these countries were the real economic 
growth rate, the real deposit rate of interest, changes in the terms of trade, the 
public investment to GDP ratio, the inflation rate, and the lagged debt service 
ratio. The estimated empirical evidence showed private investment to be 
positively related to public investment and the real interest rate for the middle-
income countries. For the low-income countries, the results confirmed a 
significantly negative relationship between private investment and the inflation 
rate, while the relationship between the real exchange rate and private investment 
was also found to be negative but insignificant. The study also showed that the 
supply of domestic credit to the private sector had a positive and significant 
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impact on the level of private investment activity in both the low- and middle-
income countries covered. 
In another study, Jaspersonet et al. (1995) confirmed that a high level of private 
investment was common in countries with high growth rates and a high level of 
access to financial resources, but that high inflation rates and government deficits 
were insignificant factors. A further discovery was that a high level of private-
sector investment tended to be common in countries with relatively open 
economies, which can be measured by the share of trade flows in GDP. 
Zerfu (2001) conducted a study on the macroeconomic determinants of private 
investment in Ethiopia, using time-series data, for the period 1965-1999. The 
empirical results revealed that GDP, public investment in infrastructure, and 
foreign exchange availability all had positive effects on private investment. In 
contrast, Getnet (1992), which was cited in the work of Hailu (2015), found a 
negative relationship between public and private investment in a similar study in 
Ethiopia, showing a crowding-out effect of public investment on private-sector 
activities.  
Ouattara (2004) assessed the determinants of private investment in Senegal over 
the period of 1970-2000. This study was also based on the flexible accelerator 
model, adjusted to take into account foreign aid flows and terms of trade that were 
posited to be additional essential determinants of investment in developing 
countries. Also discussed in this study was the idea that foreign aid flows could 
increase private-sector investment through the conditions attached to them. One 
condition attached to these flows since the 1980s has been that the recipient 
country has to privatize some of its publicly owned enterprises. Aid can also 
increase private investment if donors use it to provide private credit via local 
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institutions and non-governmental organizations. The analysis in Ouattara’ s 
(2004) study showed that private investment was positively affected by public 
investment, real GDP and foreign aid, but negatively affected by credit to the 
private sector and terms of trade.  
Similar to Blejer and Khan (1984), Sakr (1993) aimed to emphasize the effect of 
public investment on private investment, by classifying public investment into 
infrastructural and non-infrastructural components. The findings showed 
infrastructural government investment to have a positive impact on private 
investment, but non-infrastructural government investment to have a negative one. 
A recent study by Khan and Khan (2007) conducted in Pakistan attempted to 
analyse the determinants of private investment over the period 1972-2005. An 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach was employed to 
detect the existence of a long-run relationship and the short-run dynamics of 
investment. The results of the analysis showed most traditional factors to have 
little or no impact on private investment. The authors found partial support for the 
accelerator principle and the crowding-out hypothesis in the case of Pakistan. The 
study failed to find proof for the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis (see Section 2.5).  
With the increasing interest in investment behaviour in developing countries, Naa-
Idaret al. (2012) examined private investment behaviour in Ghana using data for 
the period 1960-2010, focusing on whether political instability hampered or 
encouraged investment in Ghana. Additional variables included GDP, inflation, 
external debt, the exchange rate, public investment, aid, trade openness and credit 
provided to the private sector. The empirical results showed that political stability, 
GDP, inflation, trade openness and credit provided to the private sector positively 
 49 
 
influenced the private investment level in Ghana, while public investment, the 
exchange rate, external debt and aid had a negative influence.  
In a study on Muslim developing countries, Salahuddin et al. (2009) attempted to 
examine potential determinants of investment behaviour in a panel of 21 countries 
over 1970-2002. The authors argued that, despite enormous growth potential and 
resources, the overall growth and investment rates of most Muslim developing 
countries were, on average, lower than those of non-Muslim developing countries. 
They traced this to several reasons, including unbalanced economic growth and 
development, a high level of consumption, and poor industrialization. In addition, 
the levels of investment and saving in most Muslim developing countries are 
unsatisfactory. Raimi and Mobolaji (2008) attributed the low rates of investment 
and growth in Muslim developing countries to other factors such as the low level 
of technological development, low levels of trade and financial openness, lower 
savings, political instability, lack of infrastructure, poor institutions, and high 
amounts of foreign debt accompanied by high production costs. These common 
characteristics may provide the best explanation for the insufficient rate of private 
investment in these countries. Therefore, it can be argued that Muslim countries 
such as Iraq face different challenges to other countries in their attempts to 
achieve investment and growth targets (Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). 
Following the recent trend in the literature on investment, a study carried out by 
Bakare (2009) used the flexible accelerator model to analyse economic and non-
economic factors, aiming to assess the variables with the most influence on 
private domestic investment in Nigeria. The variables investigated included GDP, 
public investment, the exchange rate, inflation, the corruption perception index, 
macroeconomic instability, infrastructure, political instability and savings. The 
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empirical results revealed GDP and savings to have a positive impact on private 
investment, and the exchange rate, inflation, the corruption perception index, 
macroeconomic instability, infrastructure, political instability and public 
investment all to have a negative impact. The study further argued that private 
investment could have a stronger and more favourable influence on growth than 
public investment, because public investment might be less efficient and could be 
associated more closely with corruption. Furthermore, political and 
macroeconomic instability were shown to present a major hindrance to private 
investment.  The further study on Nigeria  by Kehinde et al. (2012), who 
examined private domestic investment over 1970-2008, found similar results 
regarding the effect of macroeconomic instability and the political situation on 
private investment. They argued that these two factors represented big obstacles to 
private investment due to their augmenting of uncertainty. However, the results 
contradicted earlier studies by finding a “crowding in” effect of public investment 
on private domestic investment in Nigeria.  
Yin (2011), applied Johansen cointegration techniques with an error correction 
model to data from 1975-2009. The results showed that, in the long run, private 
investment decisions were mainly determined by output, domestic credit, the 
interest rate and government spending, and indicated that a competitive interest 
rate stimulated Malaysia’s private investment. However, increased public 
spending was found to crowd out private investment. In the short term, private 
domestic investment was explained by economic output, domestic credit, the 
interest rate and government investment.  
The review of the empirical literature has identified that growth in real GDP, the 
real interest rate, the debt service ratio, public sector investment, net capital 
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inflows, GDP per capita, the availability of credit to the private sector, the real 
exchange rate and the rate of inflation, among others, explain private investment 
behaviour in most developing countries. However, some differences have been 
found in the signs of their effects on private investment. This is particularly the 
case for public-sector investment and inflation. In addition, most of the reviewed 
studies were based on cross-country data. 
3.2.3 Determinants of Public Investment  
Renewed interest has been shown in empirical studies into the different types of 
public investment expenditure and how they may impact economic growth (Blejer 
and Khan, 1984; Sakr, 1993). In order to explain the function of the public sector, 
the theory of public expenditure growth will be briefly reviewed here. An 
inevitable starting point is Wagner’s law of “expanding state activity”, which was 
formulated at the end of the nineteenth century (Lamartina and Zaghini, 2011). 
This law stated that, with rising per capita income in industrializing countries, the 
public sector’s relative share of national output would rise. Wagner offered three 
reasons for this: first, with industrialization there would be increased need for the 
administrative and protective functions of the state. Second, the cultural and 
welfare functions of the state would expand, especially those connected with 
education and income distribution. Finally, with the change in technology that 
would follow industrialization and the increasing capital requirements of many 
industries, the state would intervene to protect consumers from private 
monopolies and, therefore, the direct investment role of the government would 
expand. Wagner did not see war and defence as playing a role in the expansion of 
public expenditure. However, war and defence expenditure, in some countries at 
least, proved to be one of the most important causes of the growth of public 
expenditure in the last century (Bird, 1971).  
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It is widely accepted that Wagner’s law is highly supported by the empirical 
evidence of public sector growth. However, some of its assumptions need to be 
adjusted to bring them in line with the available evidence. An earlier study by 
Groenewegen (1970) proposed that there were many reasons for the phenomenon 
of public sector growth, which can be summarized as follows: 
(i) The effect of economic growth on public sector expenditure, as proposed 
by Wagner’s law, plus the need for growth in defence spending as a 
product of industrialization, either because of the rising significance of the 
protective function of the state or due to the pressure for regional and 
market expansion, and maintaining foreign investment.   
(ii) The high income elasticity of demand for public goods at a certain stage of 
development. Musgrave (1959), in his study of fiscal systems, found 
variation in the income elasticity of demand for public goods in three 
ranges of per capita income levels. At a low level of per capita income, 
associated generally with pre-industrial society in developing countries, 
demand for public goods was generally very low because almost all 
income is devoted to satisfying basic needs. When per capita income starts 
to increase, the demand for goods supplied by the public sector becomes 
more important. Therefore, public sector expenditure will expand at a rate 
faster than that of the private sector. Finally, at the high levels of per capita 
income associated with developed countries, public sector growth will 
slow down until public and private expenditure grow almost at the same 
rate.  
(iii)  The productivity differential between the public sector and the private 
sector. When the productivity of the resources used in the public sector 
grows more slowly than that of similar resources used in the private sector, 
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there is a greater relative need for inputs to produce a given output in the 
public sector.  
(iv) War expenditure appeared to have what was called a “displacement effect” 
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1979). This study argued that government 
expenditure had to be increased during a post-war period, indicating that 
improvements to transportation and communications, for example, 
required central government intervention through the provision of 
equalization grants to improve the different standards of public services in 
various parts of a country. In summary the major aims of government 
expenditure are to achieve economic stability, full employment and price 
stability. Some economists also stress national security, social security, 
economic and social progress, and political stability. The latter is an 
important objective for all countries because, without it, economic stability 
cannot be achieved. 
Based on the above arguments, public investment has a significant impact on 
economic growth and is responsible for providing a healthy environment for 
private investment in the case of developing countries. However, only a small 
number of studies have analysed the determinants of public investment in these 
countries. They have placed a particular emphasis on the effects of per capita 
income, government current expenditure and oil revenue in explaining public 
investment (Clements et al., 2003; De Haan et al., 1996; Saghir and Khan, 2012; 
Välilä and Mehrotra, 2005).  
3.3 The Overall Trend of Private Investment in Developing Countries 
The growing interest in investment behaviour in developing countries became 
more apparent during the late 1980s. The debt crisis of the early 1980s and 
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subsequent global shocks that affected developing countries led to a drastic 
decline in capital formation. Since the 1980s, the opinion has been growing that 
private investment may be more efficient and productive than public investment 
in developing countries (Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Serven and Solimano, 1990), 
given that the average ratio of private investment to GDP in 90 developing 
countries has increased slightly from just above 10% to above 15% between 1970 
and 2000 (see Figure 3.1). In contrast, public investment has shown a downward 
trend, with the average ratio of public investment to GDP declining from 10% in 
the early 1980s to just above 5% in 2000 (see Figure 3.2) (Everhart and 
Sumlinski, 2001). As a result, many developing countries took a new approach, 
shifting from the post-war era of state-dominated investment programmes to 
market-oriented structural reform efforts. Based on policy-induced incentives, 
reform programmes under the new paradigm were adopted to varying degrees by 
almost all countries of the developing world in the mid-1980s. Ultimately, this 
meant that the old paradigm of catching up with the leaders was now largely left 
in the hands of the private sector, in an environment with greater market reliance. 
Since then, private investment has continued to be recognized as an essential 
factor for economic growth and more productive than public investment (Khan 
and Kumar, 1997; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Serven and Solimano, 1990). 
Figure  3.1: Trend in private investment in developing countries (1970–2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Everhart and Sumlinsk, (2001), P 1.  
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Figure  3.2: Trend in public investment in developing countries (1970–2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Everhart and Sumlinski (2001), P 2 
 
Further to this, Pfeffermann and Madarassy (1991) attempted to evaluate the trend 
in private investment in 40 developing countries using annual data for the period 
1970-1989. They showed that, on average, private investment increased in 
developing countries in the first half of the 1980s and its share of total investment 
increased in about 34 of the 40 countries in this period. The average ratio of 
private investment to total investment increased from 52% in 1985 to over 60% in 
1989. They further argued that the increased share of private investment in gross 
domestic investment, and reduced activity in the public sector, were a reflection of 
the world crisis and government policy aimed at controlling inflation by reducing 
public deficits.  
What is clear from the above studies is that private investment has become an 
important channel for influencing economic growth in these countries. However, 
in the designing and implementing of the new policies, it was soon realized that 
clear knowledge about how investment is determined and how a strong private 
investment response could be encouraged was largely absent. Indeed, since the 
debt crisis, private investment in developing countries had slowed substantially, 
remaining depressed throughout the decades. Signs of recovery had been very 
slow and weak during the late 1980s, often lagging behind stabilization and 
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adjustment efforts by several years. In some cases, a strong private investment 
response did not come into play at all, leading to a halt in the sustainability of 
stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, and hence to the collapse of 
adjustment efforts. 
3.4 Macroeconomic Policies and Private Investment 
It has been observed that monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies aimed at 
correcting unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances are bound to affect private 
investment (Aysan et al., 2006; Montiel, 2011; Serven and Solimano, 1992). As 
mentioned earlier, there have been very few notable attempts to develop an 
analytical model of investment adapted specifically to a developing country. 
Existing empirical studies in this field are also simple and limited both in number 
and scope. Overall, the common characteristics of these studies are that the 
estimated investment functions are either a simple adaptation of one of the 
traditional models such as the neoclassical accelerator, or endogenous, or a 
combination of two of these models. Some other studies simply depend on an 
estimation of an empirical model involving a number of variables believed to be 
related to private investment activity. In spite of these limitations, the existing 
literature has provided valuable knowledge on the process of capital formation in 
the context of developing countries.  
The basic notion here is that the correction of macroeconomic imbalances and the 
achievement of macroeconomic stability are prerequisites for attaining sustained 
growth. In turn, a strong response of private investment to the set of 
macroeconomic policies imposed by an adjustment programme is a basic element 
for economic stabilization, and would certainly be followed by sustained growth 
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(Serven and Solimano, 1992). Key macroeconomic policies that affect investment 
decisions are discussed in the rest of this section. 
3.4.1 The impact of monetary policy on private investment 
Monetary policy is one of the principal economic management tools that 
governments use to shape economic performance (Olweny and Chiluwe, 2012). 
According to the theoretical literature, a stable macroeconomic environment 
requires a prudent monetary policy. Compared to fiscal policy, monetary policy 
can more quickly resolve economic shocks. Kahn (2011) argued that monetary 
policy objectives were concerned with the management of multiple monetary 
targets, including the promotion of growth, price stability, achieving full 
employment, preventing financial crises, smoothing the business cycle, and 
stabilizing long-term interest rates and the real exchange rate. That these 
objectives are not all consistent with each other is noticeable, as the preferences of 
monetary policy objectives are based on the weights given to them by the 
monetary authorities, or the country’s priorities. A number of studies have shown 
that emphasis is usually placed on retaining price stability or ensuring low 
inflation (Dailami and Giugale, 1991; Khan, 2011; Khan and Khan, 2007).  
Therefore, price stability and low inflation are among the key objectives of 
monetary policy. Since high inflation rates have an adverse impact on investment 
by increasing the risk associated with long-run projects, inflation will lower 
productivity growth, as well as depressing output growth by decreasing real 
investment (Fischer, 1993). The policy recommendations for attaining these aims 
are based on the concepts of monetarism (Abdou, 1997; Greene and Villanueva, 
1991; Khan and Khan, 2007; Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008; Serven and Solimano, 
1992).  
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Abdou (1997) argued that a positive effect on private investment from restrictive 
monetary and credit policies can be expected if inflation is reduced and price 
stability is achieved. In other words, a macroeconomic environment in which the 
uncertainties associated with high and unpredictable inflation are reduced may 
attract private investors. However, this phenomenon can only be achieved in the 
medium or the long run. In the short run, the policies of monetarism tend to 
reduce private investment (Abdou, 1997).  
Thus, recently, increasing attention has been paid to the impact of monetary 
policy on private investment decisions, with suggestions that there is a significant 
impact on the determination of private investment and its performance in both the 
short and the long run. Conventionally, private-sector investment can be 
influenced by monetary policy through three channels: the interest rate, the 
demand for money, and credit. In less developed countries, Kahn (2011) 
confirmed that underdeveloped financial systems and weak interest rate 
responsiveness constrain the use of the interest rate and the demand for money 
channels due to limited applicability. However, it has been argued that monetary 
policy is effective on the asset side of financial intermediation (the credit 
channel), where it tends to have a greater impact.  
Furthermore, Van Wijnbergen (1982) stressed the importance of the institutional 
structure of the financial markets to any understanding of the effects of monetary 
and credit policies on investment and how such policies are conducted in 
developing countries. A number of studies, including Azam and Lukman (2010), 
Dailami and Giugale (1991), and Van Wijnbergen (1982), have indicated that 
there is a direct effect of tight credit policies on the stock of available credit for 
investment, rather than an indirect effect through the interest rate, since credit 
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provision is characterized by access to borrowing at preferential interest rates for 
firms. Firms with better access to the credit market will have higher levels of 
investment, implying that credit availability has a positive direct effect on private 
investment.  
Understanding the role of interest rates is also essential to understanding how 
private investment decisions are influenced by monetary policy. According to the 
neoclassical assumption, savings and investment can be equalized via the interest 
rate mechanism. This means that, where government spending increases are 
funded out of domestic debt, interest rates will increase to bring the capital market 
into equilibrium, reducing private-sector investment. This view is supported by 
the key proposition that the money supply remains constant. Should the money 
supply increase or accommodate fiscal spending, then interest rates may remain 
constant or decrease depending on the growth of the money supply and therefore 
liquidity in the economy (Kutepel, 2005; Olweny and Chiluwe, 2012).  
From the firm’s point of view, monetary policy affects the private sector through 
the cost of capital, its effect on investment decisions and the internal rate of return 
(Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). This implies that a monetary policy that facilitates 
the provision of credit for private-sector investment will stimulate private 
investment, whilst a tight monetary policy that restricts the credit provided to 
businesses will discourage private-sector growth. 
In the recent literature, a number of studies have emphasized that restrictive 
monetary and credit policies lead to an increase in the real cost of bank credit and 
thus the user cost of capital, in turn causing a decrease in private investment 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009). Similarly, Serven and Solimano (1992) indicated that a 
restrictive monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation and/or the current account 
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deficit would affect investment decisions through two channels. First, it would 
increase the real cost of bank credit, which is a major source of investment 
financing in developing countries. Second, it would increase the opportunity cost 
of retained earnings or internal funds, also a vital source of investment financing 
in most developing countries, due to higher real interest rates. Both effects would 
lead to an implicit or explicit decrease in the market value of existing capital 
relative to its replacement cost, and thus to a decline in investment. 
Furthermore, Ndikumana (2008) claimed that a tight monetary policy associated 
with high interest rates and a strong currency might cause damage to the export 
sector, thus discouraging international competitiveness. Achieving low inflation 
might, therefore, be potentially costly in terms of low investment, output, and 
employment.  
Taban and Kara (2006) discussed that, according to the monetarist view, if budget 
deficits were financed by taxes or borrowing via flotation, due to the increase in 
demand for loanable funds, interest rates would rise as well. This would increase 
the cost of investment and hence reduce private investment. In this case, private-
sector expenditure would decrease by as much as the increase in public 
expenditure.  
Most of the recent studies have shifted their attention to financial development as 
a key factor influencing the growth of private investment in developing countries, 
suggesting that financial development presents more opportunities and incentives 
to investors (Karagoz, 2010; Khan and Khan, 2007; Ribeiro and Teixeira, 2001). 
The empirical findings of these studies show that financial development and 
private investment have a positive relationship. In a developed financial system, 
the mobilization and distribution of resources will be more effective for investors 
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(Huang, 2006). The credit constraints that are a feature of less developed capital 
markets and inadequate financial intermediation have a negative influence on 
firms’ investment decisions (Shrestha and Chowdhury, 2005). Because of the 
absence of long-term financing and futures markets in developing countries, bank 
loans and external borrowing may be the only sources of credit available for the 
financing of private-sector investment.  
3.4.2 The effect of fiscal policy on private investment 
It has been broadly discussed that expansionary fiscal policies with high fiscal 
deficits cause a reduction in private investment, either by pushing interest rates up 
or by reducing the availability of private funds for financing investment, or both 
(interest rate/credit effect). However, a number of studies have questioned the 
validity of this statement, given that expansionary fiscal policies may lead to 
increases in public infrastructure that can benefit economic growth by enhancing 
the productivity of private investment (Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Oshikoya, 
1994). 
The theoretical assumption made by the Keynesians was that governments were 
justified in stimulating economic growth through the use of a deficit-causing 
fiscal policy. Their belief was that the economy was not at full employment and 
that the interest rate sensitivity of investment was low. Thus, increased 
government expenditure would cause a minimal increase in the interest rate whilst 
increasing output and income. Further, they argued that government expenditure 
would increase private investment due to the positive effect of government 
spending on the expectations of investors. Their argument was based on the 
principle of the multiplier effect, whereby a change in government spending 
would induce more than a proportionate change in output. 
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Overall, the effect of fiscal policy on private investment can be summarized as 
functioning through five channels (Ndikumana, 2008): 
(i) Investment can be impacted by fiscal policy through public infrastructure 
investment, which decreases the private costs of production, thereby 
raising profitability. 
(ii) Investment can also be stimulated through a predictable and credible fiscal 
policy that will build investor confidence. To achieve this, the government 
must not only implement low fiscal deficits, but must also be consistent in 
pursuing clear goals to which it commits in advance; that is, the 
government must overcome the problem of the time discrepancy of fiscal 
policy.  
(iii) Based on the view that investment is demand-constrained, fiscal policy 
influences investment by affecting domestic demand. A tight fiscal policy 
achieved through expenditure compression or tax increases thus leads to a 
decline in domestic aggregate demand, which harms sales and profit 
expectations, thus reducing the incentives to invest. 
(iv) Fiscal policy affects investment directly through tax policy that influences 
the cost of capital. 
(v) According to the view that investment is dependent on saving, fiscal 
policy influences private investment by affecting the volume of savings. A 
tight fiscal policy is deemed to promote private investment by increasing 
overall domestic saving and reducing interest rates.  
Looking at point (i) above, in many developing countries the deficiency of 
infrastructure is a substantial obstacle to private capital formation. Hence, an 
expansionary fiscal policy in the form of the provision of public goods and 
services, such as power plants, roads, communication utilities, irrigation, social 
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services, etc., can provide the private sector with significant benefits (Nwosa 
Philip Ifeakachukwu ,2013; Khan and Kumar, 1997; Montiel, 2011). This is most 
likely to be true in those developing countries where the existing stock of 
infrastructure capital is inadequate (Khan and Kumar, 1997) rather than in 
countries with high-quality and extensive public infrastructure. Thus, in the case 
of countries with extensive public infrastructure, there could be greater advantages 
to the private sector if public expenditure were targeted at improving the 
efficiency of infrastructure, as opposed to increasing its quantity (Chibber et al., 
1992; Ghura and Goodwin, 2000).  
With regards to point (ii), fiscal policy can also motivate private investment by 
building investor confidence through predictability and credibility of fiscal policy. 
Public investment in infrastructure might also signify a long-run adherence by the 
government to its policy programme of restructuring the economy, creating a 
more favourable environment for private investment projects (Aschauer, 1989; 
Badawi, 2003; Brownbridge, 1994). 
However, the overall net effect is theoretically less established and there are 
differences across countries in terms of both sign and magnitude. On the one 
hand, if fiscal deficits are caused by current public expenditure or non-
infrastructure investment, they tend to exert a negative influence on private capital 
formation. It is also argued, in the case of the provision of goods by public 
enterprises, that such enterprises are more competitive than complementary to the 
private sector (for example, in the manufacturing, mining and tourism sectors) as 
these activities require substantial funds, reducing the availability of private funds, 
and making private investors reluctant to invest and compete in these sectors 
(Chibber et al., 1992; Montiel, 2011).  
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It has also been argued that an increase in public investment could have an 
adverse effect on private investment indirectly via the public-sector budget 
constraint. If, for example, public investment were ﬁnanced through increases in 
taxation, this might exacerbate distortions in the economy and increase the costs 
of inputs, leading to an adverse effect on output growth and private investment. In 
line with this theoretical perspective, various empirical findings (Looney, 1997; 
Wai and Wong, 1982; Zou, 2006) have revealed that public investment crowds 
out private investment. 
The effect of restrictive fiscal policy on private investment is therefore 
ambiguous. Blejer and Khan (1984)  found that, in a number of developing 
countries, private investment complements public infrastructure investment but 
not other types of public investment. Similar results have been shown by various 
other studies using different country samples. This complementarity, however, 
does not rule out the possibility of the crowding out of private investment by high 
public deficits.  
However, the effect of a restrictive fiscal policy on private investment, one may 
conclude, should be positive. Decreasing public expenditure leads more private 
funds to become available, and interest rates to become low, leading to decreases 
in the cost of capital and the opportunity cost of retained profits as well. On the 
other hand, the way that a fiscal correction is made matters. For example, 
reducing fiscal deficit by cutting public infrastructure expenditure accompanied 
by insufficient government involvement in the economy may hamper the 
expansion of private investment due to the complementary relationship indicated 
by several empirical studies (Chee-Keong et al., 2010; Hassan and Salim, 2011; 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 2012; Naa-Idar et al., 2012).  
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3.4.3 Exchange rate regime and private investment 
Exchange rates are a key variable in macroeconomic policy design due to the fact 
that developing countries are highly dependent on imported inputs and capital 
goods. In general, there are three forms of exchange rate policy, namely, floating 
exchange rates, managed exchange rates, and fixed exchange rates (Maddison, 
2013). In most developed countries, a floating exchange rate regime is adopted, 
which means that there is no government intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, leaving the exchange rate to be determined only by the supply and 
demand in the market. Managed exchange rates, also termed managed floating, 
are generally allowed to adjust to equilibrium levels through the interaction of the 
supply and demand in the foreign exchange market, but with occasional 
intervention by the government. Finally, a fixed exchange rate is an exchange rate 
that is maintained at a specific level through government intervention (usually 
through the monetary policy actions of a central bank). To fix an exchange rate, a 
government must be willing to buy and sell currency in the foreign exchange 
market in whatever amounts are necessary to keep the exchange rate fixed. A 
fixed exchange rate typically disrupts the balance of trade and balance of 
payments of a country but it is the preferred regime in some developing countries 
(Montiel, 2011). 
Many international organizations, such as the WB and the IMF, support the idea 
of devaluation or depreciation of the currency in the case of developing countries, 
as a key element of economic growth that should accompany the financial aid and 
loans they provide to their member countries for the development of domestic 
production via the stimulation of net exports (Bahmani‐Oskooee and Kandil, 
2007). It increases the competitiveness of firms and the production of domestic 
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products and output and is an effective policy for countries running out of 
reserves and experiencing balance of payments deficits. The reason for this is that 
it is expected to increase the volume of exports and decrease the volume of 
imports. Indeed, typical adjustment programmes are designed in order to reduce 
expenditure on foreign-produced goods and shift it towards domestic goods 
through real currency devaluation (Taye, 1999). Therefore, devaluation of the 
currency will encourage domestic investment and improve the trade balance, thus 
increasing GDP in the long run.  
However, it is not easy, at least theoretically, to conclusively specify the effects of 
exchange rate policies. The difficulty arises mostly from the existence of various 
possible mechanisms that could produce different effects on private investment. 
The fact that such effects also differ between the short and the long run adds a 
further complication to the overall net effect. 
According to the literature, devaluation may affect investment through five 
channels (Chhibber et al., 1992; Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008):  
(i) by changing the real supply price of capital goods; 
(ii) by raising the real price of imported goods; 
(iii) by altering the distribution of income through real changes in wages and 
product prices, thus affecting profitability; 
(iv) by changing real income that affects the demand for domestically 
produced goods; and 
(v) by affecting nominal and real interest rates, which affect the supply price 
of capital. 
The effects of devaluation on private investment may operate differently in the 
short and long run via its impact on aggregate demand. When final demand is 
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encouraged after devaluation through an increase in the volume of exports and in 
the growth rate of the economy, the long-run effect of devaluation tends to be 
positive, although it is initially expected to be negative. Devaluation may even 
lead to a contractionary effect on output, at least in the short run (Montiel, 2003; 
Serven, 1989; Todaro and Smith, 2009). This argument is based on the possibility 
that devaluation could lower the consumption element of aggregate demand. In 
the absence of money wage increases, the inflationary effect of currency 
devaluation redistributes income from workers to producers. Since workers are 
said to have a high marginal propensity to consume compared to producers, total 
consumption declines as a result of currency depreciation (Van Wijnbergen, 
1982). 
Furthermore, Ribeiro and Teixeira (2001) explained that the exchange rate could 
influence the level of private-sector investment, as it is one of the components that 
determine the real cost of imports. Devaluation may have an adverse effect on 
investment, raising the cost of the imported component of new capital goods. As 
this reduces investment, especially in the non-tradable sector where output prices 
tend to decline relative to the tradable sector, it reduces the profitability of the 
private sector and may cause investment to decline. Furthermore, a real 
devaluation can mean a fall in the real income of the economy as a whole, thus 
decreasing production capacity and activity to levels that businesses find 
uncomfortably low. On the other hand, real currency devaluation can have a 
positive impact on investment in sectors producing internationally traded goods, 
as it increases competitiveness and export volumes (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
Therefore, to understand the effect of devaluation on domestic investment, one 
must look at both the supply and demand sides of an economy. On the demand 
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side, devaluation may have a contractionary or an expansionary effect, depending 
on the time horizon chosen. On the supply side, devaluation stimulates investment 
in the tradable goods sector, while it depresses it in the non-tradable goods sector. 
The magnitude of the two conflicting tendencies may depend on the relative sizes 
of the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The larger is the tradable goods sector 
relative to the non-tradable, the greater is the likelihood that, on average, 
investment will increase. Therefore, countries with a large export sector may 
benefit from devaluation. However, if these economies are highly dependent on 
imported capital goods and intermediate materials, investment may decline. The 
inflationary outcome of devaluation and the financial difficulties it creates for 
indebted firms could have a depressing effect on private investment (Chhiber et 
al., 1990; Serven, 1992). 
However, overvalued currency is another side of exchange rate policy that may 
affect private investment. Dorkin (1999) reported that an overvalued domestic 
currency could have a negative impact on private investment by causing aggregate 
demand to shift from domestic products to imports, due to the latter becoming 
cheaper. At the same time, the country's exports would decrease because the 
overvalued currency would make production expensive, increasing the prices for 
consumers abroad. Increased imports combined with decreased exports may lead 
to a troublesome deficit in a country's current account (Dorkin, 1999). Moreover, 
Chhibber e al., (1990) explained that an overvalued exchange rate might be 
beneficial only in the short run. The lower growth in exports due to the 
overvaluation would lower overall growth and reduce investment in the longer 
run. Therefore, an overvalued currency is not attractive for investment since it 
makes exports too expensive. It also has a negative impact on foreign investors 
wishing to repatriate their profits to their home country. 
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3.4.4 The effect of irreversibility and uncertainty on private investment in 
developing countries  
The other variable influenced by macroeconomic policies, which relates to the 
investment decision, is the irreversible nature of investment in capital goods. As 
was previously explained, a growing literature has focused attention on the, 
possibly large, impact of uncertainty on investment. Investment theories confirm 
that uncertainty and investment irreversibility can harm fixed investment 
decisions. The basic idea is that irreversibility, in this context, means that 
investment can be considered a sunk cost because capital, once installed, is firm- 
or industry-specific and cannot be sold or put to productive use in another activity, 
at least without incurring a substantial cost (Pindyck, 1991). This means that an 
irrecoverable cost is attached to the sale of such goods. This irreversibility results 
in uncertainty, which may have a considerable negative impact on the private 
investment decision. This may explain why investors are reluctant to make major 
investments, even during periods of prosperity. When an investment includes 
more irreversible features, excess volatility and related uncertainty could lead 
investors to seek profit opportunities in short-term portfolio projects rather than 
long-term, productive investments (Aysan et al., 2006; Karagoz, 2010). The cost 
attached to an investment relies on the degree of economic stability and the 
credibility of public policies. This is why recent studies on private investment in 
developing countries have incorporated variables representing uncertainties into 
models of the investment decision-making process (Agosin, 1994; Busari and 
Amaghionyeodiwe, 2007; Greene and Villanueva, 1995; Serven and Solimano, 
1992).  
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Furthermore, as shown by several studies, different forms of uncertainty can be 
used, such as economic instability and socio-political instability (Campos and 
Nugent, 2003; Pindyck, 1991; Serven, 2002). For developing countries, economic 
uncertainty can be measured in terms of volatility of output growth, inflation, the 
real exchange rate and terms of trade. Macroeconomic instability is an element 
that may lead to uncertainty, by creating an unreliable economic environment that 
prevents investors from benefiting from profit opportunities (Aysan et al., 2005). 
The macroeconomic instability indicator often refers to high inflation, a public 
deficit and foreign exchange volatility. High inflation rates, in addition to raising 
the cost of long-term financing, are expected to adversely affect private 
investment by increasing the risk associated with long-term investment projects. 
Similarly, a budget deficit and volatility of the exchange rate can lead to 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances and sudden economic policy reversals, 
which are likely to affect the profitability of long-term investment (Faini and De 
Melo, 1992; Larrain and Vergara, 1993; Serven and Solimano, 1992). 
Economic volatility is another factor that may lead to uncertainty. As noted 
earlier, volatility leads investors to search for profit opportunities in short-term 
portfolio investments rather than long-term productive projects, especially when 
an investment contains more irreversible features (Pindyck, 1991). Many 
researchers have shown that economic volatility has a negative impact on private 
investment (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Aysan et al., 2005; Bleaney and 
Greenaway, 2001).  
An important implication of the above discussion is that, if a goal of 
macroeconomic policy is to motivate private investment, then stability and 
credibility may be much more important than particular levels of tax and interest 
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rates or other factors in a country such as Iraq that has gone through prolonged 
economic and political instability. Overall, private investment is much more likely 
to be depressed under economic and political instability (Leonard, 2009). 
3.5 The Effects of Non-Economic Factors on Private Investment 
In addition to the economic factors reviewed above, there are some non-economic 
factors that have been identified in the literature as playing an essential role in 
motivating private investment growth in the case of the developing countries. 
These include good governance, improvement of the quality of institutions, 
political instability, and economic security. These factors are also important 
elements that allow the private sector to make substantial investment decisions 
based on a rational evaluation of risks and potential profits. These factors can play 
a complementary role alongside the traditional economic factors. It has been 
proposed that private investment and the enterprise strategies adopted are greatly 
influenced by the external environment in general, and the institutional context in 
particular (Karagoz, 2010). 
Recently, many studies have shifted their focus to the non-economic factors, due 
to the fact that these variables have caused major obstacles to the achievement of 
economic development, by limiting the volume of private investment in 
developing nations. These studies have supported the view that poor governance 
and government institutions are highly detrimental to entrepreneurial investment 
(North, 1990; Rodrik, 1996, 2001). 
The significance of good governance as part of the investment climate has been 
confirmed in many studies that contribute to reducing uncertainty and promoting 
efficiency (North, 1990). In this regard, and as reported by the World Bank, better 
governance improves the investment climate by improving bureaucratic 
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performance and predictability. This in turn reduces uncertainty, as well as the 
cost of doing business. Better governance also contributes to the effective delivery 
of public services that are necessary for productive business. It has also been 
confirmed that, in countries with good governance (political stability, low 
corruption, strong property rights), levels of private investment seem to be higher 
than in countries with poor governance (Khan and Khan, 2007; Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol, 2012; Udomkerdmongkol and Morrissey, 2008).  
Political instability is another non-economic factor that influences the growth of 
private investment in developing countries. Econometric evidence widely 
supports a negative relationship between aggregate investment and political 
instability since the latter increases uncertainty in the economy and discourages 
risk-averse entrepreneurs from taking action on profitable investment 
opportunities. The political stability index includes the aspects of government 
stability, internal conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tensions (Le, 2004). Many 
studies have used different indicators of political uncertainty. Instability prevents 
political institutions from ensuring property rights, which in turn increases the 
probability that returns on investments will be expropriated. As a result of the 
higher risk, less is invested (Aysan et al., 2006; Busari and Amaghionyeodiwe, 
2007).  
Both Karagoz (2010) and Ribeiro and Teixeira (2001) argued that prolonged 
economic and political instability was another form of uncertainty prevalent in 
developing countries. The low credibility of government policies and reform 
programmes, inefficient institutional structures and operating of the economy, and 
high debt burden – all common in these countries – act as the main sources of 
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such uncertainty, and eventually exert a negative impact on private investment 
decisions. 
The study by Le (2004) found a significant effect of political stability on 
investment. The study attempted to link private investment to several types of 
political risk, estimating the private investment equation for a panel of 25 
developing countries over 21 years. It achieved the following results: (i) socio-
political instability characterized by non-violent protests encourages private 
investment, while violent uprisings hinder private investment; (ii) regime change 
instability characterized by constitutional government change encourages private 
investment; and (iii) policy uncertainty characterized by variability of contract 
enforcement rights promotes private investment, while variability of government 
political capacity hinders private investment. 
Due to difficulties in measuring political instability, many empirical studies have 
measured it by a dummy variable to evaluate its effect on private investment. For 
example, the empirical investigations conducted recently by Kehinde et al. (2012) 
showed that growth in private investment was best explained by the political 
situation, explaining that  macroeconomic instability and the political situation 
represent large obstacles to private investment growth. The same conclusion was 
reached by Bakare (2009), who also measured political instability by using 
dummy variables. 
A secure environment is another non-economic factor that can affect private 
investment. It is identified by the literature as a key factor that helps to promote 
private investment and economic growth in developing countries. It does so by 
decreasing uncertainty about the return on investment. Security factors also 
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influence growth directly by enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, 
independent of their effect on private investment (Stasavage, 2002).  
Based on the above, non-economic factors such as good governance, improved 
institutional quality, political stability, and economic security are confirmed by 
the literature as playing significant roles in reviving the investment environment 
and attracting more private investment to developing countries. However, due to 
the limited studies on such factors and difficulties in measuring them, only 
political instability, which is more relevant to the case of Iraq, is considered in this 
study. 
3.6 Oil Revenues and Private Investment 
In the past, proponents of oil-led development believed that countries with an 
abundance of natural resources could base their development on such resources. 
They expected many benefits to materialize, such as enhanced economic growth, 
job creation, increased government investment, improvements in infrastructure 
services and technology transfer. However, in reality, very few of these benefits 
have been realised in oil-exporting countries. In addition to this, oil-exporting 
countries tend to suffer from a set of economic and political ailments (Auty, 
2001). Recent econometric studies have shown that countries that depend on oil 
exports – especially developing countries – tend to have certain characteristics, 
such as (i) slow economic growth (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001; Sachs and 
Warner, 1999, 2001), (ii) oil and mining sectors that have dominated total 
economic output and exports (Auty, 2001; Gylfason, 2001), (iii) unusually high 
corruption rates (Gylfason, 2001; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006); (iv) abnormally low 
rates of democratization (Lam and Wantchekon, 2002; Ross, 2003), and (v) a 
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much higher risk of civil war (Collier et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 
2003).  
In general, the more heavily a country relies on oil exports, the more likely it is to 
suffer from these problems. Iraq is an example of a country that is substantially 
dependent on oil and it has been highly subject to these tribulations. Against this, 
in developed countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada that have 
more successfully managed their oil revenues, the mining and oil sectors have 
never dominated total economic output. The oil sector contributes only a small 
percentage of total exports, and oil and mineral revenues have never been relied 
upon as an engine of economic growth (Karl, 2007). 
Therefore, this issue has been the focus of a number of studies in the last few 
decades that have analysed the relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth. Natural resources have been described as a “resource curse”, 
implying that negative growth and poor development outcomes are related with 
natural resources, and that these countries seem to grow more slowly than 
countries with scarce natural resources (Auty, 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Karl, 2007; 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).  
The key reason for the slow growth is that these countries have failed to produce 
growth in economic sectors other than the oil sector (Wood, 1999). A large 
petroleum industry and high dependence on oil exports reduced the opportunities 
for job creation by causing what is generally referred to as the “Dutch Disease” 
(Corden and Neary, 1982; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Karl (2007) explained the 
phenomenon of Dutch Disease, suggesting that it occurs when a booming 
minerals sector raises both the value of the real exchange rate and the cost of 
inputs for the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Both of these effects raise 
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the prices and hence reduce the international competitiveness of exports from the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The net result may be an absolute decline 
in aggregate activities and economic growth. Looney (2004) argued that, in oil-
exporting countries, the state often did not make an effort to find alternative 
sources of revenue, and had less motivation to develop non-oil wealth or to raise 
revenue through taxes. 
The unfortunate fact is that most oil-rich countries are underperforming across a 
whole range of economic, political, social, and governance standards (Karl, 2007). 
Large windfall gains associated with a rapid increase in oil prices have been a 
particular problem in that they seem to create severe conditions in the working of 
the economy and the political system, with strongly negative socio-political 
consequences (Stevens, 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argued that the 
governments in such countries usually did not encourage any steps towards 
reforms, because they were highly corrupt and took huge advantage of the 
resources. This, they said, distorted the allocation of resources and reduced both 
economic efficiency and social equity. Empirical evidence stresses that the civil 
conflict, cronyism, poor governance and corruption that has resulted from the oil 
revenue boom all tend to be obstacles to economic diversification and hinder 
economic efficiency and growth (Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1996). 
In addition to this, oil wealth can damage the economy of a country by creating 
economic volatility. Volatility tends to impact the economy in two ways: by 
causing macroeconomic shocks, and by making government revenues unstable. 
Unmanaged external shocks create a number of economic problems, including 
fiscal and monetary disequilibria and inflation, exchange rate appreciation, which 
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can hurt other export sectors, lower private investment, and the encouragement of 
capital flight (Ross, 2003). 
In oil-rich countries, a sudden rise in oil revenues might lead to an inefficient 
allocation of financial resources due to an acceleration of economic growth. This 
could encourage a government to lower its standards when choosing investments. 
With few exceptions, rapid growth in public investment leads to a reduction in the 
quality of such investment (Gelb, 1988). As a result, the investments are 
dissipated, and corruption and rent-seeking increase, ultimately harming private 
investment. 
Ross (2003) discussed the fact that revenue volatility may also cause uncertainty 
about future incomes and create instability in government policies and 
institutions, forcing investors to adopt a shorter planning horizon, and less 
encouraging them to move towards longer-term projects. 
The relationship between oil revenues and economic growth has implications for 
private investment. It has been argued that an increase in oil revenues allows 
governments to invest in economic infrastructure, and increases capital imports as 
well, which eventually reflect positively on economic growth. Furthermore, 
increased government investment in infrastructure produces higher efficiency (or 
lower production costs or transaction costs) and profitability, attracting more 
private investment. Increased government investment will also increase demand 
for private-sector products, thereby increasing investment in this sector. Private 
investment also benefits directly from cheap imports of technology and 
intermediate and capital goods (Looney, 2004; Ross, 2003).  
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On the other hand, a large windfall of gains, due to a rapid increase in oil prices, 
can encourage the state to make irrational decisions regarding expanding the level 
of investment. Since the economies in oil-rich countries have limited capacity for 
absorbing excessive investment, when combined with higher increases in oil 
revenues this leads to an inefficient allocation of financial resources to the public 
sector, creating unproductive investment which barely exerts a positive impact on 
economic growth. Moreover, the increase in imported consumer goods that is 
likely to result from a natural resource boom would decrease the competitiveness 
of domestic products and the relative productivity of private investments, leaving 
the private sector little motivation to invest in the tradable products sectors, and in 
turn harming economic growth (Mehara, 2011). An abundance of natural 
resources may also reduce private and public incentives to attract human capital 
because of high levels of non-wage income sources such as dividends, social 
spending, and low taxes (Abed and Davoodi, 2003).This view was confirmed by 
Gylfason and Zoega (2006), who observed that oil-rich countries with a heavy 
dependence on natural resources might harm saving and investment indirectly, by 
slowing down the development of the productive sector and the financial system.  
Several proposals have been put forward, by different studies, of ways to avoid 
the resource curse phenomenon (Collier et al., 2009; Hammond, 2011; Looney, 
2004; Mehrara, 2008; Merza, 2011; Richmond et al., 2013). One suggested the 
allocation of oil revenues to a separate account to which governments would have 
no direct access and would be unable to use for their own private advantage; this 
would allow a certain proportion of the oil revenues to be allocated to investment 
projects and developing deeper capital markets. Mehrara (2008) argued that if a 
country was unable to manage oil revenues optimally, it might be preferable to 
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leave the resources in the ground, where they would increase in value as oil 
became scarcer and prices increased. 
This section has demonstrated the impact of oil revenue on growth and investment 
in oil-exporting countries. It tends to be the case that these countries with the 
significant advantage of oil revenue have often promoted private investment to a 
lesser extent than other countries. Since the mining and oil sectors dominate total 
economic output, the oil sector contributes a high percentage of total exports, and 
these countries rely on the oil and mineral revenues as an engine of economic 
growth. However, inefficiencies in the system may result in the “resource curse” 
phenomenon.   
3.7 Private Investment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Economic theory attributes an essential role to FDI in fostering economic growth 
in developing countries. FDI has been observed to be an effective channel for 
transferring technology and creating employment. It influences economic growth 
through the adoption of new methods of production and enhances productivity by 
bringing competition into the economy. FDI also introduces a new knowledge 
base in the host country, adding to novice management and organizational skills, 
and explores hidden markets in the economy (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1993). It reduces barriers to the adoption of technology 
and improves the quality of labour and capital inputs in the host economy (de 
Mello Jr, 1997; Kim and Seo, 2003). 
With rising macroeconomic imbalances and the increasing need for investment to 
grow at a faster pace in developing countries, FDI flows have become 
increasingly important for providing macroeconomic stability. The greater the 
capital investment in an economy, the more favourable are its future prospects, 
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and FDI can be seen as an important source of capital investment and a 
determinant of the future growth rate of an economy.  
Recently, many countries have adopted more open economies and created 
investment-friendly environments so as to attract more investment and maximize 
the benefits in the host countries. Masuku and Dlamini (2009) empirically 
investigated the relative importance of locational determinants of FDI in 
Swaziland by employing a cointegration and error correction model. They 
concluded that the key factors in attracting FDI were infrastructure, per capita 
GDP, the extent of urbanization, and political and economic stability. They also 
noted that flexible and stable exchange rate policies were needed to attract FDI. 
More recent studies have pushed this argument further, suggesting that providers 
of FDI are no longer satisfied with traditional or underdeveloped physical 
infrastructure but are likely to seek out the best locations, historical background, 
market size, domestic growth-related factors, domestic entrepreneurial skills, 
skilled labour, provision of incentives in the form of tax exemptions and customs 
exemptions (Elboiashi, 2011; Haq, 2012; Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 
2012).   
Adams (2009) discussed two main points about how FDI affects the economic 
growth in these countries. First, it contributes to the economic development of the 
host country through the expansion of domestic capital and the boosting of 
efficiency through the transfer of new technology, innovation, marketing, and 
managerial skills and best practices. Secondly, the positive effect of FDI is 
determined by the country-specific conditions in general and the policy 
environment in particular, in terms of the ability to diversify, the level of 
absorption capacity, the targeting of FDI, and opportunities for linkages between 
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FDI and domestic investment. The conclusion was that FDI was a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for economic growth.  
However, much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between FDI and 
economic growth in the host countries. Recent investigators (Borensztein et 
al.,1998; Chudnovsky et al., 2008; Elfakhani and Matar, 2007; Frimpong and 
Oteng-Abayie, 2006; Kinoshita and Campos, 2004; Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol, 2012; Tang et al., 2008) have argued that this relationship 
may differ noticeably between countries and among industries. The effect of FDI 
on economic growth is associated with the absorptive capacity of the host country, 
and can vary according to the nature of the sectors within the host country. 
Gachino (2009) examined FDI by focusing on its positive spillovers, capability 
development and performance. The study revealed that FDI played a positive role 
in industrial development through spillover benefits. Alfaro (2003) revealed that 
FDI contributed positively to economic growth if it was directed towards the 
manufacturing sector, negatively in the primary sector, and ambiguously in the 
services sector. 
Despite these theoretical assumptions, the empirical literature on the growth 
effects of FDI provides varied evidence. The ambiguity of the evidence has been 
justified in the FDI literature in two ways. First, it has been argued that not all 
host countries are capable of benefiting from FDI externalities. Specifically, host 
countries need to reach a minimum threshold of absorptive capacity, including for 
example the development of the financial sector, the reduction of the technology 
gap, the development of infrastructure and the quality of human capital, etc., 
before they can benefit from the growth effects of FDI (Ali, 2010). The second 
argument is that not all types of FDI are capable of providing the host countries 
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with positive externalities. In particular, the positive growth effects attributed to 
FDI in the literature are confined to the manufacturing sector, while primary-
sector FDI, as just mentioned, has been found to have negative effects on growth 
(Alfaro, 2003; Aykut and Sayek, 2007; Tang et al., 2008). 
Moreover, researchers have shown an increased interest in identifying factors that 
determine the relationship between foreign and domestic investment. A study by 
Agosin and Mayer (2000) argued that the impact of FDI on total private 
investment relied on several factors, including the recipient country’s business 
environment and economic policy, types of FDI and the strength of domestic 
firms, but also relied on the relationship between FDI and domestic private 
investment. FDI that brings in goods and services that are new to a host country, 
particularly those using high technology, usually has positive effects on private 
investment. However, Misun and Tomsík, (2002) argued that FDI in sectors 
competing with domestic firms decreases investment opportunities for domestic 
investors. Even where FDI does not crowd out domestic private investment, it 
may not stimulate new downstream or upstream production and so may fail to 
exert a positive effect on domestic private investment. Potential spillovers from 
FDI to domestic firms may not be sufficient to stimulate private domestic 
investment; the contribution of FDI to technology transfer may be largely 
restricted to subsidiaries (Almeida and Fernandes, 2008), and spillovers may not 
significantly improve the efficiency of domestic firms (Girma and Gong, 2008).  
Tang et al. (2008) examined the causal link between FDI, domestic investment 
and economic growth in China for the period 1988-2003. The results illustrated 
that FDI, instead of crowding out domestic investment, had a more 
complementary effect, although domestic investment had a larger impact on 
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growth than FDI. These findings provide some support to the theoretical view that 
FDI complements domestic investment, and that long-run economic growth is 
positively associated with FDI. Consequently, FDI may not only help in 
overcoming capital shortages, but may also be a catalyst for economic growth, in 
complementing domestic investment, based on the evidence from China.  
According to the evidence reviewed above, since FDI complements domestic 
investment, less developed countries must encourage FDI inflows, for which 
appropriate FDI policies and regulations are required. For instance, host 
governments should not only promote FDI inflows, they should also impose 
regulations on foreign companies to motivate them to undertake export 
obligations or to invest in high-risk areas or in resource industries where domestic 
investment is limited. FDI should also be encouraged to invest in the primary and 
secondary industries, and in the less developed regions. Additionally, host 
governments could impose regulations on foreign companies to increase the 
generation of employment in the country. 
3.8 Summary  
The mysterious nature of investment behaviour is well reflected by the expansive 
literature on the topic. This chapter has focused on different streams of literature 
on the determinants of private investment in different countries, in order to clarify 
the nature of investment in developing countries. The major objective of this 
chapter has been to examine a highly selective portion of the existing literature, so 
as to identify factors that influence private investment in developing countries, 
and to examine more effective policies for stimulating such investment. This 
chapter has also attempted to cover a variety of topics relevant in modelling 
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private investment, and to provide an idea of the significance of existing 
investment models for developing countries. 
Most of the empirical studies examining determinants of private investment to 
date have been based on the modified neoclassical flexible accelerator model. It 
has been widely argued that, once modified, the neoclassical flexible accelerator 
model is applicable to developing countries (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Sundararajan 
and Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 1982). In these studies, however, the degree of 
modification required has varied from minimal to fundamental.  
More recently, attention has focused on investment trends and behaviour in 
developing countries, mainly stimulated by changing fundamental economic 
policies that have emphasized the importance of a market-based, private-sector-
driven economy with a strong private investment response. Since the 1970s, 
studies have attempted to highlight the interactions between macroeconomic 
policies and private investment, indicating that the private sector has become 
more motivated to invest and participate in capital formation.  
A large number of the published studies state that there are two basic types of 
factors that could influence private investment, namely economic and non-
economic. Economic factors include gross domestic production, the real interest 
rate, public-sector investment, the amount of available credit, the volume of 
external debt, the inflation rate, the exchange rate and others. Non-economic 
factors include the quality of governance, political stability, corruption and 
economic security. 
Finally, the impacts of natural resources such as oil revenue and FDI have been 
taken into consideration in this chapter, and it has been confirmed that they play a 
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substantial role in stimulating private investment. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that not all of the variables discussed above will be included in our model of the 
determinants of private investment, as data on some variables do not exist or are 
inadequate, and some are irrelevant to the case of Iraq. 
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CHAPTER 4 MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND COMARATIVE ROLE 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN IRAQ 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Iraq is located in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia and is also 
bordered by Jordan and Syria to the west, Kuwait to the south, and Turkey to the 
north (see Appendix A). It has a land area of 437,072 square kilometres, with an 
estimated population in 2014 of around 36 million, 97% of whom are Muslims, 
mainly Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Per capita income for the country was estimated 
at US$6,900 in 2012 (IMF, 2013). 
The country’s economy was based solely on agriculture until the 1950s, but after 
the 1958 revolution, extensive economic development began. In the 1970s, Iraq 
had an impressive annual economic growth rate of over 10% in real terms and 
similarly large growth in investments (Gal, 2013). Oil resources had allowed the 
country to reach a middle-income status with modern infrastructure and good 
education and healthcare systems. By 1980, Iraq had the second largest economy 
in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia and the third largest in the Middle East, and 
had developed a complex, centrally planned economy dominated by the state. 
However, between 1980 and 2003, Iraq experienced three long wars and severe 
international economic sanctions, effectively ending the positive achievements of 
the 1970s. Since then, the economy has suffered from over 20 years of neglect and 
degradation of its infrastructure, environment and social services. Key social and 
economic indicators were severely affected when the economy moved from 
positive growth and development in the 1970s to a retraction and eventual 
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collapse in the 1980s. Income per capita, for example, which rose to over 
US$3,600 in the early 1980s following sharp rises in oil prices, is estimated to 
have fallen to as low as US$200 in the early 1990s, before recovering to an 
estimated US$770-1,020 by 2001 (World Bank, 2003). The latter figure was still 
only about 20-30% of the values seen in the 1980s.  
Development regressed mainly because the economic policies adopted were 
aimed at supporting war efforts and resisting sanctions, with very little 
consideration given to developmental progress. The Iraqi economy was trapped in 
a cycle, and investment activities seriously declined as a result of both a severe 
lack of resources and years of instability in the economy, social and political 
conditions, and security, which continue to threaten development efforts today. 
Although per capita income increased from US$770-1,020 in 2001 to US$6,900 
in 2012, since 2012 there has been further instability in the country, which may 
have eroded such gains, sending the country back to where it was in the early 
2000s. 
In addition to the political and economic instability, the main challenge for the 
Iraqi economy is diversification. The oil sector’s dominance in the economy is the 
highest among all oil exporters in the Middle East. Oil exports account for 95% of 
total exports and government revenues from oil exports make up about 70% of the 
GDP (Rivlin and Gal 2014). The latter rates in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are 
around 50-55% of GDP, and in Iran 25%. The large oil exports provide the Iraqi 
economy with sufficient funds to finance the huge investments required for the 
development of the oil and gas sector. However, the rehabilitation and 
development of its economic infrastructure, the diversification of the economy to 
fields other than the energy sectors, and the realization of these investments, are 
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encountering non-financial obstacles such as political instability. For long-term 
sustainable growth, Iraq needs to diversify its economic base and increase its 
levels of international trade, which will require increased private investment. The 
private sector is a key mechanism for long-term sustainable growth, but seems to 
have been neglected in Iraq. 
In the last four decades, Iraq has shown an inability to manage its annual budget 
in terms of allocating investments efficiently, and has failed to create an economy 
that allows for progress and development. The purpose of this chapter is to shed 
some light on the historical trends in Iraq’s key macroeconomic indicators and to 
evaluate the role the public sector and private investment have played in Iraq’s 
economic performance over the last forty years.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
historical overview of Iraq’s economy, while the effects of the oil and non-oil 
sectors on Iraq’s economy are described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 examines 
macroeconomic policies including fiscal and monetary policies. Section 4.5 
considers key macroeconomic indicators, including the trends in GDP and GDP 
per capita, evaluates the role of public and private investment, and assesses the 
labour force and employment in Iraq. The final section provides a summary of the 
chapter. The discussion is a reflection of the exposition in chapter 3 and underpins 
the analysis to come in Chapters 6 – 8.  It also helps to explain the poor state of 
private investment in the country and to identify the policies needed to increase 
such investment and enable it to play the role required  in economic growth. 
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4.2 A Historical Overview of Iraq’s Economy 
Before oil discovery and exploration began in the 1950s, Iraq’s economy was 
based exclusively on agriculture. However, the nationalization of the oil industry 
in the early 1970s provided Iraq with a source of sustainable financial strength, 
leading to the adoption of expansionary fiscal policies that stimulated economic 
activity, motivated the production cycle, and encouraged consumption. Since 
then, industrial development, diversification and manufacturing have gone 
through numerous phases in Iraq. In the mid-1970s, a strong emphasis was placed 
on the agriculture sector, the aim being to apply an import substitution policy, and 
the government established food-processing industries in smaller towns 
throughout the country. Despite the emphasis on the agriculture sector, the main 
focus of development was on the petroleum sector, refining, natural gas 
processing and the development of chemical industries in Basra and Kirkuk where 
are located in South and North of a country. The concrete and building supplies 
industry also expanded rapidly.  
By the late 1970s, the emphasis in development planning had shifted towards 
heavy industry and diversified away from oil. Iron and steel production was set 
up, with French assistance, at Khor al-Zubair (which located in South East of a 
country)and the defence sector was given a high priority. The economy 
experienced high rates of growth in the 1970s, which were significantly reflected 
in the country’s standard of living and allowed the population to enjoy economic 
and social prosperity. At the same time, however, the spending policy of the 
1970s caused a host of issues, including increases in the consumer price index and 
higher import rates, leading to balance of payment deficits. Generally, the final 
outcomes of the 1970s seem to have been positive when evaluated using locally 
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and internationally recognized economic and social development measures, which 
will be clarified in the following sections (Alnasrawi, 1994). 
Since the 1980s, Iraq has experienced three major wars (the long war with Iran 
(1980-1988) and the two Gulf Wars with the United States and its allies (1991 and 
2003)) and close to a decade of harsh international sanctions in the period 
between the two Gulf Wars, all of which has had an enormous economic toll on 
the country. Poor economic performance in this period can also be attributed to 
the lack of challenge to the economy’s concentration on oil and the country’s ill-
defined objectives. Certainly, as was the case for all other sectors of the economy, 
manufacturing and industrial diversification was scaled down when the Iran-Iraq 
War began, and has never recovered. 
At the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule in 2004, Iraq’s GDP per capita was a third 
lower than it had been in the early 1980s, while most Arab states’ GDP had 
doubled or tripled in size during the same time span. As a result, Iraq went from 
being one of the wealthiest, most developed Arab states to one of the poorest 
(Figure 41.) 
Figure  4.1: Iraq’s GDP per capita in comparison to other Arab States, 2004 
and 2012 (US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: IMF (2012); Gal (2013), P 3. 
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Thus, the combined effect of wars and sanctions caused dramatic fluctuations in 
Iraq's oil production and economic involvement in the world market. The 
country’s oil infrastructure was also severely damaged, while UN sanctions from 
1990 to 2003 severely limited Iraq's ability to export oil and gain access to the 
latest technology to develop its fields, with repercussions for other sectors of the 
economy (Crocker, 2004). 
After Saddam Hussein’s demise, the Iraqi economy stabilized, despite political 
and security-related difficulties. Moreover, until recent years, Iraq has enjoyed 
accelerated economic growth, caused by a leap in oil exports. There have been 
important effects, both in the regional context and in the context of the global oil 
market. The most essential development has been the significant and continuing 
growth in Iraqi oil production and exports. Oil production has reached 3 million 
barrels per day (bpd), a doubling of the production levels seen at the end of 
Saddam Hussein’s rule. Iraq  became the second largest oil producer and exporter 
in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia, and the third largest oil exporter in the 
world, after Saudi Arabia and Russia, replacing Iran, which moved to the fifth 
largest in the Middle East (Alnasrawi, A. (1994). 
By 2003, the country had witnessed efforts to abandon central government control 
over the economy, to create independent financial and private sectors, to bring 
physical infrastructure up to adequate levels, to reduce unemployment and to 
enhance the overall economy. These goals were designed to serve the overarching 
objective of creating a new and united Iraq with a liberal economy. The economy 
began a transition to a market economy. Policy changes meant that the decades of 
heavy regulation, and the largely state-owned economy of the 1970s, had given 
way by 2003 to a much weakened public sector (Mahdi, 2007). This was a radical 
 92 
 
shift from the Baath party’s 2  conception of the private sector as not only 
exploitative but a threat to its power. The private sector is now subject to fewer 
restraints but has yet to emerge from the shadows of state patronage and oil 
dependence.  
It is worth mentioning that, after 2003, Iraq faced a particular challenge in terms 
of reconstruction and development, with a transition that was not only economic, 
but also fundamentally political and social. In the period of 2005-2007, the 
government managed to substantially increase investment in the oil and non-oil 
sectors. However, these efforts were again hampered by outdated infrastructure, 
violence and limited administrative capacity, which kept the rate of 
implementation of the investment budget low during 2005 and 2006 (Grigorian 
and Kock, 2010).  
Despite the importance of the economy, in terms of its potential to contribute 
towards social, political, and security-related stability, it has received the least 
attention from the Iraqi authorities. Looney (2004) argued that economic recovery 
in Iraq must be part of a comprehensive strategy oriented towards creating a 
virtuous circle, in which improved security leads to economic gains that in turn 
facilitate improvements in governance and market reforms. 
In summary, Iraq’s environment of economic development over the past 40 years 
has exhibited five key features:  
(i) Oil revenue has been the main source of financing for the development 
process. This has detracted from the role and importance of other 
                                                 
2
 The Baath party, usually called the Arab Socialist Baath party famously headed by Saddam 
Hussein, ruled Iraq between 1968 and 2003. At the beginning of this period, the country 
experienced high economic growth and soaring prosperity, but its rule ended with Iraq facing 
social, political, and economic stagnation.  
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financing sources, particularly taxes. Sectorial financing policies are 
unable to generate an economic surplus that can effectively contribute 
to the financing process. 
(ii) In the past, centrality was the approach adopted for managing the Iraqi 
economy, with the public sector playing a critical role in the 
development process, while the private sector had no impact and was 
even distanced from the economic arena. Though the Saddam regime 
did encourage privatization in the late 1980s, it was unsuccessful 
because of the continuing conflicts, and the lack of financing and 
support for private business owners in Iraq. 
(iii) Capital accumulation has been achieved through the transfer of oil 
revenues to other economic sectors in the form of fixed assets. There 
has been no contribution to capital accumulation from technological 
advancement or higher productivity rates. 
(iv) There is no rational basis for distributing income between investments 
and consumption. This has discouraged process development in Iraq, 
and reduced the standards for sustainable development that would 
improve the quality of life. 
(v) There has been a lack of coordination and cooperation, and 
divisiveness among various branches of economic policy. This has 
particularly been the case with fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and 
other financial policies, which has exacerbated the severity of 
unemployment, inflation and the spread of administrative corruption. 
4.3 The Effect of the Oil and Non-Oil Sectors on Iraq’s Economy 
Although oil exploration in Iraq dates back to the latter part of the 19
th
 century, oil 
was first struck in commercial quantities in 1927. The multinational Iraq 
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Petroleum Company (IPC) received three concessions from the Iraqi government 
that covered the whole of Iraq. British Petroleum, Shell Petroleum and 
Compaignie Francais des Petroles were the partners of IPC (Crocker, 2004). 
Iraq’s oil revenues largely benefited from these concessions until the price 
revolution of 1952 occurred. The concessions stipulated that the Iraqi government 
receive a fixed payment per unit of production, which in practice did not exceed 
5% of actual revenues. In 1952, a new agreement between the Iraqi government 
and IPC entitled the government to receive 50% of the profits from oil exports, as 
well as up to 12.5% of the net production, which it could sell at any price (Ozlu, 
2006). 
The significance of the new agreement for the Iraqi economy was that, for the first 
time, the government acquired a direct interest in crude oil prices. With the United 
States becoming a net importer of oil in 1948, and with the worldwide increase in 
the demand for crude oil, Iraq expanded its oil output. Government revenue per 
barrel increased from $0.222 in 1950 to $0.84 in 1952 (Alnasrawi, 1994). 
Oil production accelerated from 0.09 million bpd in 1949 to 0.697 million bpd in 
1952. The resulting upsurge in oil revenue, which went from Iraqi dinar (ID) 31 
million to ID 74 million during the same period, led to a policy of allocating a 
high proportion of the oil revenue to development purposes. At the time, the 
policy was further strengthened by the WB, which provided about $12.8 million 
in loans to Iraq under the condition that it created an independent plan for 
development (Hasan, 1970).  
The result was the creation of the first “Development Board” in 1950 by the 
monarchy, which was ruling Iraq at that time. Multiyear plans were produced, 
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with an emphasis on three major fiscal priorities: agricultural development 
(including irrigation and flood control), transportation and communication, and 
construction. The broadly set ambitious development goals covered four key 
periods between 1951 and 1961. They proposed a large amount of capital 
investment in agriculture, transportation and communication, building, and 
housing, but limited attention was given to industry and the development of 
human resources. 
In 1968 the political situation changed, when the Baath party seized power from 
the previous military regime via a coup d'etat. The nature of the Baath party’s 
regime caused a significant shift in Iraq’s economic policy. The party ruled from 
1968 until 2003, and began its economic change by shifting away from the 
military rules and multiyear economic plan, later formulating its own plan aimed 
at taking control of Iraq’s economy.  
The first National Development Plan (NDP) formulated by the new government 
covered the period of 1970-1974. Despite the new government’s adoption of a 
socialist approach and introduction of radical change, the development plan 
continued on the theme of past development plans that had overemphasized the 
agriculture sector. As shown in Table 4.1, the agriculture sector received 73% of 
the amount targeted for it in the planned budget, while the manufacturing 
industry, construction sector and transportation and communication sector 
received 44%, 40% and 67% of their respective targets (al-Ameen, 1981; 
Alnasrawi, 1994). 
Despite the shortage of economic data for this period, growth rates for some 
sectors between 1975 and 1980 can be derived, as shown in Table 4.2.  According 
to an OPEC report, in the 1970s, both the oil and non-oil sectors grew rapidly. 
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World oil prices were high, and Iraq’s oil production increased from 1.5 million 
bpd in 1970 to 3.2 million bpd in 1979, as shown in Figure 4.2. Rising oil 
revenues allowed the government to implement investment programmes outside 
the oil sector, so that the non-oil economy grew as well (Alnasrawi, 1994). 
Following the introduction of the NDP, annual investment programmes were 
adopted. 
Table  4.1: NDP Targets and Actual Values for Certain Economic Indicators, 
1974 (ID Millions) 
 
Economic Indicator Target Actual 
Actual % to 
Target 
GDP 1163 3347 288% 
Oil Extraction 409 2023 495% 
Total Exports 465 1943 418% 
Total Imports 263 906 344% 
Agriculture 317 232 73% 
Manufacturing Industry 401 176 44% 
Construction 174 69 40% 
Transportation and Communication 186 124 67% 
Electricity and Water 35 14 40% 
Private Consumption 684 1047 153% 
Public Consumption 321 477 149% 
Employment (Thousands) 3165 2800 88% 
 
Sources: Arab Monetary Fund (1983); Ozlu (2006), P 14. 
 
Table  4.2: Average Growth Rates for Economic 
Sectors, 1975 - 1980 
 
GDP 11.00% 
Mining 6.50% 
Agriculture 2.60% 
Manufacturing  14.20% 
Construction 15.80% 
Transportation and Communication 20.30% 
Government Services 13.20% 
 
Sources: Arab Monetary Fund (1983); Ozlu (2006), P 15.  
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Furthermore, during 1976-1980, oil production and revenues increased rapidly, 
resulting in oil GDP increasing from US$9,218 million in 1976 to US$19,451 
million in 1980, at 2005 prices (see Appendix B1). Consequently, Iraq had a 
balance of payments surplus of US$40 billion and the government budget 
increased from a mere ID 61 million in 1976 to ID 1.6 billion in 1990 (Ozlu, 
2006). This led to a change in the second NDP (1974-1980) in favour of capital-
intensive industries. According to Sanford (2003), the Iraqi government budget 
over 1974-1980 allocated US$14.2 billion to economic development, producing 
heavy industrial complexes such as the petrochemical complex in Basra and the 
iron and steel mill at Khor al-Zubair, and developing sulphur and phosphate 
extraction and processing, and fertilizer industries. 
In addition to that, increasing oil exports and a surplus budget allowed the 
government to play a mediating role in distributing the huge oil rent to Iraqi 
citizens and economic sectors. For example, they encouraged the government to 
increase its expenditure on different sectors, such as education, health 
infrastructure, fuel and electricity services, and also to provide subsidies for the 
main food commodities, fuel and electricity. As a result, the second half of the 
1970s witnessed a high rate of growth in national income, per capita income, 
industrial growth, construction, and public and private consumption. 
As mentioned previously, before the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had one of the most 
prosperous and advanced economies in the Arab world. It was an upper-middle-
income economy with a substantial middle class, considerable technical capacity, 
some female participation in education and the economy, and decent standards of 
education and healthcare (Ozlu, 2006; Sanford, 2003). Iraq’s economic collapse 
began with the onset of its eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s; the country 
encountered major challenges in terms of declining oil revenue, oil prices and 
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production, and it was difficult for the government to control the structural 
imbalance in the economy and the fiscal deficit. Oil production almost stopped in 
the month after the war began, and Iraq’s Gulf port facilities were destroyed. 
Production averaged slightly less than 1 million bpd from 1981 to 1985, 
recovering to just below 2 million bpd the year after the war (Figure 4.2).  
Figure  4.2: Oil Production in Iraq during 1970-2010 
 
Source: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (various years). 
 
After the war, Iraq experienced various economic crises, such as reductions in 
economic growth, the level of capital accumulation and national income, along 
with increases in the rate of unemployment and poverty. By 1987, the growing 
economic burdens of the Iran-Iraq War had resulted in a decline in government 
spending due to the fall in oil revenue. However, these circumstances forced 
Saddam Hussein’s regime to change its policy from one of strict socialism to 
more pragmatic economic regulation, including some economic liberalization for 
example, in order to escape from the economic crisis related to the war and the 
declining oil prices and production. 
The new programme included: (1) the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) such as Iraqi Airways, bus companies, gas stations, agricultural 
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enterprises, department stores and factories; (2) incentives for foreign companies 
to operate in Iraq through the relaxing of restrictions on foreign direct investment; 
and (3) the removal of controls on commodity prices. Overall, however, one can 
conclude that these policies did not help Iraq’s economy to recover, but in fact 
caused further economic problems, such as the depreciation of the real exchange 
rate (RER) for the Iraqi dinar in the financial market, a failure to control inflation 
rates, and declining government support for basic commodities, which eventually 
led to a deterioration in the standard living for most Iraqi citizens. 
The war had major economic consequences, which can be regarded as another set 
of root causes of Iraq’s current economic problems. At the end of the eight-year-
long war, Iraq’s total monetary losses were estimated to be US$452.6 billion, 
including: (1) US$91.4 billion in potential gross national product (GNP) losses in 
the oil sector as well as manufacturing, agriculture, energy, telecommunications, 
housing and health; (2) US$197.7 billion in oil revenue losses; (3) US$78.8 
billion of losses in foreign exchange reserves, comprising US$35 billion in 
original reserves plus the loss of accumulated interest over the duration of the 
war; and (4) US$80 billion of potential losses in foreign exchange reserves 
resulting from the high degree of military spending (NDP, 2010-2014; IMF, 
2003). 
When Iran started negotiations with Syria against Iraq, it caused the suspension of 
about 2.5 million bpd of Iraq's oil export capacity, which reflected negatively on 
Iraq’s economy. An estimate of the war’s negative effects on the Iraqi economy 
from an oil revenue perspective is provided by the fact that Iraq’s total national oil 
revenue from 1931 to 1988 was US$179.3 billion, while, according to the Baath 
regime, its spending during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War came to 254% of 
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the entire oil revenue that Iraq had received in the previous 57 years (Sanford, 
2003). 
However, the Iran-Iraq War proved insignificant when compared to the economic 
disaster that faced Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 
August 1990. By 1991, instead of the Iraqi government being able to focus on 
Iraq’s economic challenges, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait had caused a new war, 
ending in defeat by a US-led coalition. This defeat devastated the already weak 
Iraqi economy, damaged the country’s infrastructure, and led to the imposition of 
strict economic sanctions (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2008). A further major interruption 
to the flow of oil revenues came about due to the second Persian Gulf War, when 
the UN embargo imposed on Iraq following the invasion caused Iraq’s economy 
to be isolated from all kinds of international transactions. This drove the country 
to near collapse, its oil production declining from a peak of 2260 thousand bpd 
before the invasion to approximately 60 thousand bpd in 1994 following the 
United Nations Security Council’s decision, (see Appendix B1). According to 
Foote et al. (2004), oil production was held at a level close to that of domestic 
consumption (about 500,000 bpd) until 1996. 
Following the negotiations between the UN and Iraq under the “Resolution 986” 
in 1991, Iraq was allowed to export a limited amount of oil in return for basic 
foodstuffs and medication. However, in 1996, an “oil for food” programme was 
officially implemented and provided Iraq with opportunities to export oil to 
finance the purchase of humanitarian goods, in an effort to mitigate human 
suffering in the country. All Iraqi oil revenues earned under the programme were 
held in a UN-controlled escrow account that could not be accessed by the Iraqi 
government (Katzman, 2003). 
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Merza (2007) argued that both the oil and non-oil sectors began to grow to some 
extent in the early 1990s. However, in the late 1990s, the international sanction 
regime strangled all economic activity in Iraq except oil production, since oil was 
the only item the country was allowed to export (IMF, 2003). As a result, oil GDP 
in real prices increased markedly to US$35,798 million in 2001, from US$7,778 
million in 1994. In contrast, non-oil GDP dropped to US$384 million in 2001, 
from US$6,171 in 1994, remaining severely depressed in comparison to the 
values of the 1970s, as Figure 4.3 shows. 
Figure  4.3: Oil and Non-Oil GDP at Constant Prices (2005=100), 1970 - 2010 
 
Sources: OPEC (various years).  
 
Eventually, after the demise of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Iraq emerged 
from conflict, isolation and international economic sanctions. The economy had 
deteriorated heavily, due to decades of heavy state control over all kinds of 
economic activity, successive wars, a decade of international sanctions and the 
looting that followed the invasion. However, after the constitution was approved, 
a new democratically elected government was established. The new state began 
efforts to build foundations for new, stable governance and economic growth 
(Benson, 2012). 
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By 2003, the US had lifted the sanctions and was providing major support for 
economic liberalization reforms. In 2004, power was transferred back to Iraq, 
allowing the government to open the way for the resumption of oil exporting. 
With revenues added to the development funds held by Iraq’s central bank, the 
country witnessed greater efforts to create financial independence and renew the 
private sector, rebuild physical infrastructure, reduce unemployment levels and 
enhance the overall economy. These goals were designed to create a new and 
united Iraq with a liberal economy. 
According to data published by the WB, from 2003 to 2005 the economy of Iraq 
relied heavily on oil GDP. For example, in 2005, oil GDP rose to US$35,884 
million, comprising 96% of total GDP, with non-oil GDP decreasing sharply to 
US$384 million from a figure of US$1,623 million in 2003. The central bank also 
projected that oil exports would account for 97% of Iraqi national budget revenues 
between 2004 and 2007 (Ozlu, 2006). However, post conflict in 2007, economic 
reforms were established and included building a market-based financial system, 
setting up a functioning governing institution, reconstructing critical sectors of the 
economy such as manufacturing and agriculture, privatizing SOEs, providing 
basic services such as power, education, electricity, health and water, and creating 
jobs, as well as stabilizing the country’s relationship with the world. Based on 
these economic reforms, the share of oil to GDP decreased, from 83% and 85% in 
2007 and 2008 respectively, to 69% in 2009. Meanwhile, the average growth rate 
of oil GDP during 2007-2009 was zero, and growth in non-oil GDP was 42%.  
However, Iraq inherited many economic problems from the former regime, such 
as the still ongoing effects of the hyper-inflation that had occurred in the 1990s, a 
high rate of unemployment, depreciation of the Iraqi exchange rate, low 
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productivity in the commodity sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, 
etc.), external debt, undeveloped education and health systems, and 
underdeveloped infrastructure services.  
The outcomes of past and ongoing reform efforts remain far from meeting the 
needs and expectations of the Iraqi people. Despite increasing oil export revenue, 
growing national income and the adoption of several NDPs to improve economic 
performance in the country, the Iraqi government has failed to achieve either 
economic progress or political stability, due to its lack of a clear strategy for 
economic development since April 2003. This has caused further deterioration in 
several key indicators, especially an increase in the number of unemployed, a 
further decline in public services, particularly electricity and water, and emerging 
administrative corruption that has harmed economic performance in both 
agriculture and manufacturing. Thus, with its economic and political instability 
and devastating security climate, the country has been unable to create an 
environment for investment, whether private or public, domestic or foreign, that is 
needed as a driver for sustainable and diversified economic growth (Merza, 2011). 
4.4 Macroeconomic Policies 
As observed in Chapter 3, macroeconomic policies are the set of government rules 
and regulations used to control or stimulate the aggregate indicators of an 
economy. There are two main regulatory macroeconomic policies, fiscal and 
monetary, in addition to exchange rate adjustments. In recent years, fiscal and 
monetary policies in Iraq have been completely subordinated to political 
objectives. 
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4.4.1 Fiscal policy 
According to the economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), the concept of 
fiscal policy involves governments altering the levels of taxation and government 
spending in order to influence aggregate demand and the level of economic 
activity (Montiel, 2011). The key purposes of fiscal policy in any economy are 
basically to (1) stabilize economic growth and achieve lower unemployment, (2) 
keep inflation low, and (3) achieve sustained but controllable economic growth. 
For example, in a recession, governments will stimulate the economy with deficit 
spending (expenditure exceeds revenue), while during a period of expansion they 
will restrain a fast-growing economy with higher taxes and aim for a surplus 
(revenue exceeds expenditure). Fiscal policy is often used alongside monetary 
policy.  
Iraq faces great fiscal policy challenges following more than 30 years of sanctions 
and conflict, which have resulted in huge infrastructure and social needs. Oil 
revenue accounts for the vast majority of government income and output. As 
noted earlier, the oil sector has contributed more than half of GDP since 1974. 
The importance of the oil sector can also be seen from its substantial contribution 
towards financing annual budgets, the development plans and the balance of 
payments. For example, as shown in Table 4.3, the contribution of oil revenues, at 
current prices, during 1970-1979, was as high as 81.4% of ordinary budget 
revenues, 90.2% of total development revenues, and 98.2% of foreign exchange 
earnings (Mahdy, 1984). 
In Iraq, the majority of government revenues come from oil exports rather than 
alternative financial resources. Taxation, as a fiscal mechanism and a vital source 
of government revenue, makes a negligible contribution to the country’s 
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economy. Iraq’s oil wealth means that it does not have to levy domestic taxes. 
Furthermore, the  government believed that adopting a non-tax regime might be 
valuable and could stimulate business, since Iraq’s exports of natural resources 
could put upward pressure on its RER and thereby limit non-oil exports, the so-
called “Dutch disease3” (Karl, 2007).  
Table  4.3: Contribution of Oil Revenue to Annual Budgets, Development 
Plans and Exports, 1970-1979 
 
 Oil Revenue 
 Million Dinar 
Total Expenditure 
(receipts)  
Million Dinar 
Ratio of Oil Revenue 
to Total Expenditures 
(%) 
Ordinary Budget  9,131.4 11,217.9 81.400 
Development Plans  7,534.1 8,352.6 90.201 
Exports  20,881.2 21,264.8 98.196 
    Source: Mahdy (1984), P 12. 
 
Following the oil revenue boom of the 1970s that came as a result of increasing 
oil prices and export quantities, the Iraqi government was encouraged to set an 
objective of balanced growth and a self-sustaining economy. Therefore, during the 
five-year plan of 1970-1974, it revised its budget in favour of gross investment.   
In the 1970s, the government adopted a policy of allocating all income 
surpluses to the investment plan after the consumption budget had been 
satisfied, regardless of efficiency of projects or the expected rate of 
return, aiming to diversify the economy rather than rely on one resource. 
However, the increase in government spending and excessive allocation 
                                                 
3
 “Dutch Disease” was named after the problems experienced by the Netherlands following its 
initial exploitation of its vast domestic reserves of natural gas. The rapid growth in petroleum 
exports led to an appreciation of the exchange rate and put upward pressure on the costs and prices 
of non-traded domestic goods and services, diminishing their competitiveness and eroding the 
diversity and balance of the domestic economy. Similar symptoms have subsequently been 
identified in almost all countries where petroleum exports play a major economic role. The arrival 
of oil devastated all three of Nigeria’s traditional agricultural export industries, for example (Karl, 
2007). 
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encouraged government agencies to propose various unsound projects 
without conducting accurate feasibility studies, simply so as to fully 
spend their large budgets. Meanwhile, bottlenecks and shortages resulting 
from large amounts of investment and excessive demands on resources 
may have created a new cycle of unsound projects, as attention shifted to 
eliminating those shortages for political or social reasons. 
Consequently, the amount of investment was determined largely by the 
expected income from oil, with no real consideration of the opportunity 
cost of capital. It can be concluded that the approach adopted by the Iraqi 
government in the 1970s was contrary to the stated objectives of balanced 
growth and a self-sustaining economy. 
Iraq’s fortunes began to change in the 1990s, particularly after the second 
Persian Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, which immediately followed the 
Iran-Iraq War. The wars were exacerbated by the international sanctions 
imposed by the UN. More generally, the Iran-Iraq War forced the 
diversion of virtually all of the country’s discretionary revenues to pay for 
the cost of the conflict. In 1980, Iraq spent 38.8% of its GDP on defence. 
Military spending absorbed between a half and two-thirds of GNP during 
the late 1980s (Ozlu, 2006). 
The country faced a real challenge in the form of declining oil revenues; it 
was no longer able to control the structural imbalance in its economy or 
the fiscal deficit. According to Foote et al. (2004), when the Iran-Iraq War 
and the UN embargo disrupted oil sales, the government was denied its 
main source of income. The government started to seek out new resources 
with which to run its economy, such as internal taxation, which typically 
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totalled less than 3% of GDP; income from state activities, such as wages 
earned by employees of SOEs, was exempt from taxation, and only 
medium-sized and small firms were asked to pay taxes. This put more 
pressure on the growing private investment, commonly resulting in firms 
under-reporting their income and employment levels so as to reduce their 
tax bills. The government collected some revenues from sales taxes, but 
these too represented only a small source of funds. Therefore, in 1987, the 
government adopted a new policy via the privatization of the majority of 
the SOEs, including the sale of the majority of agricultural and industrial 
enterprises at lower than market prices. This programme also included the 
liberalization of the prices of agricultural and industrial commodities, and 
the provision of incentives for domestic and foreign investment. 
In general, this policy failed to mitigate the economic difficulties, and 
even exacerbated other problems in the Iraqi economy. As a result, the 
economy experienced an absolute decline in GDP and a high fiscal deficit 
due to the interruption to its oil revenues during the UN embargo. The 
government then began to finance its operations by printing money. Until 
then, Iraq had not been a country with high inflation. However, increasing 
the money supply after the Gulf War caused inflation to rise from 6% in 
1989 to nearly 448% in 1994. The Iraqi dinar depreciated from around 4 
dinars per dollar in 1990 to more than 1,700 in 1995 (Foote et al., 2004). 
The rate of inflation exceeded the rate of money growth during this 
period, as Iraqis fled the dinar as a store of wealth and began to hold gold 
or foreign currency instead. These problems along with low interest rate 
on deposits which were capped in single digits, meant that holding dinars 
in a bank account was a losing proposition. These caused chronic 
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inflation, a depreciation of the local currency, a lack of domestic 
investment, a rise in unemployment, and eventually a drop in living 
standards.  
However, the re-emergence of oil revenues from mid-2003 allowed the 
government to propose various reforms, such as transforming the centralized 
economy into a market economy by removing restrictions and barriers to foreign 
trade, creating an environment to stimulate the private sector, and liberalizing 
labour, capital and foreign investment, involving many elements of an economy 
that had been deteriorating for decades. According to the IMF (2003), fiscal 
expenditure was spread across four main areas: government employment 
(approximately 30%), public capital accumulation (17%), savings and foreign 
assets (18%), and transfers and subsidies (approximately 35%). Initially, in 2003, 
because of the significant decline that had occurred in the level of human 
development in Iraq, the government increased the role of the public sector in the 
economy. On the other hand, the government aimed to play a supplementary role 
to the private sector by directing public expenditure towards providing for basic 
needs and necessary infrastructure (van der Ploeg et al., 2012). 
Overall, in the years that have followed the last war, in spite of the 
improved policies, the economy has seen a further net deterioration, 
driven largely by the after-effects of the war, civil disorder, and weak and 
unstable Iraqi governments. This has forced the Iraqi governments to shift 
more and more resources into security and counter-insurgency-related 
short-term aid, which has further weakened many aspects of the 
infrastructure and the economy, posed a constant threat to the nation’s oil 
exports, and sharply limited outside investment. It has also left a legacy of 
 109 
 
growing sectarian and ethnic violence, crime, and constant shifts in the 
nature of central and local governance that have seriously disrupted local 
development. 
4.4.2 Monetary policy  
Monetary policy involves using interest rates and other monetary tools to 
influence the level of consumer spending and aggregate demand. Due to the 
limited development of their domestic financial systems, monetary policy in many 
developing countries is conducted by means of the central bank supplying money 
directly to the domestic banking system, and is often aimed at specific monetary 
aggregates. That is, the focus is the monetary supply or stock for domestic credit, 
rather than, as is more typical in advanced industrial countries, a specific short-
term domestic interest rate (Montiel, 2011).  
According to the theoretical literature, a stable macroeconomic environment 
requires a prudent monetary policy. Iraq had abundant foreign exchange reserves 
due to its oil revenue. Crude oil revenue represented 92% of the total government 
revenue. Monetary policy under the Baath regime was subservient to fiscal policy 
and a public budget was used to cover the party’s random spending. Therefore, 
the Iraqi Central Bank’s (CBI’s) monetary policy, created under the auspices of 
Law No. 64 of 1976, has not been effective, having failed to manage foreign 
reserves, achieve economic stability, or ensure a stable exchange rate for the Iraqi 
dinar in the past four decades (Mahdi, 2007).  
Managing the elements of the foreign currency reserve and their roles in 
supporting monetary policy requires a country to achieve stability, support 
growth, and balance out inflationary pressures, issues that have generally been 
seen as a formality and unrelated to monetary policy in Iraq. This is because the 
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financial policy allowed the use of these reserves and considered them highly 
flexible methods of paying and fulfilling the obligations of the previous regime. 
This was achieved by exchanging the Iraqi dinar for foreign currency. For the last 
three decades of the last century, this view led to the monetary policy following 
the options and trends of financial policy, using the public budget (Merza, 2011). 
In other words, the monetary policy involved rebalancing the national debt with 
foreign currency when the Iraqi dinar was drained. The excessive possession of 
foreign currency and its replacement with the Ministry of Finance’s treasury 
transfers rendered the Central Bank incapable of addressing domestic liquidity 
crises, including demand for foreign currency to finance external business. The 
situation became worse when treasury transfers were used as a substitute for 
foreign currency through the printing of new money to fund public budget 
deficits. This greatly increased domestic liquidity without a real cover (reserve) of 
foreign currency for over two decades. Consequently, the Iraqi dinar’s external 
value depreciated and exchange rates fell, causing severe shocks that created 
extraordinary inflation of prices and a continual deterioration in living standards. 
Therefore, stabilizing domestic liquidity rates, addressing inflation and achieving 
a stable exchange rate became impossible tasks for the central bank. 
However, after 2003, the government aimed to restore the function of the 
monetary policy by promoting economic and financial stability, maintaining 
stability of domestic prices to create a competitive economic environment based 
on market forces, and eventually establishing independent objectives and setting 
policies accordingly. The Central Bank gained its independence and was allowed 
to refuse to provide credit or loans to the government or other public entities, 
except for liquidity support in the form of loans. Loans given to state-owned 
commercial banks were required to be kept under Central Bank supervision. The 
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same loan provisions would be applicable to commercial banks in the private 
sector. Thus, it is essential to shed light on the nature of the monetary policy tools, 
such as exchange rates and interest rates, which have been used over the last four 
decades. 
4.4.2.1 Exchange Rate Policy in Iraq over 1970-2010 
The exchange rate regime is a key variable in macroeconomic policy design due 
to the fact that developing countries are highly dependent on imported inputs and 
capital goods. As discussed in chapter 3, there are three forms of exchange rate 
policy, namely, floating exchange rates, managed exchange rates, and fixed 
exchange rates (Maddison, 2013).  It was also observed that a fixed exchange rate 
typically disrupts the balance of trade and balance of payments of a country, but it 
is the preferred regime in some developing countries (Montiel, 2011). 
In the case of oil-producing countries like Iraq, fixed exchange rates accompanied 
by high inflows of oil revenues during the oil boom led to increased demand for 
imports. This in turn led to higher domestic prices in the short run and the 
appreciation of the RER. Also, the increase in foreign assets resulting from 
balance of payment surpluses during the oil boom led to a temporarily higher 
money stock being required to maintain the fixed exchange rate policy. This 
negatively affected domestic production by making it less attractive for 
investment. Consequently, this restricted the growth rate of agriculture, 
manufacturing, and other sectors in the economy. Moreover, it led to limited job 
opportunities in the non-oil tradable sectors and made the economy heavily 
dependent on the oil sector. These all seems to be evidence of the “Dutch 
Disease” in Iraq. The fixed exchange rate regime, together with oil revenues, was, 
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ultimately, not conducive to attracting investment or the diversification of the 
economy (Hermes and Lensink, 2013). 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the development of the Iraqi nominal exchange rate over the 
period 1970-2010. It can be noted that, for many years, the official nominal 
exchange rate for the Iraqi dinar was subject to a fixed exchange rate regime. 
From the early 1970s, the official exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar was pegged at 
US$3.3. In other words, one Iraqi dinar was equal to approximately 3 US dollars 
on average and remained steady at this exchange rate, even during the period of 
the oil boom in the 1970s, and from the late 1980s until 1990.  
Figure  4.4: Nominal Exchange Rate of Iraq Dinar, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: WB (various years); UNCTAD (various years); IMF (various years). 
 
In the 1980s, the government experienced budget deficits due to increased 
military spending requirements. Hence, the second interruption to Iraq’s oil 
revenue, the UN embargo, which involved the controlling of Iraqi exports and the 
freezing of Iraq’s foreign currency accounts, caused many economic difficulties, 
such as a heavy debt burden, inflation, currency depreciation, a non-responsive 
private sector, stagnant output, and a lack of funds for reconstruction. Therefore, 
the government pursued another approach, financing its operations by printing 
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money. This situation caused the money supply to grow much faster than the 
output of goods and services, leading to high inflation rates. As the money supply 
and inflation rates grew, firms’ international competiveness declined and 
unemployment rose.  
Furthermore, the rapid increase in the price of the US dollar relative to the Iraqi 
dinar, driven by an increasing money supply, political events and instability, led 
to a change to a flexible exchange rate regime in the late 1990s. As a result of 
increasing demand for the dollar and a rising inflation rate, the price of the dollar 
increased sharply from 10 dinars in 1991 to 1,700 dinars in 1995 (Foote et al., 
2004).   
An increasing expectation of higher rates of inflation was the key reason for the 
depreciation of the Iraqi currency, which led people to convert their financial 
assets into real assets in Iraq or foreign assets abroad, as the dinar lost its function 
as a store of value. Thus, there were increased demands on foreign currencies such 
as the dollar for transactions, and the Iraqi dinar began to play an increasingly 
limited role in the market (Alnasrawi, 1994). 
Another reason for the depreciation in the exchange rate during the Gulf War was 
the increasing uncertainty, which stimulated those who could do so to emigrate, 
requiring them to convert their wealth into foreign currency. This increased the 
supply of the dinar on the international market and caused a further decline in its 
value (Al-Saadi, 2006). 
Grigorian and Kock (2010) further clarified the reasons for the depreciation of the 
Iraqi currency, attributing it to a reduction in the importation of consumer goods 
during the wars, which in turn motivated the smuggling of local currency to 
neighbouring countries so as to import goods for sale in Iraq at prohibitive prices. 
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The increase in the supply of the dinar in these countries led its value to decline 
further against foreign currencies.  
However, in the post-war period, government reforms in the financial sector have 
allowed the CBI to gain independence and credibility, which should help transform 
the country from a centralized economy into a market-oriented one. To stabilize 
the exchange rate, the CBI issued Law No. 56, aimed at achieving equilibrium 
between the demand and supply of the dollar on the one hand, and a balance in the 
dollar-to-dinar exchange rate on the other hand, objectives that could aid price 
stability and make the domestic currency more attractive. 
Practically, since the restoration of oil revenues in 2004, monetary policy 
has mainly been influenced by oil exports, two-thirds of Iraq’s economic 
output being comprised of exporting oil to international markets for a 
price denominated in US dollars. High oil prices after the war have put an 
upward pressure on Iraq’s RER. Hence, monetary policy is closely 
intertwined with the exchange rate and how these US dollars are 
converted into dinars. In the end, Iraq has adopted a de facto managed 
floating exchange rate. A floating exchange rate provides Iraq’s economy 
some cushion against oil-price shocks; a drop in the oil price would likely 
cause the dinar to fall, which would encourage Iraq’s as yet limited non-
oil exports to rise, and would decrease demand for its imports in 
competing industries (Foote et al., 2004). 
In general, central banks in small open economies typically intervene in currency 
markets so as to guard against high volatility. In 2004, this approach was used by 
the CBI to influence the exchange rate and control the growth of the domestic 
monetary base, in foreign exchange auctions. The Ministry of Finance sold dollars 
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from its oil income to the CBI, purchasing dinars to pay for government 
operations. The CBI then sold some of those dollars in the daily foreign exchange 
auctions. Consequently, the CBI successfully increased the value of the Iraqi dinar 
and achieved stability in it. The dinar was pegged to the dollar at a stable rate of 
between 1,193 and 1,170 dinars per dollar during 2008-2010 (IMF, 2013). 
The RER is often used as an indicator of the competitiveness of the foreign trade 
of a country. Figure 4.5 shows the development of the RER, confirming the vital 
improvement in the international value of the Iraqi dinar that has resulted from the 
growth in oil exports and the trade surplus. Furthermore, monetary policy has 
included reforms aimed at causing the Iraqi dinar to appreciate, via the use of 
interest rate tools to control the money supply. 
Figure  4.5: Real Exchange Rate at Constant 2005 Prices, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: WB (various years); UNCTAD (various years); IMF (various years). 
 
However, the nominal exchange rate continues to be a very common tool for 
conducting monetary policy, maintaining price stability, reducing domestic 
inflation rates, and supporting the advantages of foreign payments and reserves. 
For example, appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in Iraq from 2006 to 2009 
helped to bring inflation down from 53.23% in 2006 to low single digits. 
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Appreciation of the RER stimulated a reduction in the total cost of local 
production in the real economy, the promotion of growth, and an increase in total 
revenues from production activities.  
4.4.2.2 Interest Rate and Inflation  
The CBI, since its establishment, has relied on a policy of administratively setting 
the nominal interest rate (NIR). As shown in Figure 4.6, during the period from 
1970 to 2003, the NIR stood at a level of 6% on average, and remained steady 
even during the period of the oil boom and sanctions. The trend in the NIR has not 
seen any change related to inflation trends. This implies that the interest rate has 
played no significant role as an instrument of monetary policy in Iraq's economy, 
which has made monetary policy ineffective for the achievement of 
macroeconomic goals. 
Figure  4.6: Nominal Interest Rate in Iraq, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: CBI, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues); IMF (various years); World Bank (various 
years); COST (1991, 2006, 2010). 
 
Iraq’s economy did not experience high inflation4 during 1970-1989, and for most 
of that period inflation remained in single digits. Despite the increased money 
supply, the consumer price index (CPI 2005=100) indicates that inflation was 
                                                 
4
 Inflation is a general increase in prices, which can be measured by the Consumer Price Index 
over months or years, and reflects the decreasing purchasing power of a currency (Kock and 
Grigorian, 2010). 
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under control, mainly due to price controls and wages freeze imposed in 1974
5
. 
However, a high rate of inflation emerged after the second Gulf War and the 
commencement of international sanctions, when the government began to finance 
its operations by printing money. Hence, the rapid rate of money growth caused 
inflation to rise from 6% in 1989 to approximately 450% in 1994 (Figure 4.7). As 
a result, Iraq suffered from a prolonged period of very high inflation, which can 
be labelled hyperinflation
6
. Despite the efforts of the CBI, through its monetary 
policy, to strengthen the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar against the US dollar, the 
dinar depreciated from around 10 per dollar in 1991 to roughly 1,700 in 1995 (see 
Figure 4.4). The continued high rate of inflation has turned out to be one of the 
most challenging aspects of economic management in Iraq.  
Figure  4.7: Inflation Rate of Iraqi Economy at Constant 2005 Prices. 1970-
2010 
 
Sources: CBI, Yearbook Bulletin (various issues); IMF (various years); WB (various years); 
COST (various years). 
                                                 
5
 After 1974, wage levels in the public sector were constant. On the other hand, living standards 
were supported by the government through the provision of education, healthcare and housing, 
subsidized food and utility prices, and sizeable energy subsidies (Sanford, 2003). 
6
 Hyperinflation is defined as a devastatingly high increase in prices, of 50% or more per month, 
due to the near total collapse of a country's monetary system, making its currency almost worthless 
as a medium of exchange. Although hyperinflation is caused mainly by excessive deficit spending 
by a government (financed by the printing of more money), some economists believe that social 
breakdown leads to hyperinflation (not vice versa), and that its roots lie in political rather than 
economic causes (Barro, 1995). 
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The real interest rate
7
 (RIR) has been negative at many times over the last three 
decades (see Figure 4.8). This happens especially when the rate of inflation 
exceeds the rate of growth. As a result, Iraqis abandoned the dinar as a store of 
wealth, holding gold or foreign currency instead. Since fewer people were willing 
to save, holding dinars in a bank account was also an unattractive proposition. All 
these factors had an adverse influence on gross investment, especially for private 
businessmen, who found it difficult to access credit.  
The constant interest rate lowered the size of bank savings and led savers to 
redirect their capital towards speculation. Mahdy (1984) argued that the reason for 
the negative RIR was that the financial authority was not as sophisticated about 
nominal and real interest rates as it needed to be. Therefore, before 2003, one can 
conclude that the interest rate had a limiting effect on most economic activities 
and the level of investment.  
However, since 2003, monetary policy has been aimed at activating the role of 
interest rates to counter inflation and the expectations resulting from it, in an 
effort to encourage domestic and foreign investment. By 2003, the interest rate 
had been liberalized, and it was used to counteract the expansion in the 
government’s current expenditure and investment spending, as well as to control 
and restrict inflation rates related to such spending. For this purpose, the CBI set 
the interest rate at 6% in 2003, increasing it to 14% in 2006. The key objectives of 
liberalizing the NIR were to make it attractive for borrowers, to motivate saving in 
banks, to contribute towards reducing the burden of public spending, and to 
control domestic liquidity. 
                                                 
7
 The RIR is the NIR adjusted for inflation; it can be calculated as the NIR less the inflation rate. 
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However, the inflation rate turned out to be much higher than expected. 
For example, the consumer price index was 33.5% in 2003 and increased 
to 53.2% by 2006. Therefore, a stable exchange rate was a key tool of 
monetary policy, used later to keep the inflation rate in the single digits 
between 2009 and 2010. This policy strengthened the Iraqi dinar against 
the dollar. It was allowed to appreciate in November 2006, and the 
exchange rate is estimated to have been between 1,454 and 1,205 ID to 
the US dollar during the period of 2003-2008. By 2007, inflation had 
been capped through a mixture of fiscal and monetary policy, and it 
declined to 12.6% by the end of 2008 (IMF, 2003). It appears that a large 
part of the changes in the inflation rate since 2003 have derived from the 
volatile behaviour of energy and transportation prices, while the 
magnitude of financial support provided to most ration card commodities 
has also led to an increase in inflation rates (Grigorian and Kock, 2010). 
The interest rate continued to rise to 19% in 2007. In 2008, the monetary authority 
accelerated reductions in the NIR to adapt it to reducing inflation levels and to 
motivate investment, so that the interest rate was subsequently reduced to 16% in 
2009 and 14% in 2010. This development was expected to control the inflation 
rate to the same level and encourage more lending to private-sector companies, 
help create a stock market, and attract foreign investment.   
Eventually, the inflation rate was reduced to 6.8% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2010, as 
proposed by the CBI, indicating the effectiveness of the monetary in reducing the 
severity of inflation. The annual reduction of inflation since 2007 also improved 
the purchasing power of the local currency, promoting private-sector involvement 
in the economy. 
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Figure  4.8: Real Interest Rate in Iraq (1970-2010) 
 
 
 Sources: CBI Quarterly Bulletin (various issues); IMF (various years); WB (various years); COST 
(various years). 
 
4.5 Macroeconomic Indicators 
4.5.1 Trend in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP Per Capita 
As explained in Section 4.2, extensive development plans were adopted during the 
period of 1970-1979, which reflected positively on GDP growth and per capita 
income. Appendix B2 shows the average GDP growth to be about 12%, with GDP 
per capita income increasing significantly from US$998 in 1970 to US$2,018 in 
1979, a 172% increase. This can also be attributed to a significant increase in oil 
prices, which led to a substantial increase in oil production at that time. It in turn 
supported the development of related industries, including petroleum refining, 
chemicals, and fertilizers. 
The growth of the Iraqi economy has historically been linked to developments in 
the oil sector. Successive NDPs since the 1970s have laid emphasis on building a 
viable economy by diversifying and expanding the non-oil sectors, particularly 
non-oil tradable sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. Table 4.4 shows 
the trend in the share of GDP of key sectors, reflecting the major structural 
changes in the economy. In the 1970s and 1980s, local production increased in 
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favour of agriculture and manufacturing, although crude oil continued to dominate 
as the source of foreign currency. 
During 1980-1989, the state aimed to expand the two key sectors of agriculture 
and manufacturing, but put most emphasis on the agricultural sector. Therefore, 
the latter’s share of GDP increased to 13.1%, while that of the manufacturing 
industry was around 10.2%. However, these two key sectors declined markedly 
after the 1990s, when the whole political situation changed and the country 
became engaged in successive wars, and there has been no significant recovery 
even since the wars. 
The economic indicators were seriously affected by Iraq’s involvement in the long 
war with Iran (1980-1988). For example, real GDP growth decreased significantly 
to negative figures (see Table 4.B.2) because of the stoppage of oil exports and 
decrease in oil production. The latter occurred when Syria, which supported Iran 
at the time, closed the 500-mile (650,000-bpd-capacity Banias pipeline), which 
had been a vital Iraqi access route to the Mediterranean Sea and European oil 
markets.  
Table  4.4: Share of GDP of Key Economic Sectors, 1979-2009 (%)  
          
Economic Sector 
1972-1980     
(Average ) 
1981-1989 
(Average) 
1990-2003 
(Average ) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Hunting and Fishing 
5 13.1 12.4 6.9 6.9 5.8 4.9 3.7 4.4 
Mining and Quarrying  60.4 21.7 64.4 58 57.8 55.5 53.2 55.7 40.7 
Crude Oil  60 21.3 64.3 57.9 57.6 55.3 53 55.5 40.4 
Other Types of Mining  0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Manufacturing 
Industry  
6.3 10.2 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 2.4 
Electricity and Water  1 13 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.2 
Building and 
Construction  
1.8 11.3 1.2 1.3 3.7 3.6 4.4 3.8 5.1 
Transport, 
Communication  
and Storage  
3.1 6.6 6.9 8.3 8 7.1 6.6 7.7 10.2 
Wholesale, Retail 
Trade,  
Hotels and Others 
4.6 12.2 7.2 6.1 5.7 6.6 6.3 6.5 8.2 
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Finance and Insurance, 
 Real Estate and 
Business Services  
2.8 9.4 2.6 6.9 7.4 8.3 9.7 8.3 10.4 
Banking and Insurance  2.5 5.6 1.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.7 
Ownership of 
Dwellings  
0.3 3.8 1.3 6.3 6.7 7.6 8.4 7 8.7 
Social and Personal 
Services  
18.2 18.6 4.6 10.4 8.9 11.2 12.8 12.4 18 
General Government  18.2 17.4 3.5 8.5 7.1 9.4 11 11.1 16.3 
Personal Services  0.1 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 14 1.7 
Total by Activities  100.1 104.3 101.2 
100.
5 
100.5 100.5 100.5 100.4 100.6 
Less Imputed Bank  
Service Charges 
0.1 4.3 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 
                    
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: WB (2011); CBI (various issues); COST (2010). 
 
During 1990-2003, when Iraq faced the second Gulf War with the United States 
and close to a decade of harsh international sanctions, there were negative effects 
on GDP, with the real GDP fluctuating considerably during this period (Benson, 
2012). These fluctuations noticeably influenced per capita income, which dropped 
sharply from US$1408.65 in 1990 to US$463.96 in 1991 (see Figure 4.10 and 
Appendix B2) before recovering to US$1,334.95 in 2002. 
Alnasrawi (1994: p.81) discussed that, since a major portion of GDP was devoted 
to the military and similar forms of spending, “When people reached the stage 
where they started selling their private property such as jewellery, home furniture, 
statistically this means that they were approaching the famine stage”. 
Furthermore, other sectors of the economy, such as the manufacturing industry, 
electricity and water, and building and construction, were affected by a 
combination of the effects of the second Gulf War and the international sanctions. 
They were heavily dependent on budget support and thus the manufacturing 
industry’s share of GDP declined markedly to 1.7% (Table 4.4). That industry lost 
its competitiveness due to mismanagement, capital stock degradation, and the 
sanctions. Although the agricultural sector already comprised only a relatively 
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small share of the Iraqi economy, it has also been seriously affected in the last 
three decades by the burdens of military conflict. In the mid-1980s, agriculture 
accounted for only about 13.1% of the national GDP. After the imposition of UN 
sanctions and the Iraqi government’s initial refusal in 1991 to participate in the 
UN’s proposed Oil-for-Food Program, oil production fell, and agriculture’s share 
of GDP rose to an estimated 35% by 1992 (Sanford, 2003). The sector was then 
affected by severe droughts in 1999 and 2000, while food prices were repressed 
by the imports of agricultural commodities under the aforementioned UN 
programme (Mahdi, 2007). 
Figure  4.9: Real GDP Growth at Constant 2005 Prices, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: UNCTAD (various years); CBI (various years); IMF (various years); WB (various years);  
COST (various years). 
 
By 2003, oil production and exports had yet to reach the pre-war levels, and the 
non-oil sectors remained sluggish. As a direct result of the conflict, real GDP 
growth between 2003 and 2010 was volatile and fragile. After reaching 54% in 
2004, it saw a slowdown between 2005 and 2007, falling to 1.38% by 2007 (see 
Figure 4.9). As a result, real GDP per capita consistently averaged around 
US$1,416 during 2004-2010. Economic activities such as transport, construction, 
communication, and storage benefited from oil production and exports, and their 
contributions to GDP increased to 10.2%, while manufacturing saw a slight 
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increase to 2.4%, its highest figure since 2004 (Table 4.4). This indicates that 
Iraq’s recovery and reconstruction is progressing at a much slower pace than 
expected. 
Figure  4.10: GDP Per Capita at Constant 2005 Prices, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: UNCTAD (various years); CBI (various years); IMF (various years); WB (various years); 
COST (various years). 
 
4.5.2 Evaluating the Role of Public and Private Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is considered to be an essential engine of 
economic development. It refers to net additions of capital stock, such as 
equipment, buildings and other intermediate goods, within the measurement 
period. It does not account for the consumption (depreciation) of fixed capital. It 
is an element of the expenditure approach to calculating GDP (Todaro and Smith, 
2009). The stages of fixed capital formation are considered strategic mechanisms, 
not only in terms of long-term but also short-term economic growth (Cavallo and 
Daude, 2011).  
Since the early development of the oil industry, in addition to the general 
objectives of increasing the rate of potential growth, per capita income and social 
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continued growth without dependence on one economic sector (Mahdy, 1984) 
(see also Table 4.4). On the other hand, a new objective was adopted after the 
1958 revolution that ended the monarchy. The key target was to create a socialist 
society. Thus, in 1964, the government nationalized all banks, insurance 
companies, and major private industrial and commercial enterprises. Furthermore, 
the state took control of the most important parts of economic activity, using the 
rapid increases in oil revenues and public investment to do so. However, the 
macroeconomic policy shifted again in the late 1970s, towards stimulating 
private-sector participation in the economy. 
During 1970, there was a boom in oil revenue, due to rising world oil prices that 
led oil production to increase from 1.5 to 3.2 million bpd (see Appendix B1). This 
allowed the government to implement investment programmes outside the oil 
sector, which reflected positively on all of the non-oil sectors (Merza, 2011) (see 
also Table 4.4). The increase in oil revenues also allowed the state to adopt a five-
year plan (1970-1974). Based on it, oil revenues were allocated equally between 
the investment programme and ordinary budgets. The development plan exhibited 
a shift in favour of public industry, and the state started to identify 
industrialization as the key sector for economic and social development (Ozlu, 
2006). The government increased its participation in the economy based on the 
belief that industrialization was the engine of economic growth and key to the 
transformation of the traditional economy. Hence, this led gross public fixed 
capital formation (GPFCF) to increase from $591million in 1970 to $2,584 
million in 1975, an average yearly growth rate of 40%. In contrast, Gross 
Domestic Private Fixed Capital Formation (GDPFCF) did not follow the same 
trend, which decreased from $491 million to $421 million (see Figure 4.11), 
indicating a lack of appropriate legal and regulatory arrangements for facilitating 
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private investment. Thus, the private sector was playing an insignificant and 
unclear role in the economy (Mahdy, 1984).  
However, during 1975-1980, the government realized the importance of creating 
an attractive investment climate that would stimulate private investment. The 
Planning Authority allocated more of the income surplus to the investment plan 
after the consumption budget had been satisfied. As a result, both GPFCF and 
GDPFCF increased, with average growth rates of 27% and 18% respectively, as 
shown in Appendix B3. These figures may indicate that, during that period, public 
investment was “crowding in” private investment. As observed in chapter 3, 
increasing public investment can create more favourable conditions for private 
investment, for example by improving relevant infrastructure such as roads, 
highways, sewage systems, harbours and airports. The existence of such facilities 
increases the productivity of private investment, which can then take advantage of 
potentially improved business conditions.  
With regard to non-oil exports during 1970-1979, although a large amount of the 
budget was allocated to investment during that period, the non-oil sector 
comprised only 1.8% of total exports, while oil exports dominated. This indicates 
that the government was unable to develop other important commodities to export 
in addition to crude oil. This was due, generally, to the concentration of the 
development efforts on import-substituting industries, which had only limited 
success (Mahdy, 1984). 
A combination of several factors meant that private investment played a limited 
role in the economy. Iraq’s national economy was centrally planned and largely 
state-owned; the public sector was a key sector and heavily regulated. In contrast, 
the private sector received less consideration from the state, and non-Arab foreign 
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direct investment was not allowed. This resulted in a lack of modern technology 
in the productive sector. Moreover, a poor financial market, common in 
developing countries, combined with political instability, formed a key issue that 
caused great uncertainty over the expected future returns of private investment.  
Figure  4.11: Trends in Private and Public Capital Formation at 2005 
Constant Prices, 1970-2010  
 
Sources: UNCTAD (various years); CBI (various years); COST (various years). 
 
In the 1980s, when the Iraqi government first became involved in conflict, the 
expectation was that the economy would continue with the development plan and 
achieve further decades of economic growth. However, as discussed earlier, all 
macroeconomic indicators, without exception, were influenced by the onset of the 
country’s eight-year war with Iran. As a result, both GPFCF and GDPFCF 
experienced a remarkable decline in real terms. Appendix B3 and Figure 4.11 
show that GPFCF declined significantly to $2,730 million in 1988, from $7,377 
million in 1981. Meanwhile, GDPFCF also witnessed a decline from $1,585 
million to $819 million over the same period, exhibiting 48% negative growth. 
This shows that the Iran-Iraq War had a negative influence on private investment. 
The growth of the Iraqi economy is strongly linked to developments in the oil 
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sector. Consequently, as soon as oil export revenues start to decrease, for any 
reason, government expenditure decreases, and the impact of this decline is 
directly transmitted via a multiplier effect to the rest of the economy. This is 
exactly what happened to Iraq’s economy when war erupted. 
In the first post-conflict stage, new situations caused by the war forced the state to 
play an essential role in increasing the level of private investment, rebuilding 
physical and human capital, and restoring the population’s access to vital services. 
There was a significant shift in macroeconomic policies, redefining the role of 
public investment in the economy. The government abandoned a number of 
interventions in the economy, for example announcing its withdrawal from direct 
involvement in the agriculture sector in order to give more space to private 
investment (Mofid, 1990). The announcement of a motivational programme of 
trade liberalization and privatization represented a further step towards promoting 
private investment in other sectors of the economy. The key features of the 
privatization programme included the sale of most of the state lands, farms, and 
SOEs in the manufacturing industry to the private sector at very low prices. It was 
expected that privatization would enhance the capacity for specialization, the 
utilization of economic resources, and competition in the economy.  
To achieve this goal, macroeconomic policies, in particular fiscal policies, were 
designed to help expand the level of private investment and accelerate 
development. This included incentives for private-sector enterprise, the 
facilitation of financial and administrative procedures, the creation of a stock 
exchange, and the opening up of the country to foreign investment. Along with 
these policies, due to the budget deficit caused by the reduction in oil revenues 
during the Iran-Iraq War, the government reduced its subsidies to SOEs and 
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removed policies that set price ceilings for commodities (Alnasrawi, 1994). As a 
result, in 1990, private capital formation increased to a peak of $1,825 million. 
Thus, the contribution of GDPFCF to GDP increased to 7.5%, while that of 
GPFCF was just 8.8% (see Appendix B3). The main thrust of the government’s 
macroeconomic policies, in particular its fiscal policies, revolved around market-
friendly reforms and the creation of an attractive climate for domestic and foreign 
investment (Ozlu, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, the efforts to continue with the privatization programme 
were unsuccessful because of the continuing conflict and lack of financing and 
support for private business owners in Iraq. Economic incentives and proposed 
policies aimed at expanding private investment were soon interrupted when Iraq 
became involved in the second Gulf War and when sanctions were imposed, 
forcing the country to cease exporting oil. The reduction in oil revenues 
noticeably influenced development spending and private and public capital 
formation, and the continued political turmoil increased the risk in the business 
environment. As a result, both public and private investment declined after 1990, 
and in 1996 they reached their lowest points ever. GDPFCF declined sharply and 
reached its lowest point of just $202 million, and the public and private sectors’ 
shares of GDP were barely existent. Furthermore, the embargo imposed on Iraq 
by the UN as a result of the Kuwait invasion negatively impacted a wide range of 
economic activities, including the availability of inputs and capital goods that 
were essential to the operation of all sectors of the economy (Al-Roubaie and 
Elali, 1995). 
Successive wars and economic sanctions had a number of consequences for the 
country, such as the devastation of its formerly large oil exporting capacity, the 
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destruction or damage of basic and heavy industries, extensive infrastructure 
damage, severe reduction in the labour force due to many serving in the military, 
and low industrial growth. Also, agriculture suffered a recession; many rural 
workers had enrolled in the army or moved to urban centres, the reliance on food 
imports increased, especially after Iraq’s entry into the Oil-for-Food Programme, 
and development planning eventually ceased (Alnasrawi, 1994). 
During 1990-2003, in addition to the above problems, an inefficient fiscal policy 
led to financial issues related to the public budget, and further exacerbated the 
crisis in the Iraqi economy, through a rapid increase in consumer prices and high 
rates of inflation and unemployment, which eventually led to a deterioration in the 
standard of living. As a result, the government shifted its focus from increasing 
the rate of private investment to stabilizing the living standard for Iraqi citizens, 
with policies including lowering prices, increasing subsidies to the agricultural 
sector, a law freezing the prices of some consumer goods, and a low cap on the 
profits of public-sector and mixed companies (Crocker, 2004). 
Mahdi (2007) argued that the UN sanctions from 1990 to 2003 had a serious 
influence on Iraq’s manufacturing sector, which not only declined in overall size 
but also became much less diverse, losing technologically advanced sub-sectors. 
Meanwhile, the chemical, vehicle manufacturing, small manufacturing, and 
scientific equipment industries all virtually vanished. As can be seen from Table 
4.4, the majority of economic sectors declined due to the political instability. 
In 2003, after decades of conflict and isolation, the eventual demise of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime ended thirty years of economic destruction. It was expected that 
Iraq’s economy would recover and overcome the effects of its prolonged conflicts. 
Decades of heavy state control over all kinds of economic activity in Iraq meant 
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that diversification through increased international trade was sorely needed. At the 
same time, however, the economy was confronted with enormous development 
challenges, necessitating a change in orientation marked by the formal adoption of 
development plans. The government introduced and implemented NDPs for the 
years 2005-2007. The NDPs were established based on four key objectives: 
sustaining economic growth, reviving the private sector, improving the quality of 
life, and establishing good governance and security. As the government made 
clear, the mechanism that would be used to achieve these four objectives would be 
high economic growth outside of the oil sector. The NDPs also marked the 
beginning of efficient government involvement in the economy.   
However, despite the post-war efforts in 2003onwards to increase local and 
international private investment, GDPFCF in Iraq showed no noticeable progress. 
The private sector did not exceed $200 million, barely contributing to GDP, from 
2004 until 2008, before increasing to $379 in 2009 and then $560 million in 2010. 
White (2012) argued that the share of the private sector was too low to generate a 
significant increase in economic activity and employment, while the oil sector – 
averaging around 98% of GDP – employs only 1% of all labour. 
The new government’s economic policies failed to increase private investment 
and its contribution to GDP. This can be attributed to the absence of an 
appropriate investment climate, and to political instability and poor security, 
caused by internal conflicts following the war. Moreover, in post-war 2003, the 
private sector experienced new setbacks, such as stoppages to private industrial 
projects, high production costs, and a lack of demand for local products due to 
local markets being filled with imported goods. The lack of security and threats to 
capitalists’ families due to increasing street violence, led many capitalists to flee 
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to neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Jordan, in an effort to find stability 
and safety for their investments. 
However, GPFCF showed positive results in 2003, although it did fluctuate 
between $2,500 and $8,600 million. The average annual contribution of GPFCF to 
GDP from 2004 to 2006 was around 15%.  
It should be noted that, in spite of improved policies, the years that have followed 
the war have seen a further net deterioration, driven largely by the outcomes of the 
war, civil disorder, and weak and unstable Iraqi governments. The violence has 
increased steadily since power was transferred to the Iraqi authorities in 2004. 
This has forced both the coalition and the various Iraqi governments to allocate 
more and more resources to security and counterinsurgency, resulting in further 
weakening of various aspects of the infrastructure and the economy, and causing a 
continual threat to the nation’s oil exports, which has severely limited investment. 
The war has also left a legacy of growing sectarian and ethnic violence, crime, 
and continual shifts in the nature of central and local governance that have 
seriously harmed local development (Ozlu, 2006). 
What can be concluded is that, in terms of the diversification of Iraq's economy, 
there is strong evidence that the agriculture and manufacturing, building and 
construction, and transport, communication and storage sectors all have very 
strong potential, based on observations from the 1970s and 1980s (Table 4.4). 
Private investment is needed to revitalize these sectors. There is a need for 
political stability and security, and for the redefinition of macroeconomic policies, 
in order to attract more private investment into the Iraqi economy. 
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4.5.3 Assessment of the Labour Force and Employment in Iraq 
According to the arguments of endogenous growth theories, a considerable 
amount of attention must be given to human capital
8
. There is a broadly held 
belief that human capital positively affects the productivity of all other factors of 
production and may also generate innovative opportunities or products that 
support technological progress. The economic disruption in Iraq has led to a 
noticeable deterioration in its human development indicators (Leonard, 2009). It is 
well known that oil, the dominant sector of Iraq's economy, is capital intensive 
and generates less than 1% of the demand for labour in Iraq. Like any oil-based 
economy, Iraq faces the challenge of using its oil wealth to foster growth and job 
creation in the manufacturing and other economic sectors (Al-Saadi, 2006). 
As was mentioned earlier, in the past three decades the contributions of most of 
the economic sectors to the economy have been influenced by the pressures of 
military conflict, particularly the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War 
(see Table 4.4). Only the service sector has stayed stable to any extent. At the 
same time, the contributions of both the manufacturing and agriculture sectors 
have decreased, to 1.7% and 12% of GDP respectively. This has certainly 
influenced the structure of employment, and caused the labour force
9
 to shift away 
from those sectors, which are labour intensive and produce commodities, towards 
service activities, which are also labour intensive but generate no commodities. 
Consequently, in 1996, the share of the labour force working in the service sector 
                                                 
8
 Human capital refers to people’s knowledge, competence and ability with respect to providing 
labour. Factors such as formal education and training are important for human capital. The success 
of a business depends on the quality of human capital available (Baron, 2007). 
9
 The total number of people who are eligible to work, whether currently employed or 
unemployed, in a country or region. The labour force is usually determined by the size of the 
population (Cain, 1978 and Montiel, 2011). 
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was about 66.4% ,while 17.5% were employed in the manufacturing industry, and 
16.1% in the agriculture sector (Region, 2006). This caused a shortage in the 
supply of commodities and increased the country’s imports of agricultural 
products and other consumer goods (Mahdi, 2007). 
Therefore, the trends in and composition of the population and labour force have 
been greatly influenced by a number of demographic, economic, political and 
social factors. In 1980, the distribution of the labour force was also seriously 
influenced by the Iran-Iraq War. The armed forces’ share of the labour force 
increased from 2.9% (62,000 workers) in 1970 to 13.4% (430,000 workers) in 
1980. As a result of the expansion of the armed forces, industrial employment 
declined from 25% to 7.8%, while employment in the agriculture sector declined 
from 42% to 12.5% (Alnasrawi, 1994). This pattern of mobilization for wars has 
caused distortions in the labour market and reflected adversely on the economy 
and the labour force, leaving the population unskilled or semi-skilled (Yousif, 
2006). 
Moreover, as a result of the war, two distinguishing phenomena emerged in Iraq’s 
labour force, specifically in the rural areas. The first was a reduction in the 
number of people who were economically active in rural areas, from 16% of the 
total labour force in the early 1990s to approximately 10% in 2000. This was due 
to broadly spread unemployment in the countryside, especially among young men. 
This is believed to have encouraged a continual migration of the labour force from 
the agriculture sector to the city. The second phenomenon was the increased 
dependence on women in agricultural labour. The share of women among all 
agricultural workers in 2000 was more than 50%, according to data from the Food 
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and Agriculture Organization (FAO), making them the main contributors to such 
work (IMF, 2003). 
In 2003, Iraq’s labour force was estimated at 6 million people. A statistical survey 
conducted in Iraq by the IMF and the WB confirmed a tangible change in the 
structure of the labour force in favour of certain economic activities in the post-
war period. For example, labour that had previously worked in agriculture was 
now attracted to activities such as the police, security and the army, due to the 
higher incomes available and the deterioration of the agriculture sector. This led 
to clear disorder in the distribution of labour among other economic activities.  
Furthermore, modernization has had a negative effect on labour force trends in 
Iraq. The percentage of labour involved in services (non-commodity activities) 
increased from 59% in 2006 to 82% in 2008, indicating the decreased share of the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors in the economy. The industrial sector used 
only 5.9% of the total labour force in 2006, increasing to 13.7% in 2008 (NDP, 
2010). With regard to the employment structure by gender, the rate of female 
participation in economic activity is generally low, due to institutional, cultural, 
economic and legal factors. 
Based on the population demographics, the Iraqi labour force is growing at an 
average rate of 3.0% per year, as shown in Appendix B4 and Figure 4.12, which 
means that Iraq’s labour force is growing rapidly in the long term. In recent years, 
unemployment has become the social challenge with the most adverse influence 
on the economy and society as a whole. During 1980-1990, the unemployment 
rate was not prominent due to obligatory military service. Following the second 
Gulf War and the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq, the rate of 
unemployment increased rapidly. The economy was unable to provide enough 
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work, due to declining production in all economic sectors, which made job 
opportunities rare. Therefore, a large number of people were encouraged to 
emigrate abroad, seeking a better life.  
Figure  4.12: Trends in Population and Labour Growth in Iraq, 1970-2010 
 
Sources: UNCTAD (various years); CBI (various years); COST (various years). 
 
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, many factors have contributed 
towards pushing the unemployment rate still higher. It is difficult to obtain 
accurate data on the exact rate of unemployment in Iraq. However, according to 
the formal data published by COST (2010), national unemployment in 2003, 
2004, and 2005 stood at 28.1%, 10.5%, and 26.8% respectively. According to a 
World Bank (2006) report, Iraq had one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
region in 2010, at close to 30%, almost twice the MENA average. Apparently, the 
unemployment rate then decreased to 17.6% in 2007, before increasing to 18.3% 
in 2009 (Cordesman, 2010). 
Opportunities for private-sector job creation have been limited by an unfavourable 
investment climate, an unconducive regulatory environment, a high dependence 
on oil revenues, and security issues such as violence and internal and external 
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displacement, causing low levels of economic activity in the public and private 
sectors (Merza, 2007). 
The unemployment rate needs to be put in the context of Iraqi demographic 
conditions to provide the best understanding of the real situation. Iraq has a very 
young population. 40% of the 30 million citizens are under the age of 15 years 
and the mean age is an incredibly low at 23.8 years. Another significant factor is 
the low number of middle-aged men, mostly because of the Iran-Iraq War and 
more recent wars, and the high number of middle-aged women (Cordesman, 
2010). The lack of middle-aged men creates a higher dependence on young Iraqi 
men. In fact, the Iraq Living Conditions Survey carried out in 2004 indicates that 
the average dependency ratio in Iraq is 73.97%.  
What can be concluded is that increasing Iraq’s labour force and reducing the 
unemployment rate is one of the biggest challenges facing Iraq’s economy today. 
There is a need to establish solutions and constructive processes to alleviate 
unemployment. The key to sustainable job creation is investment in productive 
areas of the economy, including sectors other than oil. In the long run, strong job 
creation can be ensured only through economic diversification (particularly in 
service sectors such as tourism), efficient import substitution, and an export 
industry. Hence, Iraq's state needs to strengthen labour skills and the performance 
of the labour market by increasing both public and private investment. In doing 
so, it will also reduce the social problems associated with this issue (Bank, 1993). 
4.6 Summary 
After decades of a heavily state-controlled economy, the deterioration produced 
by a succession of wars, a decade of international sanctions, and the looting that 
followed the 2003 war, the post-2003 Iraqi state faces particular challenges in 
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striving towards reconstruction and development. Government commitment to a 
sound fiscal framework that will enhance both public and private investment is a 
necessary condition for robust economic growth and job creation. Macroeconomic 
stability needs to be maintained, regardless of the highly uncertain domestic and 
external environment. Since 2003, inflation has remained in the low digits and the 
exchange rate stable. In spite of these achievements, gross domestic investment is 
still too low due to a lack of appropriate infrastructure services, an inefficient 
public sector, a lack of skilled labour, and political instability. These are the major 
obstacles facing Iraq's economy.  
Moreover, Iraqi recovery and reconstruction is progressing at a much slower pace 
than expected. The task of rebuilding the country after 2003 remains enormous 
and has been made harder by sectarian politics and prolonged violence. Iraq’s 
reconstruction requires not only the rebuilding of its infrastructure, but also of its 
economic and social institutions, and the creation of a business environment that 
will attract capital, and new technology and skills for modernizing the economy. 
Iraq’s huge oil reserves could, in principle, provide the revenues needed to finance 
the reconstruction, but strong institutions and a favourable business environment 
are needed if these resources are to be used effectively.  
The key objectives for economic recovery are reconstructing the war-
ravaged infrastructure, laying the economic foundations needed for 
generating faster and more efficient economic growth in all sectors, and 
giving Iraqi citizens access to a greater number of productive jobs. 
Economic reforms are needed to meet these key objectives, such as 
developing the financial system and bank sector, and adopting appropriate 
monetary and fiscal policies, so as to make Iraq's economy more business 
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friendly and further ensure economic diversification. Diversifying the 
economy will be an important part of Iraq's economic revitalization, as it 
will also create an alternative resource in the form of a tax base. The 
ultimate purpose will be to achieve an economic transformation from 
state domination to private entrepreneurship, from a closed to an open 
economy, and from oil dependence to diversification.  
This chapter has provided a broad analysis of some macroeconomic 
indicators in Iraq in the last four decades. Following on from this, the next 
chapter addresses the methodology, based on which most of the indicators 
presented in this chapter will be examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 so as to 
draw policy implications.    
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CHAPTER 5 ECONOMIC MODELLING AND ESTIMATION APPROACH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There is broad agreement that investment, in particular private investment, and 
economic growth are strongly associated with one another. Some key studies, 
such as Chirinko (1993) and Khan and Reinhart (1990), have confirmed that 
countries in which investment stays stagnant over a prolonged period of time have 
their future growth potential endangered due to the shortage of capital 
accumulation. This conclusion is worrying for a country like Iraq, which has 
shown some inconsistent and downward trends relating to private investment, in 
terms of both the total amount and in relation to GDP (Foote et al., 2004; Tadlock, 
2004). 
The theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidences relating to determinants of 
domestic private investment and public investment, and an evaluation of the role 
of both public and private investment in economic development, were discussed 
extensively in Chapters 2 and 3, Specific variables influencing the investment 
environment in Iraq and economic growth in the country were also assessed in 
chapter 4.  This chapter aims to present the modelling and estimation-related 
issues regarding the relationship between domestic investment, public investment 
and economic growth in the case of Iraq. To address the key objectives specified 
in Chapter 1, three empirical models are modified to fit Iraq’s economic structure, 
and then estimated. A simple growth model is formulated based on a neoclassical 
framework separating the effects of private and public investment, so as to 
examine the complementarity or substitutability of public capital versus private 
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investment in the case of Iraq. Secondly, a flexible accelerator model is developed 
to estimate the pattern of domestic private investment in Iraq and the key 
variables explaining it. Finally, based on recent empirical studies, a public 
investment model is developed and estimated in the context of Iraq. 
For estimation purposes, yearly data from 1970-2010 are used to examine the 
behavioural equations of the model. However, before the macroeconomic 
situation of the Iraqi economy is evaluated, it is essential to examine whether the 
key macroeconomic variables in the behavioural equations contain a trend or not, 
and if so whether it is deterministic or stochastic. Therefore, each time series is 
checked using the stationarity test via two common unit root tests, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP). The Johansen cointegration 
trace test and the maximum eigenvalue statistics are then used to establish the 
long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables in the models. A Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) is also used, to find the short-run dynamic 
relationship between the variables and to better understand the investment 
behaviour. Finally, in addition to the model specification, another important issue 
that is considered is whether there is a problem of multicollinearity in the models. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 deals with the 
philosophy of research. Section 5.3 presents research methodology. Theoretical 
and empirical specification of the growth investment model are explained in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the modelling of the domestic investment 
function. In this section, the theoretical framework, empirical model and 
hypotheses for the explanatory variables are described as well. The specification 
of the public investment model is presented in Section 5.6. The data set and 
sources are clarified in Section 5.7. The main approaches of the research 
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methodology, namely the stationarity, cointegration and VECM tests, are 
discussed in Section 5.8 while the final section provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
5.2 The research philosophy 
The word "methodology" means the theoretical analysis of the methods suitable 
for a field of study or the body of methods and principles particular to a branch of 
knowledge. The term “methodology", generally, refers to a strategy that can be 
followed in order to achieve the objectives of a study. 
Creswell (2009) distinguishes between four research philosophies: positivism, 
social constructivism, participatory research or advocacy, and pragmatism. 
Positivism (alternatively post-positivism or the scientific method philosophy) 
assumes that causes probably determine results in the form of causal relationships 
but the outcomes can be different across research done in different countries. 
Thus, positivism and post-positivism are considered the traditional research 
paradigm. These approaches tend to be more quantitative than qualitative 
(Creswell, 2009). With this philosophy, researchers start with a theory, collect 
data, and then conclude that the findings either support or refute the theory. The 
assumptions of this philosophy mostly apply to quantitative research, such as 
economic research in which researchers describe causal relationships in terms of 
research hypotheses or questions. The researcher must be objective and check the 
methods for bias. 
The second philosophy is social constructivism; this is the typical approach used 
in qualitative research. In this philosophy, researchers attempt to understand the 
real world in terms of the way people work and live. Qualitative open-ended 
questions are used to enable the participants to share their views and construct the 
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meaning in a situation. The process of qualitative research according to this 
philosophy is inductive; meaning is generated from the data that are collected and 
shaped according to the researcher’s experience and background. 
Participatory research, the third philosophy, can also be seen as a qualitative 
research approach, despite the fact that it can also act as a foundation for 
quantitative research. This type of research contains an action plan which may 
help to change the lives of the contributors and the institutions in which they 
work. Advocacy research is a voice through which participants can raise their 
agenda for change. Participatory studies usually start with an important issue or 
problem in society and the main purpose behind this is to create political 
controversy and discussion leading to change. 
The fourth philosophy, pragmatism, deals with the research problem instead of the 
methods used to understand the problem. Many approaches can be used to expand 
knowledge about the problem. According to pragmatism, the researcher is free to 
choose any research methods, techniques and procedures that best meet their 
aims. Therefore, pragmatism can be distinguished as research that mixes 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Leech et al., 2010). In this philosophy, 
researchers start with assumptions, then collect and analyse data (Creswell, 2003). 
It is believed that pragmatism is an applicable philosophy for business and 
tourism research and it is commonly used in those areas (Jogulu and Pansiri, 
2011). 
The present research adopts a positivist approach as, based on the aforementioned 
descriptions, it appears to be the most suitable for achieving this study’s research 
objectives. 
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5.3 Research methodology  
The design of a research study begins with the selection of a topic and a paradigm. 
According to Creswell (1994), "A qualitative study is defined as an inquiry 
process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a 
complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of 
informants, and conducted in a natural setting. Alternatively a quantitative study, 
consistent with the quantitative paradigm, is an inquiry into a social or human 
problem, based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with 
numbers, and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether 
the predictive generalizations of the theory hold true." 
A paradigm is essentially a world view, which guides the researchers in their 
choice of relevant ontological and epistemological views as well as the methods to 
adopt (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Furthermore, the paradigm of inquiry explains 
aspects of the research inquiry including its ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Creswell, 2009). Ontological assumptions refer to the nature and 
form of reality that can be revealed (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). The 
epistemological approach, meanwhile, clarifies what could be considered as valid 
knowledge (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), as well as the link between the researcher 
and the subject investigated (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). An ontological perception 
can be either objective or subjective. An objective ontological view regards the 
world and reality as independent and distinctive from the individuals in it, while a 
subjective ontology argues for the existence of a link and a dependence between 
reality and people (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).   
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5.4 Private and Public Investment, and Economic Growth 
5.4.1 Theoretical and empirical specification of the model 
The majority of growth models for developing economies trace their roots to the 
neoclassical framework of Solow (1956). In recent years, a growing number of 
works (Khan and Kumar, 1997; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Khan and Khan, 2007; 
Majeed and Khan, 2008) have expanded the framework, attempting to clarify the 
role of private and public investment in growth in developing countries. In order 
to address one of its key research objectives, this study investigates whether 
private-sector investment and public-sector investment have different impacts on 
Iraq’s growth rate.  
The Solow model starts with a production function framework, assuming that 
output is a function of physical capital, labour, and a variable that represents 
factor productivity: 
y = A f(K, L, V)                                                                                                       ( 5.1)  
 
where y is the level of output, K is the stock of physical capital, L represents the 
labour force and V denotes a vector of other variables assumed to influence 
economic growth. The variable A denotes a measure of productivity that is 
assumed to be exogenous. 
The signs of all of the partial derivatives of  y with respect to the arguments of f(•) 
are expected to be positive. Equation (5.1) can be expressed as a growth model as 
follows (Khan and Reinhart, 1990: pp.3-4): 
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Equation (5.2) can be simplified for estimation purposes, with the variable 𝒅𝑲 
replaced with I, leading to the following: 
ΔY
 yt−1
=  β0 +  β1
I
 yt−1
+ β2
ΔL
 Lt−1
+  β3
ΔV
Vt−1
                                                         (‎5.3) 
 
where β0 =
dA
A  
  represents the constant term assumed to capture the growth in 
productivity; β1 = A.
∂y
∂k
 represents the marginal productivity of capital; β2 =
 A .
∂y
∂L
 .
L
y
 represents the elasticity of output with respect to labour; β3 = A .
∂y
∂V
 .
V
y 
 
represents the elasticity of output with respect to the other explanatory factors.  
The more general specification of equation (5.3) is the most commonly used 
model in research of this nature. It has been utilized in various studies that have 
implemented this growth model for developing economies. A weakness of this 
model, from the perspective of market-based development and economic growth 
analysis, is that it does not distinguish between the independent effects of private 
and public investment on economic growth. Since the effects of each are 
combined into a single aggregate investment variable, it would be an impossible 
task to determine whether an increase in private investment with a simultaneous 
decline in public investment would encourage or stifle growth. Hence, when 
estimating the aggregate investment variable, any change in private and public 
investment would not be reflected in total investment. Therefore, several 
empirical studies (Khan and Kumar, 1997; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Zou, 2006; 
Sakr, 1993) have suggested that public and private investment should be 
distinguished between, the argument being that these two types of capital stock 
exhibit different functions and productivity. Therefore, equation (5.3) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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Δy
 yt−1
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 yt−1
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 yt−1
+ β3
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   ( 5. 4) 
where aggregate investment (I) is divided into private investment (PI) and public 
investment (GI) with PI +GI = I. Thus, one can distinguish between the effects of 
the two types of investment on economic growth. If their impacts are found to be 
the same, this could imply that the respective marginal productivities of private 
and public investment are equal, i.e. β1 =  β2. However, if private investment is 
more efficient and productive than public investment, then the estimated 
coefficient of private investment will be larger than the public investment 
coefficient,  β1 >  β2, and vice versa (Ghura, 1997; Kandenge, 2007; Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990; Zou, 2006). Khan and Reinhart (1990), in particular, emphasize 
the need for caution when using the relative sizes of  β1 and β2  to draw 
conclusions about the respective roles of private and public investment. This is 
due to some uncertainty about whether public-sector investment encourages or 
hinders private investment (i.e. has a crowding-in or a crowding-out effect), since 
private and public investment are related in developing countries. 
In the present study, the variable V in the model is expanded to include some 
other determinants of economic growth in addition to capital and labour, such as 
the real exchange rate, the inflation rate and the value of petroleum exports. 
Following Blejer and Khan (1984), equations (5.3) and (5.4) respectively can be 
simplified to a log-linear form with an error term μt for estimation purposes as 
follows: 
𝐋𝐑𝐆𝐃𝐏 =  𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐋𝐆𝐅𝐂𝐅 +  𝛃𝟐 𝐋𝐋𝐀𝐁𝐎𝐔𝐑 +  𝛃𝟑𝐋𝐑𝐎𝐗 +  𝛃𝟒𝐋𝐑𝐄𝐗𝐑 +
𝛃𝟓𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐋 + 𝛍𝐭                                                                                      (𝟓. 𝟓𝒂)                   
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LRGDP =  β0 + β1LRPI + β2 LRPUI +  β3 LLABOUR +  β4LROX +
 β5LREXR + β6LINFL + μt                                                            (  5. 5b)                                  
                                                                         
where LRGDP represents the log of the real gross domestic product; LRPI 
represents the log of real private domestic investment, which is by proxied by the 
log of real private domestic fixed capital formation.; LRPUI represents the log of 
real public investment, which is proxied real public fixed capital formation; 
LLABOUR represents the log of the size of the labour market, comprising people 
aged 15-64; LROX represents the log of the real value of petroleum exports; 
LREXR represents the log of the real exchange rate; and LINFL represents the log 
of the inflation rate based on the GDP deflator.  LGFCF is the log of the gross 
fixed capital formation which is the sum of private and public fixed capital 
formation. 
μt  is the error term, which is assumed to be normally and independently 
distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance, capturing all other 
omitted explanatory variables that may affect economic growth but are not 
included in the model (Brooks, 2014).  β0,  β1,  β2,  β3,  β4,  β5,  β6 are the partial 
elasticities of the explanatory variables.  
Equation (5.5b) represents the economic growth model used for estimation 
purposes in the context of Iraq over the period from 1970 to 2010. 
5.4.2 Hypotheses for the economic growth model 
The following hypotheses are tested with respect to the economic growth model 
(5.5b). The expected signs of the coefficients are shown in Table 5.1.  
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Table  5.1: Economic Growth Model (Measurement of variables and expected 
signs of the coefficients) 
 
Variable 
 
Variable 
measurement 
 
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
 
Sources 
 
RGDP 
Real gross domestic 
product in constant 
2005 prices (US$ 
million). 
Dependent 
variable  
Wai and Wong, 1982; Khan and 
Kumar, 1997; Mlambo and 
Oshikoya, 2001; Sakr, 1993; Ghura 
and Goodwin, 2000; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991; Naa-Idar et al., 
2012; Ndikumana, 2000. 
 
RPI 
Gross domestic private 
fixed capital formation 
in constant 2005 prices 
(US$ million). 
 
+ 
Ramirez & Nazmi, 2003; Oshikoya, 
1994; Isaac and Samwel, 2012; 
Kandenge, 2007; Akanbi and 
Detroit, 2008; Havi et al., 2013; 
Baghebo and Edoumiekumo, 2012. 
 
RPUI 
Real public-sector 
investment in constant 
2005 prices (US$ 
million). 
+ 
 
 
Ramirea and Nazmi, 2003; Blejer 
and Khan, 1984; Frimpong and 
Marbuah, 2010; Naa-Idar et al., 
2012. 
 
LABOUR  
Refers to the physical 
size of labour in the 
labour market, 
comprising people 
aged 15-64. 
+ Blejer and Khan, 1984; Sachs and 
Warner, 2001; Moradi, 2009. 
 
ROX 
Refers to the oil export 
revenue, calculated in 
constant 2005 prices 
(US$ million). 
+ Ghassemi, 1996; Auty, 2001; 
Gylfason, 2001; Nurkse, 1953. 
 
10
REXR 
Nominal exchange rate 
multiplied by the ratio 
of the foreign to local-
currency consumer 
price indexes. 
- 
 
Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Khan 
and Kumar, 1997; Majeed and 
Khan, 2008; Mallick, 2002. 
                                                 
10
 Various measurements are used to calculate the real exchange rate, but the most common is the 
nominal exchange rate (domestic prices of foreign currency) multiplied by the national price level 
(domestic price level divided by foreign price level) (Taylor, 2004; Acosta and Loza, 2005). 
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INFL 
The rate of inflation 
based on the GDP 
deflator (%) 
- 
 
 
+ 
Omoke, 2010; Krugman, 1995; 
Saaed, 2007; Ahmed and Mortaza, 
2005; Baghebo and Edoumiekumo, 
2012; Havi et al., 2013; Majeed and 
Khan, 2008. 
Sweidan, 2004; Mallik and 
Chowdhury, 2001. 
 
Some studies (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Ghura, 1997; 
Khan and Reinhart, 1990) suggest that economic growth in developing countries 
is mainly explained by private investment, public investment, and size of the 
labour force, all of which have a positive effect on it; therefore, it is expected that 
the coefficients of private investment, public investment and the size of the labour 
force will all exhibit positive signs ( 𝛽1 > 0,  𝛽2 > 0,  𝛽3 > 0). 
The empirical literature also indicates that discovering crude oil has, in most oil-
producing countries, given rise to high expectations of enhanced prospects for 
rapid poverty reduction and economic development. In Iraq, economic growth is 
extensively influenced by the volume of petroleum exports. The oil sector 
dominates Iraq's economy, with oil exports accounting for over 90% of 
government revenue, 80% of foreign exchange earnings and about 75% of GDP 
(see Section 4.3). Therefore, it is necessary to include this variable as a 
determinant of Iraq’s economic growth, and it is expected that the coefficient will 
be positive (𝛽4 > 0).  
Furthermore, price fluctuations and volatility in the real exchange rate are also 
considered to influence economic growth, but expectations regarding the signs of 
their estimated coefficients are ambiguous (Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Khan and 
Kumar, 1997; Majeed and Khan, 2008; Mallick, 2002). However, since a high 
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rate of inflation can be a sign of macroeconomic instability and the government’s 
inability to manage the economy effectively, it is expected to have an adverse 
effect on the efficient allocation of resources and thus also on economic 
development. Economists have also long known that poorly managed exchange 
rates can be devastating for economic growth. Avoiding a large overvaluation of 
the currency is one of the most robust imperatives, strongly supported by cross-
country empirical evidence (Easterly, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011; Razin and Collins, 1997; Rodrik, 2008). The reason for this is 
that overvalued exchange rates are associated with shortages of foreign currency, 
rent seeking and corruption, and unsustainably large current account deficits, 
which are damaging to economic growth. However, devaluation of the real 
exchange rate may also harm economic growth by reducing the real income of the 
economy, thus causing production capacity and activity to decline (Isaac and 
Samwel, 2012; Kandenge, 2007). Thus, the coefficients of both the inflation rate 
and the real exchange rate are expected to be negative (𝛽5 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛽6 < 0). 
5.5 Determinants of Domestic Investment in Iraq 
The variables in this model are macroeconomic determinants highlighted in the 
theoretical and empirical studies that were described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Generally, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that there are two basic 
types of factors that influence private investment: economic and non-economic. 
Due to limited studies and difficulties in how to measure non- economic factors, 
only political instability, which is relevant to the case of Iraq, is considered in this 
study. Consequently, this study aims to identify the key macroeconomic variables 
affecting private investment in Iraq.  
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Since the start of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, there has been renewed interest 
in the determinants of private investment in developing countries. The theory on 
the determinants of private investment has proposed several hypotheses 
concerning the key macroeconomic variables that play a crucial role in explaining 
the investment behaviour in a country (see Chapter 2). Based on these hypotheses, 
a number of important studies have modelled the determinants of private 
investment in several developing countries, including Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, 
Nigeria, Ghana and others (Baghebo and Edoumiekumo, 2012; Bakare, 2009; 
Frimpong and Marbuah, 2010; Karagoz, 2010; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Mellati, 
2008; Naa-Idar et al., 2012; Yin, 2011). 
5.5.1 Theoretical framework  
As observed in Chapter 2, the theoretical literature on private investment theories 
is quite large and diverse. The major investment strands are associated with two 
common theories: that of Keynes, and the Jorgenson neoclassical model. The 
Keynesian accelerator model comes with the assumption that the underlying 
production function specifies a positive fixed relationship between the desired 
capital stock and the change in output, and that capital costs have no effect on the 
optimal capital stock (Khan and Khan, 2007; Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001; Sakr, 
1993; Ghura and Goodwin, 2000). In the same context, Greene and Villanueva 
(1991) asserted that private investment had a positive relationship with both per 
capita income and the growth of real output. 
However, neoclassical theory and others later suggested that there was a missing 
component in the Keynesian model. Therefore, the neoclassical approach further 
assume that the investment function was proportional to the cost of capital (see 
Section 2.4). Although, in the theoretical literature, the cost of capital is argued to 
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depend on the interest rate, the price of capital goods, the rate of depreciation, and 
the tax structure, in various empirical studies only the interest rate has been used 
to represent the cost of capital. The real interest rate represents the usage cost of 
capital or the cost of credit for firms. A negative relation is expected because 
increases in the interest rate are likely to represent a disincentive for potential 
investors (Ang, 2010; Ribeiro and Teixeira, 2001, Khan and Khan, 2007; Nwosa 
Philip Ifeakachukwu, 2013; Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 
1982). On the other hand, in the neoliberal approach, financial deepening and high 
interest rates are important for stimulating growth. According to this view, 
investment is positively related to the real interest rate (see Section 2.5). The basic 
notion behind this is that high interest rates increase savings through financial 
intermediaries and this raises the amount of investible funds. This is known as the 
McKinnon-Showan hypothesis and is based on the assumption that the quantity 
rather than the cost of financial resources is the main constraint on investment 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
At the theoretical level, public investment has an ambiguous effect on private 
investment. The relationship between the two can either be positive or negative. 
Keynesian economists often advocate a mixed economy, arguing that private-
sector decisions sometimes lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes that 
require active policy responses from the public sector, in particular monetary 
policy actions from the central bank and fiscal policy actions from the 
government, in order for output to be stabilized over the business cycle (Arestis, 
2011). According to Keynesian theory, public-sector capital has a positive impact 
on private investment, since higher public expenditure and lower taxes enhance 
aggregate demand through the multiplier effect (Ahmad and Qayyum, 2008; Yin, 
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2011). The enhanced demand is an incentive for the acceleration of investment 
and improved productivity from private investment (see Sections 2.3 and 3.2). 
Generally, it is evident that in developing countries the government plays a 
substantial role in economic activity. The public sector can increase productivity 
by generating positive externalities such as investments in infrastructure and 
public services (e.g. health or education), which in turn can lead to an increase in 
the demand for private-sector inputs and services. The availability and quality of 
such services also attracts private investment since it improves the ease of doing 
business in a country. In this scenario, public and private can complement each 
other. As observed in Section 3.2, this is known in the economic literature as the 
“crowding in” effect. Contrary to this hypothesis, it is also argued that public 
investment may “crowd out” private investment, when the public sector competes 
with the private sector for both physical and financial resources, especially when 
additional public investment requires the financing of budget deficits through 
taxes and borrowing. In this case, private investment may decrease by the same 
amount as the increase in public expenditure (Karagoz, 2010; Khan and Kumar, 
1997). 
Recent theories have incorporated uncertainty into the explanations of investment 
behaviour. The theoretical expectations are different, but most of them predict a 
negative relationship between uncertainty and private investment. Different 
proxies are used to examine uncertainty, including economic instability 
(Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Mellati, 2008; Pindyck, 1991; Serven, 2002). In the 
case of developing countries, economic uncertainty can be measured in terms of 
the volatility of inflation, the real exchange rate and output growth (Section 3.4.4). 
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The real exchange rate is one of the elements that determine the real cost of 
imports and exports demand. The predicted effect of the real exchange rate on 
private investment is ambiguous. Devaluation of a currency would raise the cost 
of imported capital goods, reducing the profitability of investment and possibly 
causing investment to decline. In addition, the depreciation of a currency could 
lead to a reduction in the real income of the economy, causing the production 
capacity and activity to decline. On the other hand, a lower real exchange rate 
may have a positive influence on investment in sectors producing internationally 
traded goods. A lower real exchange rate may therefore raise the profitability of 
the tradable sector and increase the competitiveness and volume of exports 
(Serven, 1998, 2002, 2009) (see Section 3.4.3).  
Many recent studies have shifted their focus to political instability and/or war, due 
to the fact that these variables have been identified as major obstacles to the 
achievement of economic development because they limit the volume of private 
investment. There is a number of empirical evidence supporting the view that 
non-economic factors such as political instability and wars have an adverse 
influence on private investment. The argument is that political instability 
increases uncertainty in the economy and discourages risk-averse entrepreneurs 
from taking advantage of profitable investment opportunities (Aysan et al., 2006; 
Bakare, 2009; Campos and Nugent, 2003; Kehinde et al., 2012) (see also Section 
3.5). 
5.5.2 Empirical specification of the Private Investment model  
For developed countries, the investment function is often described from a 
neoclassical perspective, which was initially based on flexible accelerator models 
(Jorgenson, 1971; Monadjemi and Huh, 1998) (see Chapter 2). Various 
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researchers, such as Blejer and Khan (1984), Chhibber et al. (1992), Greene and 
Villanueva (1991), Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) and Wai and Wong (1982), 
have since modified the flexible accelerator model, in an effort to take account of 
factors that can best capture the behaviour of private investment decision making 
in developing countries (see also Sections 2.7 and 3.2.1). It should be noted that 
the flexible accelerator model has been confirmed by these studies as the most 
popular theory for applied work. However, a modified version of the flexible 
accelerator model has been used in most of these empirical studies in the context 
of developing countries, due to data limitations and structural constraints. 
Similarly, a flexible accelerator model will be applied in this study in order to 
clarify the pattern of investment behaviour in developing countries, taking Iraq as 
a case study. 
The choice to use the modified accelerator model rather than the more 
conventional formulation of the neoclassical investment model was based on the 
fact that the traditional model of investment assumes enlightened government 
intervention and free market conditions, which are unrealistic in the context of 
developing countries, especially oil-exporting countries such as Iraq. The absence 
of asset and stock markets, structural constraints and the strong presence of the 
government in the economy through the huge oil export revenues are other 
reasons for selecting a flexible accelerator model. Moreover, the monetary policy 
in developing countries encourages the rate of interest rate to be lower than the 
market rate, while overvaluation of the local currency is pursued in an effort to 
slow down the inflation rate (see Section 4.2.2). 
According to the accelerator model, the desired capital stock in any time period is 
assumed to be proportional to the expected level of output. In other words, a fixed 
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ratio (𝛼) is assumed between the desired capital stock (𝐾𝑡∗) and the expected 
output (𝑌𝑡
∗). Mathematically, this proposition is expressed as follows (Eklund, 
2013): 
Kt
∗ = αYt
∗                                                                                                      ( 5.6)   
where 𝐾𝑡
∗ represents the desired capital stock held by the private sector in period t, 
Yt
∗ is the expected output in period t and 𝛼 is a constant denoting the capital output 
ratio.  
The flexible accelerator makes the generalization that net investment is a given 
proportion of the investment needed to attain the desired capital stock. Thus, the 
desired level of gross fixed investment, in any period t, can be divided into two 
parts. The first consists of net investment, whereas the second consists of the 
replacement of capital, known as depreciation. The gross fixed investment can 
therefore be represented as: 
𝐈𝐭
∗ =  𝚫𝐊𝐭 + 𝐃𝐭                                                                                                 ( 5. 𝟕)                                                                              
where 𝐼𝑡
∗  is gross investment, which is equal to net investment (ΔK) plus 
replacement investment (D).  
The standard assumption is that depreciation or replacement investment is a 
proportion of the existing capital stock (𝛿𝐾𝑡−1). Therefore, the above equation 
can be simplified as follows:  
It
∗ =  Kt
∗ − Kt−1 + δKt−1 ; ΔKt =  Kt
∗ − Kt−1  
It
∗ =  Kt
∗ − (Kt−1 − δKt−1) 
𝐈𝐭
∗ =  𝐊𝐭
∗ − (𝟏 − 𝛅)𝐊𝐭−𝟏                                                                                       ( 5. 𝟖) 
 
 Introducing a lag operator (L) into the above equation ( 𝐿𝐾𝑡
∗ =  𝐾𝑡−1), equation 
(5.8) is revised as follows: 
 158 
 
𝐼𝑡
∗ =  𝐾𝑡
∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝐿𝐾𝑡
∗ 
It
∗ = [1 − (1 − δ)L]Kt
∗                                                                                    ( 5.9) 
                                                                        
From equation (5.6), the accelerator principle is presented as 𝐾𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑌𝑡
∗ . 
Substituting capital stock (𝐾𝑡
∗) into equation (5.9) we have: 
It
∗ = [1 − (1 − δ)L]αYt
e                                                                                  ( 5. 10) 
Where 𝐼𝑡
∗     is the desired level of investment in period t; δ ,  the rate of 
depreciation of capital stock; L,  the lag operator; and Yt
e, the expected level of 
output in period t. 
This is simply the well-known flexible accelerator model, which assumes that, 
given flexible prices and partial adjustment toward the desired capital stock in 
each period, investment depends on output (Jorgenson, 1971). Lags are included 
in the capital stock due to the fact that the unit price of capital increases with the 
adjustment speed (Lucas, 1967). 
In order to incorporate the effect of a time lag between the expected and actual 
period of an investment project, partial adjustment models were introduced in 
later versions of the flexible accelerator models of investment. In these models, 
actual gross investment is assumed to adjust in response to the difference between 
desired investment in period t and actual investment in period t-1. The adjustment 
process of such investment models can be represented thus: 
(𝐈𝐭 − 𝐈𝐭−𝟏) =  𝛃(𝐈𝐭
∗  − 𝐈𝐭−𝟏)                                                                         ( 5. 𝟏𝟏)                                                                         
 
where 𝐼𝑡 ,  𝐼𝑡−1 denote the levels of capital stock in period t and in the previous 
period t-1 respectively, and  𝛽 is the speed of adjustment, whose value is assumed 
to lie between zero and one (Eklund, 2013). 
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Several attempts have been made to determine the speed of adjustment with which 
private investment responds to the difference between desired and actual 
investment. Recent empirical works (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Chhibber et al., 
1988) have identified such factors as GDP, government investment and the real 
interest rate as having crucial impacts on the ability and motivation of private 
investors to implement their investment projects, and thereby on the speed of 
adjustment. Based on the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, and especially 
Section 3.3, additional variables are included in the model. These are the real 
exchange rate and the inflation rate. Based on Chapter 4, a dummy variable 
(DUM) is also included, to capture the effect of the wars on private domestic 
investment. Thus, this study attempts to model the speed of adjustment by 
incorporating the above factors into a mathematical formulation of the following 
form:  
β =  𝛽0 +
1
(𝐼𝑡
∗−𝐼𝑡−1 )
 ( β1RGDP +  β2RPUI +  β3REXR +  β4RINTR +  β5INFL +
  β6DUM                                                                                                                      ( 5.12) 
 where RGDP represents gross domestic product, RPUI is government investment, 
REXR is the real exchange rate, RINTR is the real interest rate, INFL is the 
inflation rate and DUM is as defined above.  
 
By substituting the function for 𝛽 from equation (5.12) into equation (5.11), we 
have 
𝐼𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡−1 = [ 𝛽0 +
1
(𝐼𝑡
∗ − 𝐼𝑡−1 )
 ( β1RGDP +  β2RPUI +  β3REXR +  β4RINTR +  β5INFL
+   β6DUM )] (𝐼𝑡
∗ − 𝐼𝑡−1 )                                                     ( 5. 13) 
 Equation (5.13) can be simplified as follows: 
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(𝐈𝐭 − 𝐈𝐭−𝟏) =   𝛃𝟎 (𝐈𝐭
∗ − 𝐈𝐭−𝟏) +  𝛃𝟏𝐑𝐆𝐃𝐏 +  𝛃𝟐𝐑𝐏𝐔𝐈 +  𝛃𝟑𝐑𝐄𝐗𝐑 +  𝛃𝟒𝐑𝐈𝐍𝐓𝐑 +
 𝛃
𝟓
𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐋 +   𝛃
𝟔
𝐃𝐔𝐌                                                                                                  ( 5. 𝟏𝟒)                                                                                
Substituting equation (5.10) into equation (5.14), we have 
It  =   β0 [1 − (1 − δ)L]αYt
e +  β1RGDP +  β2RPUI +  β3REXR +  β4RINTR +
 β5INFL +   β6DUM + (I −  β0 )It−1                                                        ( 5.15) 
Equation (5.15) above can be simplified (as shown below) by excluding the 
depreciation of capital goods due to the difficulties of measuring the depreciation 
rate in developing countries (see Section 2.7). This is the type of investment 
model that has been used in numerous empirical studies (see Section 3.2.1). This 
model attempts to incorporate variables that best capture private investment 
decision-making behaviour. The empirical model defined in equation (5.16) will 
be examined for Iraq. This will address the second objective from Chapter 1.  
RPI =  β0 +  β1(RGDP) +  β2(RPUI) +  β3(REXR) +  β4(RINTR) +  β5(INFL)  
+  β6(DUM) + μt                                                                      ( 5. 16) 
A double-log functional form is estimated for equation (5.16) as follows: 
LRPI =  β0 +  β1LRGDP +  β2LRPUI +  β3LREXR +  β4LRINTR +  β5LINFL +  β6DUM
+  μt                                                                                                 ( 5. 17) 
Where LRPI represents the log of real private investment, which is proxied by the 
log of real private fixed capital formation. LRGDP represents the log of the real 
gross domestic product. LRPUI represents the log of real public investment, 
which is proxied by the log of real public fixed capital formation. LREXR 
represents the log of the real exchange rate, calculated by multiplying the nominal 
exchange rate by the ratio of foreign to domestic prices using an appropriate index 
of prices (see Table 5.2). LINFL represents the log of the inflation rate based on 
the GDP deflator. In addition to these variables, based on the discussion in 
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Chapter 4, the long-run model includes one dummy variable to capture war or 
political instability (DUM = 1 for the war years 1980-1987, 1990-1992, and 2003, 
and 0 in other years) (see Table 5.1). DUM is treated as an exogenous variable in 
the model, whose value is specified outside the system. However, in the short-run 
model, two dummy variables are included: DUM1 captures the period of the Iran–
Iraq War (1980-1988), while DUM2 captures the period when international 
economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq (1990-2003).  β0 is the intercept,  β1 to 
 β6 the estimated parameters, and μt  an error term.  
In these models, all time-series variables are transformed into their logarithms, 
symbolized by the letter L in the variable names.
11
 In econometrics, it is common 
to take the natural logarithm of a time series if it seems to be growing over time. 
For example, the logarithmic transformation is an appropriate means of 
transforming a highly skewed variable into one that is more approximately normal 
(Gujarati, 2012). This is because series expressed in logarithms present roughly 
constant variances, while the variance of a level series tends to increase with the 
size of the sample (Ribeiro and Teixeira, 2001). Another justification for using the 
log transformation is a purely practical one, as it generally makes time series data 
better behaved (Koop et al., 2000).  
5.5.3 Hypotheses regarding the determinants of private investment 
The following hypotheses are tested regarding the determinants shown in the 
private investment model (5.17). The expected signs of the coefficients are 
presented in Table 5.2. 
                                                 
11
 Details about logarithms are given in any standard mathematical economics textbook (Enders, 2004; Griffiths et al., 
2008). If a series, Y, is growing at a roughly constant rate, then the time series plot of ln(Y) will approximate a straight line. 
In this common case, ln(Y) will generally be well behaved (Brooks, 2014). 
Note also that in regressions of logged variables, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. It can also be shown that 
ln(Yt) - ln(Yt-1) is approximately equal to the percentage change in Y between periods t-1 and t. For all these reasons, it is 
often convenient to work with logged series (Griffiths et al., 2008). 
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H1: GDP is predicted to have a positive impact on private investment. The 
empirical evidence is consistent with this view and shows high output 
growth to be associated with high investment. Since there is no ambiguity 
regarding this variable in the empirical literature, we also predict this 
variable to exert a positive impact on private investment (  β1˃0)  (see 
Chapter 3). 
H2: It has been suggested that public-sector investment affects private 
investment, though its impact remains ambiguous. Public investment may 
crowd in private investment via positive externalities of infrastructure 
(communication, transportation, roads, electricity, etc.). However, public 
investment may also crowd out private investment due to competition for 
both physical and financial resources, for example when additional public 
investment requires budget deficits to be financed through increased taxes 
and borrowing. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of the public-sector 
variable could be positive ( β2˃0), or negative (β2˂ 0 ) (see Chapter 3).  
H3: The coefficient of the exchange rate is expected to be negative 
(β3˂ 0 ). This is because devaluation/depreciation of the local currency 
increases the real cost of purchasing imported capital. Thus, it lowers 
private-sector real wealth and expenditure through its effect on domestic 
prices. However, other arguments suggests that the supply side of currency 
devaluation/depreciation may have a positive impact on investment, 
particularly in sectors producing internationally traded goods, through 
greater international competitiveness and export volumes (see Chapter 3).  
H4: The coefficient of the real interest rate could be negative 
 (β4 < 0 ) or positive  (β4 >  0)  (see Table 5.2). Higher interest 
rates may be negatively associated with private investment due to 
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the fact that a high cost of borrowing investment funds may be 
associated with lower investment profitability. On the other hand, 
high interest rates may induce investment by encouraging savings, 
increasing the volume and availability of domestic credit (see 
Chapters 2 and 3.2.1). 
H5: Macroeconomic instability increases uncertainty and have an 
adverse effect on capital formation. High inflation rates are an 
indicator of macroeconomic instability and are expected to have an 
adverse effect on private investment(β5˂ 0 ) (see Section 3.4). 
H6: The sign of the dummy variable is also predicted to be 
negative (β6˂ 0 ). Both war and political instability could have a 
massive impact, discouraging private investment by increasing 
macroeconomic instability (see Chapter 4). 
Table  5.2: Private Investment Model (Measurement of variables and expected 
signs of the coefficients) 
 
Variable 
 
Variable 
measurement 
 
Expected sign 
of coefficient 
 
Sources 
 
RPI 
Gross domestic private 
fixed capital formation 
in constant 2005 prices 
in millions of US 
dollars 
Dependent  
variable  
Khan and Khan, 2007; Mlambo 
and Oshikoya, 2001; Sakr, 
1993; Ghura and Goodwin, 
2000. 
 
RGDP 
Real gross domestic 
product in constant 
2005 prices in millions 
of US dollars 
 
+ 
Bakare, 2009; Chirinko, 1993; 
Greene and Villanueva, 1991; 
Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001; 
Naa-Idar et al., 2012; 
Ndikumana, 2000; Oshikoya, 
1994. 
 Real public-sector 
investment in constant 
+ Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009; 
Blejer and Khan, 1984; 
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RPUI 2005 prices in millions 
of US dollars 
 
 
 
- 
Frimpong and Marbuah, 2010; 
Naa-Idar et al., 2012; 
Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980. 
 
Chhibber et al., 1988; Rossiter, 
2002. 
 
REXR 
Nominal exchange rate 
multiplied by the ratio 
of the foreign to the 
local currency 
consumer price index. 
- 
 
Duncan, 1999; Kehinde et al., 
2012; Ribeiro and Teixeira, 
2001; Rodrik, 2008; Zardashty, 
2014. 
 
RINTR 
 
The real interest rate is 
the nominal interest 
rate adjusted for 
inflation; it can be 
calculated as the 
nominal interest rate 
minus the inflation 
rate. 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973. 
 
Blejer and Khan, 1984; Nwosa 
Philip Ifeakachukwu, 2013; 
Shaw, 1973; Sundararajan and 
Thakur, 1980; Wai and Wong, 
1982. 
 
INFL 
 
The rate of inflation 
based on the GDP 
deflator (%). 
 
+ 
- 
 
Tobin, 1969. 
 
Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1989; 
Majeed and Khan, 2008. 
War or 
political 
instability 
A dummy for war/ 
political instability 
(DUM = 1 for for the 
years 1980-1987, 1990-
1992, and 2003; and 
DUM = 0, otherwise). 
 
- 
 
Asante, 2000; Feng, 2001. 
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5.6 Determinants of Public Investment in Iraq 
5.6.1 Specification of determinants of public investment 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, there is a substantial consensus among empirical 
studies that the provision of infrastructure services in oil-exporting countries is the 
government’s responsibility. The government has a significant role in 
infrastructure development and recognizes that well-targeted infrastructure 
investment generates significant social and economic benefits. Investing in 
infrastructure helps to increase productivity and competitiveness and the capacity 
of the private and public sectors to deliver high-quality services. Eventually, it 
helps to establish a stronger economy, to increase real income and to improve 
community well-being (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Khan and Kumar, 1997; Majeed 
and Khan, 2008). 
The current belief is that infrastructure investment is important to economic 
growth. The implications for policy makers seem to be clear: in cases where 
public investment has been found to have a positive effect on economic growth, 
public investment should be increased in order to boost the economy. Indeed, such 
policies have been strongly supported by politicians and international institutes 
such as the WB and the IMF as the right option for many countries (Clements et 
al., 2003). 
Little research has been conducted, however, on the determinants of public 
investment in developing countries. Thus, the present study suggests that 
developing a model of the determinants of public investment in Iraq over the 
period 1970-2010 will be a significant contribution to the economic literature in 
developing countries. The lack of analysis is especially surprising since, in a great 
majority of countries all over the world, productive government services have 
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declined as a percentage of GDP due to the observation that public investment is 
less productive than private. Simultaneously, productivity growth has dropped 
worldwide. Aschauer (1989) assumed that this decrease in productive government 
services was crucial to explaining the decline in general productivity growth. This 
assumption has received a great deal of attention in the literature ever since (De 
Haan et al., 1996; Saghir and Khan, 2012; Välilä and Mehrotra, 2005). 
Therefore, following prior empirical studies (Clements et al., 2003; De Haan et 
al., 1996; Saghir and Khan, 2012; Välilä and Mehrotra, 2005), this section focuses 
mainly on the determinants of public capital investment as a relevant factor in 
explaining economic growth on the one hand, and in providing positive 
externalities for private investment on the other hand.  
Based on the above arguments, a particular emphasis will be placed on the likely 
effects of per capita income, government current expenditure and oil revenue in 
explaining public investment, as it is obvious from the earlier discussion that these 
effects could differ among countries and that the debate can only be settled with 
country-specific evidence. Public investment is assumed to be a function of real 
per capita income, real public current expenditure and real oil export revenue. The 
model specification is as follows: 
RPUI =  β0 +  β1RGDPC + β2RGC +  β3ROX + μt                       ( 5.18a) 
LRPUI = β0 + β1LRGDPC + β2LRGC + β3LROX + μt                 (5.18b) 
where RPUI represents real public investment, RGDPC real per capita income, 
RGC real public current expenditure and ROX real oil export revenue. The 
variables are transformed into their logarithms, as shown in equation (5.18b), for 
the purposes of the estimation. 
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With this model, a third objective of this thesis will be addressed through the 
discovery of the indirect impact of oil export revenue on private investment. It is 
clear that, in Iraq, the bulk of government revenues are raised through oil revenue. 
Taxation, as a fiscal instrument and source of government income, is negligible in 
the country’s economy. Hence, this study suggests that oil revenue could provide 
an indirect boost to private investment through its effect on public investment in 
goods such as high-quality road infrastructure, electrical and gas facilities, public 
transportation, and so on, that in turn reflect positively on private investment.  
5.6.2 Hypotheses regarding the determinants of public investment 
The studies by Clements et al. (2003), Saghir and Khan (2012) and Tanzi and 
Hamid (1997) suggest that public investment in developing countries is strongly 
explained by real per capita income, which has a positive impact on it; therefore, 
it is expected that the coefficient of real per capita income will be positive 
( 𝛽1 > 0). 
Real public current expenditure (RGC) is expected to have a positive impact on 
public investment, thus  𝛽2 > 0. According to the literature, the government’s 
current expenditure, classified under non-productive or consumption expenditure, 
includes aspects such as defence, interest payments, law and order, public 
administration, public health and education, and the maintenance of government 
machinery. This sort of expenditure does not create any productive assets that 
might bring income or returns to the government (Todaro and Smith, 2009). On 
the other hand, this type of government expenditure helps to create a healthy 
environment for economic activity and increases aggregate demand. Due to 
economic growth, the government will then be able to generate income in the 
form of duties and taxes. Based on this argument, the theoretical and empirical 
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literature expects this variable to exert a positive impact on public investment in 
the long run.  
As is well known, in the case of oil-exporting countries, public investment is 
strongly determined by oil export revenue, since a large proportion of government 
income is obtained from oil exports. Thus, a positive relationship is expected 
between oil export revenue and public investment in the case of Iraq ( 𝛽3 > 0).  
Table  5.3: Public Investment Model (Measurement of variables and expected 
signs of the coefficients) 
 
Variable 
 
Variable 
measurement 
 
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
 
Sources 
 
RPUI 
Real public-sector 
investment in constant 
2005 prices in millions 
of US dollars 
Dependent  
variable 
Clements et al., 2003; Saghir 
and Khan, 2012; Tanzi and 
Hamid, 1997; Ghassemi, 
1996. 
 
RGDPC 
Real per capita income 
in constant 2005 prices 
in millions of US 
dollars 
+ 
 
Clements et al., 2003; Saghir 
and Khan, 2012; Tanzi and 
Hamid, 1997. 
RGC Real government 
current expenditure in 
constant 2005 prices in 
millions of US dollars 
+ Ghassemi, 1996; Saghir and 
Khan, 2012. 
ROX Real oil export revenue 
in constant 2005 prices 
in millions of US 
dollars 
+ Ghassemi, 1996; Clements et 
al., 2003. 
 
 169 
 
5.7 Data Sources 
Time-series data on the selected macroeconomic variables for Iraq were collected 
for the period 1970-2010. All variables were calculated in real terms using a GDP 
deflator index (2005=100). Annual data were chosen because most of the data are 
reported annually. It is generally recommended that more observations are better 
when testing hypotheses. However, Shiller and Perron (1985) claimed that, when 
analysing the long-run characteristics of economic time series, the length of the 
time series is much more important than the frequency of observations. Moreover, 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) observed that cointegration is a long-run notion and thus 
requires a long span of data. Hence, they argued, there is little to be gained from 
increasing the number of observations by using a higher frequency within the 
same time span, but there is a gain to be made by using the same frequency of 
data over a longer time span. Kennedy (2003) also explained that the power of 
unit root tests relies far more on the span of the data than on the number of 
observations, claiming that “. . . for macroeconomic data where long business 
cycles are of importance, a long span of annual data would be preferred to a 
shorter span with, say, monthly data, even though the latter case may have more 
observations. . .” because “. . . the longer span has a greater chance of containing a 
structural break.” (p. 353). 
There are no direct sources available that provide all of the data. Thus, the data 
were derived from various sources. The time-series data for real GDP and labour 
size were obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) database. The data for private fixed capital formation 
(PFCF) and public fixed capital formation (PFCF) were obtained from the 
Handbook of Annual Statistics published by the Iraqi Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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Data on the exchange rate, inflation rate, and real interest rate were collated from 
various online sources, such as the World Development Indicators of the WB, and 
the International Financial Statistics (IFC) and Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED) databases. Data on the value of Iraqi petroleum exports were collected 
from annual statistics series compiled by OPEC. 
The time-series data are collected from a wide range of national and international 
sources, then validated and processed. The data cover long periods, with different 
measurements, for almost all economies of the world. All the sources have 
previously been used by key studies, attesting to their reliability. With regards to 
the PFCF and PUFCF from the Iraq Central Bureau of Statistics, this is the only 
source for these data and can be deemed fairly reliable. Until other sources 
become available, this appears to be the most appropriate source of data for this 
analysis. 
5.8 Method of Analysis 
Given that time-series data are used, a time-series econometric approach is 
applied, with a focus on cointegration (Gujarati, 2011; Koop, 2013). Before 
applying the cointegration test and the VECM, it is necessary to determine the 
order of integration of the variables. A cointegration relationship is present within 
a set of non-stationary time series when it is possible to identify a linear 
combination of those variables that gives stationary results. In other words, when 
the variables have unit roots, but some linear combination of them is stationary, 
then it can be concluded that the variables are cointegrated (Brooks, 2014; Koop, 
2013; Martin, 2012). To determine this, a unit root test is conducted. According to 
theoretical econometrics, several methods can be used to test for stationarity (e.g., 
the Correlogram, the autocorrelation function, the Box-Pierce Q statistic and 
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Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test, the Jarque-Bera test statistics, and 
ARCH heteroskedasticity) (Brooks, 2014; Griffiths et al., 2008). However, this 
study employs the ADF and PP tests (Granger, 1986). 
After the unit root tests for stationarity have been performed, the Johansen (1988) 
and Johansen and Juselius (1990) approach is employed to identify the number of 
cointegration vectors and to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship among 
the variables. As noted before, by definition, two or more series are said to be 
cointegrated if they exhibit a well-established long-term relationship. This 
normally implies that the variables must have long-term comovement (trending 
together). For time-series variables to exhibit cointegration, they may be non-
stationary in levels, but their regression relationship must have a valid long-run 
relationship. Thus, testing for cointegration becomes very important when dealing 
with time-series data. Subsequently, the VECM is conducted to find the short-run 
dynamic relationship between the variables and better understand the investment 
behaviour. Finally, it is important to check for multicollinearity in the models. 
The empirical results and discussion of them are presented in the next chapter. 
5.8.1 Tests for stationarity 
To evaluate any long-run cointegrated relationships among the different variables 
by applying Johansen’s maximum likelihood approach, it was necessary to test for 
the stationarity of the variables and to find the order of integration of each of the 
series used in the model. If variables are non-stationary, this leads to spurious 
regression (with a stochastic trend) which cannot be used for the intended purpose 
(Griffiths et al., 2008; Gujarati, 2012; Koop, 2013). As a result, confidence 
intervals and hypothesis tests would be unreliable (Gujarati, 2012). Although 
spurious regressions may have high R-squares and significant t- and F-statistics, 
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the estimated coefficients are unreliable, it is difficult to generalize from the 
results, and they may not have any economic meaning. Hence, in this study, two 
unit root tests, the ADF and the PP, were conducted on the individual series to 
offer evidence as to whether the variables were stationary and integrated to the 
same order.  
5.8.1.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
First, a standard approach is used to examine the stationarity of the time series, in 
the form of unit root tests. Several procedures for the test of order of integration 
have been developed, of which the most popular is the ADF test. It relies on 
rejecting a null hypothesis of a unit root (the series are non-stationary) in favour 
of the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The time-series variables are 
transformed into log form for easier analysis and interpretation. In most 
econometric analyses, the natural logarithm of the time series of each variable is 
preferred. This is because series expressed in logarithms present roughly constant 
variances, while the variance of a level series tends to increase with the size of the 
sample (Ribeiro and Teixeira, 2001). 
It is necessary to test for stationarity and to find the order of integration of each 
series used in the model. The ADF test for a unit root is formulated by the 
following regression model, which is referred to as a random walk with drift 
(Gujarati, 2012): 
∆𝒀𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜹𝒀𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏∆𝒀𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐∆𝒀𝒕−𝟐 … … . … . + 𝜷𝒏∆𝒀𝒕−𝒏 + 𝜺𝒕     5(5.19) 
where Y represents respectively RPI, RGDP, RPUI, REXR, RINTR, and INFL, 
the set of macroeconomic variables under study. Δ represents the differencing 
operator. 𝛼0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽𝑛 are the estimated parameters and 𝜀𝑡 is white noise. 
The null hypothesis (H0) in this case can be described as follows: 
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H0: 𝛿 = 0  stipulates that Yt has a unit root or has a stochastic trend, 
meaning that the time series is non-stationary. 
Meanwhile, the alternative hypothesis (H1) is as follows: 
H1: 𝛿 < 0  stipulates that the time series Yt is stationary. 
A time trend can be added to the above equation (5.19) when Yt is stationary 
around a deterministic linear process, referred to as a random walk with drift 
around a deterministic trend. The revised equation is written as follows: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽1∆𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑌𝑡−2 … … . … . + 𝛽𝑛∆𝑌𝑡−𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                     ( 5. 20) 
where t is the time trend and γ is the estimated parameter for the time trend. 
An important feature of the ADF unit root test is to select an appropriate lag 
length. According to Enders (2004), a small number of lags means that the 
residuals in the regression equation are akin to white noise processes, while a high 
number of lags reduces the power of the test to reject the null of a unit root. This 
is because the increased number of lags requires the estimation of additional 
parameters and a loss of degrees of freedom. The econometric software package 
E-Views used in this study automatically selected an optimal lag length for each 
time-series variable based on the frequency of the data used. 
5.8.1.2 Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root test  
Phillips and Perron (1988) developed a more comprehensive theory of unit root 
non-stationarity by extending the Dickey-Fuller model and making a semi-
parametric correction for autocorrelation. The PP test can be used as an alternative 
to the unit root process and is even more robust when there is weak 
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autocorrelation and heteroskedastic regression residuals. Enders (2004) suggests 
that the PP test can be utilized if the residual series of a unit root process is 
heterogeneous or weakly dependent. The PP unit root test is based on the same 
hypotheses as the ADF unit root test. The null hypothesis is that the series is non-
stationary (H0: 𝛿 = 0) and the alternative hypothesis is that the series is stationary 
(H1: 𝛿 < 0) (Brooks, 2014). However, the key differences are that the PP unit root 
test incorporates an automatic correction to the ADF to allow for autocorrelated 
residuals, employs different lagged profiles for the estimated variables and 
sometimes produces low levels of significance. In the end, though, the test 
provides conclusions that are qualitatively the same as those produced by the ADF 
test (Gujarati and Handelshøyskolen, 2011).  
5.8.2 Johansen cointegration test 
The Johansen approach was developed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship among variables 
when a unit root is confirmed for a data series. Hence, once it has been determined 
that the variables under examination are integrated to the same order, the 
cointegration test can be implemented (Alexander, 2008). The null hypothesis is 
non-cointegration, against the alternative of the existence of cointegration, and is 
tested using the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure. In other words, the 
Johansen method uses maximum likelihood estimation to identify whether 
cointegrated vectors exist in non-stationary time series. 
There is more than one method for performing cointegration tests. This study uses 
the multivariate cointegration method (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 
1990). This approach is preferred to the Engle-Granger method, because the latter 
has several econometric limitations. Banerjee et al. (1993) and Davidson and 
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MacKinnon (1993) revealed that there is a substantial small-sample bias in 
estimates based on the Engle-Granger test. Banerjee (1998) confirmed that the 
size of the small sample bias is inversely associated with the value of the R-square 
in the Engle-Granger residual based on the cointegration regression. Moreover, 
according to Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), a relatively low value of R-square 
in the cointegration regression should be taken as a warning that the two-step 
Engle-Granger procedure might not operate well. 
Additionally, the Engle-Granger cointegration procedure pays no attention to the 
probability of multiple cointegrating relationships. Economic variables can exhibit 
more than one long-run relationship in a cointegrated equilibrium space. The 
Engle-Granger method depends highly on super-convergence outcomes and 
conducts OLS estimation to derive the parameter estimates of the long-run or 
cointegration equations. However, OLS estimates are widely sensitive to the 
arbitrary normalization implicit in the selection of the dependent variable in the 
cointegration regression equation (Harris and Sollis, 2003). This implies that 
different arbitrary normalizations may provide different empirical results. 
In addition, the Engle-Granger method omits short-term dynamics from the 
cointegrating regression. Doing so results in increased bias and might cause a loss 
of information and thus reduced efficiency of the parameters of interest in the 
cointegrating relationships. Finally, and most importantly, the Engle-Granger 
procedure does not allow testing for various restrictions or exclusions on 
individual variables of the observed cointegrating vectors. When examining the 
assumptions associated with long-run economic relationships, this shortcoming of 
the Engle-Granger procedure could create a severe problem. 
However, the Johansen-Juselius approach is able to overcome these weaknesses 
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and offers a very flexible format for considering the properties of the estimators 
under different hypotheses about the underlying data-generating process. In 
addition, the Johansen-Juselius procedure operates more effectively than other 
estimators of long-run parameters, even in the presence of abnormal errors and 
unknown dynamics (Gonzalo, 1994). Another advantage of Johansen 
cointegration is that, unlike the Engle-Granger procedure, it is capable of 
identifying the number of cointegrating vectors in the relationship. According to 
Cuthbertson et al. (1992), the Johansen-Juselius approach is preferable in the case 
of more than two variables. It has also been found to be the most powerful 
approach even for the bivariate system (Gonzalo, 1994). 
The cointegration test in the present study uses a version of the Johansen-Juselius 
approach that follows those in previous studies (Abdullahi et al., 2012; Atukeren, 
2005; Oriavwote and Oyovwi, 2013). Two test statistics, the trace statistic (λtrace ) 
and the max-eigenvalue statistic ( λmax ), are employed to determine the 
appropriate rank and to identify the number of cointegration vectors. Then, all 
variables are treated as potentially endogenous and a vector autoregressive 
specification is used. The likelihood ratio statistic for the trace test (λtrace ), as 
proposed by Johansen (1988), is 
λtrace (r) =  −T ∑ 𝐿𝑛(1 − λi )
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+1              
where r = 0, 1, 3, ….p-1, the symbol λi  denotes the largest predicted value of the 
characteristic root (eigenvalue) achieved from the estimated matrix (π), and T is 
the number of observations that can be used in the model. 
The λtrace  statistic examines the null hypothesis that the number of distinct 
characteristic roots is less than or equal to r, against the general alternative. The 
 177 
 
value of λtrace  in this statistical test will be lower when the values of the 
characteristic roots are close to zero. In other words, the value of λtrace will be 
larger when the values of the characteristic roots are further from zero (Griffiths et 
al., 2008). 
The maximum eigenvalue λmax statistic, as proposed by Johansen, is as follows: 
λmax (r, r + 1) =  −T ∑ 𝐿𝑛(1 − λr+1 )
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+1            
The λmax  statistic examines the null hypothesis that the number of r cointegrated 
vectors is a r value against the alternative of r+1 cointegrated vectors. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of r=1 is tested against the alternative of r=2, and also r=2 will 
be against the alternative r =3 and so on. This implies that, when the estimated 
value of the characteristic root is near to zero, the value of λmax  will be small. 
The Johansen cointegration tests are well known for being quite sensitive to the 
choice of lag length. Thus, Akaike information criterion (AIC) is used to choose 
the number of lags in the cointegration test. Briefly, many lag length selection 
criteria have been employed in economic study to determine the Autoregressive 
(AR) lag length of time series variables. such as the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC); Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC); final 
prediction error (FPE) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), (for an overview 
of these criteria see Liew, 2004).These criteria managed to pick up the correct lag 
length at least half of the time in small sample. With relatively large sample (120 
or more observations), HQC is preferred to outdo the rest of correctly identifying 
the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and SIC should be a better choice for smaller 
sample and they produce the least probability of under estimation among all 
criteria under study. 
 178 
 
5.8.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
Following prior studies (Alhajhoj, 2007; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Majeed and 
Khan, 2008; Olayiwola and Okodua, 2009), if the variables are cointegrated, the 
next step is to estimate and identify a VECM, including the error correction term, 
to investigate the dynamic behaviour of the model and better understand the 
behaviour of the dependent variable. In the short run, once in equilibrium, the 
VECM explains how the tested model is adjusted in each time period towards its 
long-run equilibrium condition. Therefore, when the variables are cointegrated, in 
the short run, deviations from this long-run equilibrium will respond to changes in 
the dependent variables in order to force their movements towards the long-run 
equilibrium condition.  
Hence, the cointegrated vectors from which the error correction terms are derived 
each show an independent direction in which a stable long-run equilibrium 
condition exists. The VECM specification forces the long-run behaviour of the 
endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrated relationships, while 
adjusting the short-run dynamics (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
The form of the error correction model for this study was selected according to the 
approach suggested by Maddala and Lahiri (1992). The general form of the 
VECM is as follows: 
∆Yt =  β0 +  β1𝑖 ∑ ∆
n
i=1 Yt−ii,t +  β2𝑖 ∑ ∆
n
i=1 Xt−ii,t +  β3𝑖 ∑ ∆
n
i=1 Zt−ii,t + ⋯ +
 λECMt−1 + εt                                                                                                       (‎5.21) 
where Δ is the first difference operator, the coefficients  β1i, β2i …  βni  of the 
explanatory variables are the parameters of the model to be estimated, λECt−1 is 
the error correction term, which is lagged by one period, εt   is the white noise 
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term, and λ is the short-run coefficient of the error correction term, which reflects 
the speed of adjustment parameter. It should be noted that an error correction 
model can be used not only to overcome the problem of spurious regression, but 
also to correct for this deviation from the long-run equilibrium.  
The common belief with the error correction model is that λ should satisfy (-1 ≤ λ 
≤ 0) and should be statistically significant in order for the long-run relationship 
among the variables to be confirmed.  
5.9 Summary  
This chapter is highly important in that it gives comprehensive details covering 
several key issues related to the methodology of this study. The chapter initially 
addresses the first objective regarding the development of an economic growth 
model based on the neoclassical Solow growth framework for the purpose of 
examining the relationship between private and public investment and economic 
growth. The empirical model is extended to enable an investigation of whether 
private and public investment have different impacts on Iraq’s economic growth 
rate, and also the identification of any crowding-in or crowding-out effect. The 
second objective is addressed through the development of a private investment 
model based on the neoclassical flexible accelerator model. The empirical model 
also includes additional variables specific to developing countries and particular 
relating to Iraq. A public investment model for the context of Iraq is developed 
based on recent empirical studies, although few studies have been conducted in 
this area, for the purpose of addressing the third objective of the study. 
Next this chapter describes how time-series data on the selected macroeconomic 
variables for Iraq were collected from various sources for the period 1970-2010. 
Two common unit root tests, the ADF and the PP, used to test the stationarity of 
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each time series, are explained, as well as the Johansen cointegration trace test and 
the maximum eigenvalue statistics, which were used to investigate the long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the variables in the models. Finally, this chapter 
explains how the VECM was used to determine the short-run dynamic 
relationship between the variables. The results and discussion of them will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 COMPARATIVE ROLES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAQ 
 
6.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, investment is crucial to economic development 
as it enhances technological progress and productivity and increases employment. 
In the last few decades, one of the most important issues in macroeconomics and 
development economics – and one of renewed consideration in the academic 
literature – has been the impact of public and private investment on economic 
growth. There is a general consensus that these two elements of investment have 
different impacts on economic growth and social conditions. Since the distinction 
between public and private investment matters for economic growth, it is essential 
to understand the linkages between them. This is especially the case for Iraq, in 
whose economy public investment plays a large role.  
In recent years, a large body of empirical research has investigated the interaction 
between private and public investment and economic growth for developed and 
developing countries. This chapter aims to provide some empirical evidence on 
this interaction in the case of Iraq over 1970 - 2010. Investigating how the two 
sources of investment contribute to economic growth may provide new 
information for policy makers that could help them to have a good balance 
between the two sources and thus enhance their benefits to economic growth. The 
outcomes also contribute to the empirical literature on economic growth, 
especially for oil-rich developing countries.   
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The analysis in this chapter, as discussed in Chapter 3, is based on the neoclassical 
framework adopted by Aschauer (1989), Khan and Reinhart (1990), Ramirez and 
Khan and Kumar (1997) and Nazmi (2003), who attempted to investigate 
empirically how public and private investment affect economic growth. In 
Chapter 5, a simple analytical model was developed for Iraq, including additional 
theoretical determinants of growth, such as labour force, macroeconomic 
instability, and exchange rate policies, which have received significant attention in 
the recent literature and have to be taken into account when assessing this issue. 
More importantly, the analysis examines the respective impacts of public and 
private investment on economic growth.  
Following a similar structure to that of Chapter 5, the rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 6.2 provides a discussion of the unit root test 
results, including the ADF and PP tests. Section 6.3 presents the long-run 
dynamics of the determinants of economic growth based on the application of the 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration test. Section 6.4 
discusses the short-run dynamics of economic growth. The last section presents 
the main conclusions derived from this chapter. 
6.2 Results of Unit Root Tests 
As a preliminary analysis of the data, the ADF test and the PP test were used to 
examine each individual variable for stationarity, in both the intercept without 
trend and intercept with trend models (see Section 5.6.1). Testing for unit roots in 
time-series data conventionally precedes cointegration. If the variables are non-
stationary, this can lead to a “spurious regression” and the estimated coefficients 
will be biased (Griffiths et al., 2008); as a result, confidence intervals and 
hypothesis tests will be unreliable (Granger and Swanson, 1974). The ADF and 
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PP tests are often employed to determine the degree of integration of variables, so 
as to identify how many times each time series should be differenced in order to 
attain stationarity (Griffiths et al., 2008). The core purpose of these tests is to 
verify the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, the rejection of which requires a 
negative and significant test statistic. The optimal lag length for the lagged 
differences of the tested variables is determined by minimizing the AIC. 
Table 6.1 shows the results of the ADF and PP tests of stationarity that were 
applied to each individual variable. The results show that all of the variables in the 
growth model (LRGDP, LRPI, LRPUI, LLABOUR, LROX, LREXR, and 
LINFL) are non-stationary in both cases (intercept without trend and intercept 
with trend models) at a 5% or lower level of significance. These results confirm 
that the variables need to be differenced once to attain stationarity. After 
computing their first differences, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected 
for all first-differenced variables. This means that all of the time series are 
integrated of order one in the first differences at either a 5% or 1% significance 
level. 
Table  6.1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests -  Economic Growth Model 
Series 
ADF intercept without 
trend  
ADF intercept with 
trend  
 
PP intercept  
without trend  
PP intercept with 
 trend 
  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  
LRGDP -1.712 -6.436
** 
-2.385 -6.348
**
 -1.712 -6.459
** 
-2.445 -6.366
**
 
LRPI -2.567 6.701** -2.934 -6.625
**
 -2.605 -7.851
** 
-2.939 -7.565
**
 
LRPUI -1.708 -7.029** -1.711 -6.931
**
 -1.657 -7.029** -1.666 -6.932
**
 
LLABOUR 0.658 6.903** -0.658 -6.808
**
 0.658 6.903** -2.707 -6.808
**
 
LROX 2.127 6.894** -2.871 -6.816
**
 2.127 7.164** -2.897 -7.065
**
 
LREXR 0.890 4.866** -1.632 -4.804
**
 -0.998 -4.845** -1.899 -4.778
**
 
LINFL  -1.610 -5.693** -1.605 -4.975
**
 -1.349 -6.359** -1.226 -6.281
**
 
Note:  (1) The lag length in both tests is based on the AIC.  (2) * and ** imply that we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the time series contains a non-stationarity or has a stochastic trend at 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
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6.3 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test and Long-Run Dynamics of 
Economic Growth Model  
The Johansen approach was developed by Johansen (1998) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) for examining the long-run equilibrium relationships among 
variables (see Section 5.6.2). The objective of the cointegration test is to 
determine whether a group of non-stationary series is cointegrated or not; when all 
of the variables are integrated of the same order, I(1), a cointegration analysis is 
justified. Furthermore, it can be argued that the basic idea behind the cointegration 
approach is that if, in the long run, two or more series are cointegrated (move 
closely together), even though the series themselves are trended, then the 
differences between them are constant. Thus, it is possible to regard these series 
as having a long-run equilibrium relationship, since the differences between them 
are stationary (Hall and Henry, 1989). The Johansen approach represents an 
advancement over the single-equation estimation technique, since it offers the 
possibility of dealing with more than one cointegrating vector (Johansen, 1995). 
Table 6.2 displays the Johansen cointegration results based on the trace statistics 
and maximum eigenvalue statistics. Both trace and maximum tests show the 
existence of five cointegrating vectors between the variables at the 1% critical 
level. Hence, the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is rejected against 
the alternative of one cointegrating vector at the 1% significance level. Similarly, 
the null hypotheses of at most one, at most two, at most three, and at most four 
cointegrating vectors are also rejected against their respective alternative 
hypotheses. Thus, it can be concluded that there are five cointegrating vectors 
specified in the model.  
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The existence of five cointegrating vectors implies that there are long-run 
equilibrium relationships between the GDP and the explanatory variables. 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the GDP and its determinants – private 
investment, public investment, labour force size, the value of petroleum exports, 
the real exchange rate, and the inflation rate – are moving together in the long run. 
Table  6.2: Johansen Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) – Economic Growth 
Model 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Eigenvalue 
 Trace statistic 5% critical value Prob.** 
None * 0.956953 224.5021 111.7805 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.928977 149.0112 83.93712 0.0000 
At most 2 *
 
0.776097 85.53724 60.06141 0.0001 
At most 3 * 0.649133 49.62022 40.17493 0.0043 
At most 4 * 0.599325 24.48386 24.27596 0.0471 
At most 5  0.092224 2.533366 12.32090 0.9017 
At most 6 0.008761 0.211185 4.129906 0.7024 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Eigenvalue 
 
Maximum 
eigenvalue statistic 5% critical value Prob.** 
None * 0.956953 75.49089 42.77219 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.928977 63.47393 36.63019 0.0000 
At most 2 * 0.776097 35.91702 30.43961 0.0094 
At most 3 * 0.649133 25.13635 24.15921 0.0368 
At most 4 * 0.599325 21.95050 17.79730 0.0112 
At most 5 0.092224 2.322181 11.22480 0.8847 
At most 6 0.008761 0.211185 4.129906 0.7024 
Note: (1) Trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics indicate five cointegrating equations 
at the 5% level.  (2) * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level. (3)  ** MacKinnon-
Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
The estimated coefficients expressed in terms of the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients of the economic growth model (equation 5.5b) are given in Table 6.3, 
showing the long-run relationship amongst the variables. In general, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients for all variables are strongly consistent with the 
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macroeconomic theory, as well as being statistically significant. Since the natural 
logarithms are used for all of the variables in the estimation, the estimated 
coefficients of all variables can be described as their long-run elasticities.  
Table  6.3: Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients - Economic Growth Model 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic 
LRPI 0.0488 0.019 -2.5684 
LRPUI 0.3997 0.023 -17.3783 
LLABOUR 0.0052 0.0014 -3.7143 
LROX 0.2830 0.0189 -14.9735 
LINFL -0.0295 0.0058 5.0863 
LREXR -0.0249 0.0076 3.2763 
 
The cointegration equation can be written as follows: 
LRGDP = 0.048LRPI +0.399LRPUI + 0.005LLABOUR + 0.283LROX- 0.03LINFL- 
0.025LREXR 
To determine whether real public investment is more productive or efficient than 
real private investment, the two coefficients can be compared according to the 
approach adopted by Khan and Reinhart (1990) and Khan and Kumar (1997). 
Although the estimated coefficients of both the private and public investment 
variables show a positive and significant effect on the GDP in the long run, the 
coefficient of real public investment is greater than that of real private investment. 
Therefore, based on the theoretical argument, it can be concluded that, in the long 
run, real public investment is more productive than real private investment in 
encouraging GDP growth in Iraq over the time period analysed.  
The RPI elasticity of RGDP is 0.048, which is less than the RPUI elasticity of 
RGDP of 0.399, suggesting that a 1% increase in RPUI will bring about a 0.339% 
increase in RGDP, while a 1% increase in RPI will bring about 0.048% increase 
in RGDP. These findings are similar to other empirical results that have implied 
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that a higher impact should be expected from public investment in the case of 
low-income countries than in the case of high-income countries (Khan and 
Kumar, 1997; Ramirez and Nazmi, 2003). It has been widely discussed in 
empirical studies that the roles of public and private investment, and their 
relationship with economic growth, might differ across countries, due to 
numerous factors such as differences in incomes, level of development, 
population growth rates, the degree of technical support, the availability of basic 
services, and macro stability (social, economic and political) (Agarwal, 2009; 
Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Poirson, 1998).   
The results presented above are completely consistent with the literature’s 
argument that increasing public investment may complement private investment, 
since both coefficients have a positive sign (Khan and Kumar, 1997; Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990). It has been argued by a number of studies that increasing public 
investment will be beneficial for the development of the private sector. The 
government sector, for instance, has a great capacity to invest in infrastructure 
projects with large sunk costs, which require long lead times in order to become 
profitable. The private sector might benefit from spillovers from such public 
investments, during and after their completion. For example, a better-developed 
infrastructure for roads and railways reduces transportation costs, and hence 
facilitates the creation of a better business environment. Furthermore, public 
infrastructure investments in education and health care facilities help improve the 
level and quality of human capital in an economy (Aschauer, 1989; Atukeren, 
2005; Blejer and Khan, 1984; Kandenge, 2007; Naqvi, 2002; Sundararajan and 
Thakur, 1980; Zou, 2006). 
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A number of empirical works have concluded that the assumption of the 
crowding-in hypothesis holds when there is a shortage of public infrastructure 
investment, or when economic resources are underemployed, as often occurs in 
developing countries (Akanbi and Detroit, 2008; Baghebo and Edoumiekumo, 
2012; Havi et al., 2013; Isaac and Samwel, 2012; Kandenge, 2007). Since Iraq has 
a large deficiency in public infrastructure investment, due to its involvement in 
several wars (see Chapter 4), it is more likely that increasing public investment 
would not crowd out private investment in the case of Iraq.   
With crowding in, a rise in public investment causes a rise in domestic investment 
(see Chapter 7). Thus, any reduction in public investment may crucially 
compromise economic growth, both directly, and indirectly through private 
investment. As suggested by Khan and Reinhart (1990), even if private 
investment is found to be directly more productive than public investment, any 
conclusion about making adjustment strategies aimed at increasing private 
investment should be qualified with the consideration of the relationship between 
public and private investment. Indeed, if the crowding-in hypothesis holds, a 
fiscal adjustment that reduced public investment would imply a contraction in 
fixed capital formation and a slowdown in economic performance. 
This could be true in the case of Iraq; for example, increasing the level of public 
investment might facilitate and stimulate private investment, as the results in 
Chapter 7 will indicate, through the provision of infrastructure support. This could 
raise the productivity of capital and expand the overall availability of resources by 
increasing output. Furthermore, the results presented in this chapter may not 
necessarily mean that real public investment is more efficient or productive than 
private investment in the context of Iraq, but might suggest that a high rate of 
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public investment is crucial at this stage of Iraq's economic development. Public 
investment might complement rather than compete with private investment. 
Unlike in the neoclassical model, Lucas (1988) emphasized that human capital 
plays a significant role in determining economic growth. It has also been indicated 
by a number of studies that labour force, which used as proxy for human capital, 
can be considered a complementary input to physical capital (Anaman, 2004; 
Blejer and Khan, 1984; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Mallick, 2002). Hence, the size 
of the labour force is an important factor that positively influences the economic 
growth process, and might affect the productivity of all other factors of 
production, or lead to the generation of new products or ideas that support 
technological progress. As indicated in Table 6.3, the parameter estimate for the 
labour force variable, although positive, exhibits only a slight impact on economic 
growth, such that a 1% increase in the size of the labour force will cause a 
0.0052% increase in economic growth. The estimated results for the labour force 
strongly support the Solow growth model, suggesting that growth in the labour 
force impacts the economic growth rate in the expected positive direction. Similar 
outcomes have been obtained by Khan and Reinhart (1990), Khan and Kumar 
(1997), Anaman (2004) and Kandenge (2007), showing that an increased 
emphasis on education and the improvement of human capital skills is likely to 
play an important role in stimulating both investment and the sustainability of 
long-term economic growth. 
In the models formulated in the 20th century, based on the neoclassical 
perspective, outputs are mainly a function of capital and labour, constrained by 
the level of technology (Solow, 1956). There are some criticisms of the 
neoclassical model in the literature, such as that a significant part of economic 
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growth is not explained by the contributions of capital and labour alone. 
Therefore, a new growth theory has been developed, including natural capital, 
which is also said to play a significant role in differentiating economic 
performance (Moradi, 2009; Sachs and Warner, 2001).  Nurkse (1953) and 
Rostow (1960) indicate the positive role natural resources play in economic 
development, confirming that primary products can promote economic growth, 
and increased oil revenue, for example, may accelerate economic growth through 
the provision of basic infrastructure and improvements in the legal framework 
(Lewis, 1989), and if the foreign exchange gained from resource exports is used to 
import the capital goods required to build a modern economy.  
Supporting the above argument, the estimated coefficient of the petroleum 
variable is both positive and significant (0.2830), indicating that a 1% increase in 
oil revenue would increase GDP by 0.28% percentage points. The oil sector 
continues to provide the basic means for growth and stability in the medium term 
in Iraq, accounting for over 90% of government revenue and a 75% share of GDP, 
as discussed in Chapter 4.  
There is a strong consensus among many economists, international institutions 
such as the WB and IMF, and policymakers in central banks that one of the 
essential objectives of macroeconomic policies in both developed and developing 
economies is to sustain high economic growth with a low level of inflation 
(Omoke, 2010). This is because a high level of inflation hinders the functioning of 
a market economy (Krugman, 1995). As shown by the estimated coefficient in 
Table 6.3, inflation is seen to influence real GDP negatively and significantly in 
the long run, with a 1% rise in the inflation rate predicted to result in a 0.029% 
reduction in GDP. This outcome is consistent with the theory (see Chapters 3 and 
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5) and previous empirical studies such as Saaed (2007), Ahmed and Mortaza 
(2005), Malla (1997), Baghebo and Edoumiekumo (2012) and Havi et al. (2013), 
suggesting that high inflation rates adversely affect the process of economic 
growth. Since a high rate of inflation can be a sign of macroeconomic instability 
and the government’s inability to manage the economy effectively, it is expected 
to have an adverse effect on the efficient allocation of resources and thus also on 
economic development. According to this, for Iraq to achieve sustained economic 
growth, it would need to control its inflation rate. However, the results contrast 
with Sweidan (2004) and Mallik and Chowdhury (2001), who found a positive 
association between a high level of inflation and economic growth.    
Traditionally, the real exchange rate has not received any attention in the analysis 
of economic growth. It was assumed to have no effect on economic growth in the 
neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956), which mainly focused on savings and 
investment as determinants of economic growth (Eichengreen, 2007). However, 
recent empirical studies have shifted their attention to the exchange rate as a 
determinant of economic growth, arguing for a robust relationship between the 
real exchange rate and economic growth, and that undervaluation of the currency 
might stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, it is well known among 
economists that poorly managed exchange rates can be devastating for economic 
growth. Avoiding a heavy overvaluation of the currency is one of the most robust 
imperatives, strongly supported by cross-country empirical evidence (Easterly, 
2005; Johnson et al, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011; Razin and Collins, 
1997; Rodrik, 2008). The reason behind this is that overvalued exchange rates are 
associated with shortages of foreign currency, rent seeking and corruption, and 
unsustainably large current account deficits, which are damaging to economic 
growth. However, devaluation of the real exchange rate may impact economic 
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growth negatively by reducing the real income of the economy, thus causing 
production capacity and activity to decline (Isaac and Samwel, 2012; Kandenge, 
2007). 
The results of this study show that the real exchange rate has a negative and 
significant effect on real GDP. The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the 
real exchange rate would cause a 0.0295% reduction in real GDP. This result is 
consistent with other empirical studies (Akanbi and Detroit, 2008; Kandenge, 
2007). Given the above argument and the discussions in Chapter 4 regarding how 
the real exchange rate has been poorly managed by the Iraqi government in the 
last few decades, it seems clear that growth has been negatively affected by the 
real exchange rate. What can be concluded here is that this variable is directly 
associated with investment, and that a high real exchange rate may produce 
greater uncertainty in the economy, depressing economic development as a result. 
6.4 Short-Run Dynamics of Economic Growth in Iraq 
The short-run dynamics among the variables were explored using a VECM. Error 
correction allows the introduction of the previous disequilibrium as an 
independent variable affecting the dynamic behaviour of the current variables. 
Based on empirical studies (Baghebo and Edoumiekumo, 2012; Havi et al., 2013; 
Kandenge, 2007), when the cointegrated time series between GDP and the 
explanatory variables exhibit a long-run equilibrium relationship at the 5% critical 
level, then the VECM can be employed to find the short-run dynamics of the 
economic growth model.   
The results of the short-run VECM are shown in Table 6.4. These results associate 
the changes in real GDP to changes in the one-period-lagged variables and the 
disturbance term of the lagged period. As discussed earlier in the Section 5.6.3, 
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the common belief with the error correction model is that the value of the error 
term should be lie in the range -1 ≤ ECM-1 ≤ 0  and should be statistically 
significant in order for the long-run relationship among the variables to be 
confirmed. The coefficient of the speed of adjustment is negative and significant 
and the magnitude of this coefficient, -0.5459, suggests that approximately 54% 
of the disequilibrium in economic growth is corrected in the following year. The 
significance of the coefficient associated with the error correction term further 
supports the acceptance of the cointegration hypothesis (Harris and Sollis, 2003). 
Table  6.4: VECM for the Economic Growth Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-statistic 
D(LRGDP(-1)) 0.1470 0.4147 0.3545 
D(LRPI(-1)) 0.0839 0.0764 1.0981 
D(LRPUI(-1)) 0.1419 0.0668 2.1251 
D(LROX (-1)) 0.1248 0.0887 1.4075 
D(LLABOUR(-1)) 0.0469 0.1988 0.2359 
D(LREXR(-1)) -0.0925 0.0135 -6.8483 
D(LINFL(-1)) -0.043 0.0312 -1.3771 
ECM(-1) -0.5459 0.1624 -3.3611 
R-squared 0.9289 Sum squared resid 0.5038 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9137 S.D. dependent var 0.4567 
S.E. of regression 0.1341 Akaike info criterion -1.0031 
F-statistic 3.4531 Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
According to Table 6.4, in the short run the estimated coefficients of all the 
explanatory variables have the same signs as in the long run. In the short run, 
private investment, public investment, growth in the labour force, and growth in 
the value of petroleum exports still exhibit positive impacts, while the real 
exchange rate and inflation rate volatility still have negative impacts on economic 
growth. 
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The variables that appear to influence economic growth most significantly are 
public investment and the real exchange rate. The estimated coefficients suggest 
that a 1% increase in the previous year’s public investment will cause real GDP to 
grow by 0.14%, whilst an increase in the real exchange rate will cause real GDP 
to decrease by about 0.09%. The other explanatory variables do not exhibit 
significant impacts on economic growth in the short run. 
Additionally, in order to test whether the model is correctly specified, several 
diagnostic tests were conducted on the residuals from the model; the results of 
these diagnostic tests are as follows: The Jarque Bera test statistic is 3.77, which 
confirms that the residuals are normally distributed. The F-statistic for the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test is 0.9, indicating that no serial 
autocorrelation is present. The ARCH heteroskedasticity test results (F-statistic 
0.31, p-value 0.28) show the absence of heteroskedasticity. Thus, we can conclude 
that the model is correctly specified. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has examined the macroeconomic determinants of long-run 
economic growth in Iraq, based on a Solow growth framework. The empirical 
analysis employed a cointegration approach using time-series data from 1970 to 
2010. The results of the Johansen’s cointegration test indicate that there are 
several significant relationships between GDP growth and the explanatory 
variables examined here. In the long run, the empirical results suggest that both 
forms of investment (public and private), growth in the labour force, and the value 
of petroleum exports are important in explaining economic growth in Iraq as the 
coefficients have the expected signs and are highly significant, whilst the real 
exchange rate and macroeconomic instability, as proxied by the inflation rate, are 
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shown to negatively and significantly affect GDP. However, in the short run, only 
public investment and the real exchange rate are found to have significant effects, 
positive and negative respectively, on real GDP. The analysis also assessed the 
distinction between the impacts of public and private investment on economic 
growth, and found public investment to have contributed more to economic 
growth in Iraq than private investment between 1970 and 2010. 
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CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSION OF DETERMINANTS OF 
DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN IRAQ  
 
7.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 3, private investment is a powerful instrument for 
innovation, economic growth and poverty reduction. Countries with deeper and 
wider private-sector investments demonstrate accelerated economic growth. 
Undoubtedly, in many developing countries such as Iraq, investment rates are still 
too low, the motivation to innovate is insufficient and returns on investment are 
not very predictable, which are some of the main reasons for the slow growth in 
most developing countries. 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the second research objective from 
Chapter 1 by empirically examining the pattern of domestic private investment 
and the key variables explaining that pattern in Iraq over the period, 1970 - 2010, 
and more importantly by examining the crowding-in or crowding-out effect of 
public investment. The ADF and PP unit root tests are employed to test for the 
stationarity of the data, and the variables are found to attain stationarity after first 
differences. The Johansen cointegration tests, using trace and maximum 
eigenvalue statistics, are used to establish long-run equilibrium relationships 
among the variables in the model. Also, an error correction model is estimated 
based on the cointegration. The significance of the coefficient of the error 
correction term confirms the long-run relationship between the explanatory 
variables and private investment.  
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An essential question is how public policy can affect private investment. 
Generally, academic research suggests that public investment in human capital 
and infrastructure services, such as transportation, communication and sanitation, 
crowds in private investment, by increasing the latter’s productivity and thus 
having a significant positive impact on economic growth. This means that public 
investment may not only stimulate economic growth directly, as established in 
chapter 6, but also indirectly by promoting private investment (Aschauer, 1989; 
Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Erenburg, 1993; Pereira, 2001; Seitz and Conrad, 
1994). However, some empirical literature (Monadjemi, 1993; Zou, 2006) 
suggests that public investment may also crowd out private investment by over 
utilizing scarce resources and reducing the aggregate amount of savings available 
for private investment; in this case, public investment would be deemed to have 
an adverse effect on economic growth (see Section 3.2.2). 
The long-run empirical results of  the analysis in this chapter show real GDP and 
real public investment to be positively associated with private investment. 
However, the real exchange rate, real interest rate and inflation rate are found to 
have negative impacts on the growth of private investment. The findings also 
indicate that war and political uncertainty serve as severe obstacles to the 
attraction of private investment. This chapter also examines the short-run 
dynamics of the model, including two dummy variables in an effort to make a 
distinction between the effects of the Iran-Iraq War and of international sanctions. 
The results show that only two variables are significant in explaining private 
domestic investment in the short run, namely, public investment and international 
sanctions.  
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The rest of the chapter presents a detailed discussion of the results and is 
organized as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the unit root test results, including the 
ADF and PP tests. Section 7.3 presents the long-run dynamics of the determinants 
of private domestic investment by employing the Johansen (1988) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) cointegration test. Section 7.4 discusses the short-run 
dynamics of private investment, and concluding remarks are made in Section 7.5.  
7.2 Results of Unit Root Tests – Private Investment Model 
A similar approach was used to that described in Section 6.2. The results of the 
unit root tests for the private investment model are shown in Table 7.1. Similar to 
Table 6.1, the ADF and PP tests indicate a non-rejection of the null hypothesis, 
suggesting a unit root or non-stationarity in the time series of the variables (LRPI, 
LRGDP, LRPUI, LREXR, LRINTR and LINFL) at the level in both the intercept 
without trend and intercept with trend models,  with the exception of LRINTR 
which is found to be stationary at the level (having no stochastic trend) only in the 
PP test. The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected for this variable at the 1% 
significance level. However, all time-series data were tested again at the first 
differences for all variables found to be non-stationary at the level. The results 
show that the null hypothesis (suggesting non-stationarity of unit roots in the time 
series) should be rejected for the first differences. This implies that all the time-
series variables are integrated of order one at first differences based on the ADF 
test, having the same integration level of I(1) at the 5% and 1% significance 
levels, except for LRINTR which has a zero order of integration in the PP test 
only. 
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Table  7.1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for Private Investment Model 
Series 
ADF intercept 
without trend  
ADF intercept t with 
trend  
PP intercept without 
trend  
PP intercept with 
 trend  
  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences  
LRGDP -1.712 -6.436**
 
-2.385 -6.348** -1.712 -6.459**
 
-2.445 -6.366** 
LRPI -2.567 6.701** -2.934 -6.625** -2.605 -7.851**
 
-2.939 -7.565** 
LRPUI -1.708 -7.029** -1.711 -6.931** -1.657 -7.029** -1.666 -6.932** 
LREXR 0.890 4.866** -1.632 -4.804** -0.998 -4.845** -1.899 -4.778** 
LINFL  -1.610 -5.693** -1.605 -4.975** -1.349 -6.359** -1.226 -6.281** 
LRINTR -1.612 -6.709** -1.978 -6.627** 
-
3.576** 
-7.072** 
-
3.572* 
-6.907** 
Note: (1) The lag length in both tests is based on the AIC. 
(2) * and ** imply that we can reject the null hypothesis that the time series contains a 
non-stationarity or has a stochastic trend at 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
7.3 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test and Long-Run Dynamics of 
Domestic Private Investment in Iraq 
Following the ADF and PP tests, it is confirmed that the variables under 
examination are integrated to the same order, I(1). Thus, the cointegration test can 
be implemented (Koop, 2013). Following on from the unit root results, the AIC 
was applied to select the optimum lag length (1) in the Johansen cointegration 
test. 
The cointegration test in the present study used a version of the Johansen-Juselius 
approach, following the lead of previous studies (Abdullahi et al., 2012; Atukeren, 
2005; Oriavwote and Oyovwi, 2013). According to Cuthbertson et al. (1992), the 
Johansen-Juselius approach is preferable when there are more than two variables. 
It has also been found to be the most powerful approach even for the bivariate 
system. Two test statistics, the trace statistic and the max-eigenvalue statistic, 
were employed to determine the appropriate rank and to identify the number of 
cointegration vectors. Then, all variables were treated as potentially endogenous. 
The Johansen cointegration test results are shown in Table 7.2. It can be 
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concluded that the cointegrated time-series variables have the same common 
trend. 
Table  7.2: Johansen Cointegration Test Results – Private Investment Model 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Null  
Eigenvalue Trace statistics 
5% 
Prob.** 
Hypothesis critical value 
None *  0.915272  220.5060  134.6780  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.899557  156.3301  103.8473  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.852740  96.57786  76.97277  0.0008 
At most 3  0.667996  46.77341  54.07904  0.1904 
At most 4  0.329270  18.10559  35.19275  0.8350 
At most 5  0.178380  7.721482  20.26184  0.8464 
At most 6  0.095617  2.613066  9.164546  0.6552 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Null hypothesis Eigenvalue 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
5% critical 
value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.915272  64.17593  47.07897  0.0003 
At most 1 *  0.899557  59.75222  40.95680  0.0002 
At most 2 *  0.852740  49.80445  34.80587  0.0004 
At most 3 *  0.667996  28.66782  28.58808  0.0488 
At most 4  0.329270  10.38411  22.29962  0.8040 
At most 5  0.178380  5.108416  15.89210  0.8787 
At most 6  0.095617  2.613066  9.164546  0.6552 
 
Note: (1) Trace statistics and max-eigenvalue statistics indicate three and four cointegrating 
equations, respectively, at the 5% level.  (2) * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level. 
(3) ** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
Furthermore, identifying multiple cointegration vectors with theoretical economic 
relationships is possible when using the Johansen cointegration approach. The 
Johansen cointegration test revealed that trace statistics and max-eigenvalue 
statistics indicate three and four cointegrating vectors, respectively, at the 5% 
level of significance. The presence of cointegration vectors confirms that there 
exist unique long-run equilibrium relationships between private investment and 
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the explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2012). Furthermore, once a cointegrating 
relationship has been confirmed, it is possible to apply an error correction model 
that reconciles the short-and long-run properties of the estimated model.  
In general, the confirmation of cointegrating vectors implies that domestic 
investment and its determinants (GDP, public investment, the exchange rate, the 
interest rate and inflation) are moving together in the long run. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients for the variables RGDP, RPUI, REXR, RINTR, INFL, and 
the dummy for war are strongly consistent with the economic theory, even though 
they are not all statistically significant. Again, since all variables are transformed 
into their natural logs, the estimated coefficient of each variable can be described 
as the long-run elasticity. The normalized cointegrating vector for the long-run  
Table  7.3: Normalized Cointegration Coefficients - Private Investment Model 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic 
LRGDP 1.1647 -0.1446 8.0565 
LRPUI 0.0175 -0.0524 0.3331 
LREXR -0.2091 -0.0115 -18.1179 
LRINTR -4.0829 -0.6688 -6.1049 
LINFL -0.4832 -0.0644 -7.5025 
DUM -0.6886 -0.0866 -7.9512 
 
The cointegration equation can be written as follows: 
LPRI = 1.165 LRGDP + 0.018 LRPUI - 0.210LREXR - 4.083LRINTR - 0.483LINFL  
- 0.689DUM 
As explained in the section on theoretical background in Chapter 2, the flexible 
accelerator model proposes that private investment is influenced positively by 
expected demand, namely that investors take initiative when there is increased 
market demand (Ahmad and Qayyum, 2009). It has also been suggested by a 
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number of empirical studies focusing on developing countries that private 
investment is positively associated with the growth of real GDP, indicating that 
high economic growth will lead to higher investment rates (Mlambo and 
Oshikoya, 2001). 
The estimated coefficient of the GDP growth rate, in the current study, shows a 
positive and significant effect of that variable on private investment in Iraq. The 
GDP elasticity of private investment is 1.1647, suggesting that a 1% increase in 
GDP will bring about a 1.1647% increase in domestic investment. This result of 
the long-run analysis strongly supports the accelerator principle, confirming that 
private investment is strongly impacted by growth in GDP, a proxy for an increase 
in aggregate demand (Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001). 
Similar outcomes have been obtained by Greene and Villanueva (1991), 
Unteroberdoerster and Guimarães (2006) and Ahmad and Qayyum (2008). There 
is no evidence among empirical studies confirming increased GDP will decrease 
private investment.  
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the issue of the association between public and 
private investment in the case of developing countries has been a focus of 
attention in the literature for the last four decades, and is still subject to a large 
amount of controversy. According to the literature, public investment or 
government expenditure has an ambiguous effect on private domestic investment. 
Khan and Kumar (1997) analysed the potential complementary effects might raise 
in the case of public investment in infrastructure such as the construction of roads 
and the provision of public goods. The idea here is that, if public infrastructure 
capital is complementary to private capital, then an increase in public investment 
will not only attract more private investment, thus enhancing capital 
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accumulation, but will also increase the marginal product of private investment. 
However, public investment in infrastructure may not automatically have a 
beneficial influence on private investment and growth. Instead, it may compete 
with private investment, it may be of a dubious quality, or it may be financed by 
taxes or a deficit, which will have a negative impact on credit availability, the cost 
of inputs, and macroeconomic stability (Acosta and Loza, 2005; Cavallo and 
Daude, 2011; Rossiter, 2002).  
The estimated results from the current study reveal some, albeit not very strong, 
evidence of crowding in effects of public investment on private investment in the 
long run, in the context of Iraq. The coefficient of public investment has a positive 
sign, although it is statistically insignificant. It implies that a 1% increase in fixed 
government capital formation is accompanied by a 0.0175% increase in domestic 
investment. This result provides a further support to previous result in section 6.3, 
indicating crowding in effects of public investment to private investment in Iraq. 
Although there are no data available on infrastructure investment in most 
developing countries, it is well known that the provision of infrastructure services 
and public goods in oil-producing countries is a government responsibility and 
comes under the government investment framework. Hence, the positive 
coefficient of public investment indicates that there is a complementary link 
between these two types of investment but the high allocation of Iraqi government 
expenditure to military spending in the past few decades may account for public 
investment not showing up as statistically significant in explaining private 
investment. In order to motivate private investment in Iraq, more public 
investment should be directed towards infrastructure and public goods, and public 
spending policies need to be designed that target sectors in which an extra unit of 
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public spending will contribute positively to the private sector's expected 
profitability.  
The results obtained in this study are similar to those of previous studies 
confirming that most of the fiscal and financial resources used by the public sector 
exert a positive impact on private investment, and raise the marginal productivity 
of private capital (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001; Greene 
and Villanueva, 1991; Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980). A positive relationship 
was also found by Aschauer (1989), who argued that the net effect of public 
investment (particularly non-military spending) is positive. On the other hand, the 
results contrast with studies in other countries, such as Shafik (1992) in the 
context of Egypt, and Bakare (2009), Majeed and Khan (2008) and Yin (2011) in 
the context of Nigeria, Pakistan and Malaysia respectively, all of whose results 
indicated that increasing the level of public investment had a negative effect on 
the private investment rate.  
Another variable considered in this study for explaining Iraq’s domestic 
investment in the long run is the real exchange rate. As discussed in the empirical 
literature in Chapter 3, there are two arguments as to how the real exchange rate 
might affect private investment. On the demand side, depreciation of the real 
exchange rate might cause private-sector real wealth and expenditure to decrease 
by increasing the real cost of imported capital goods and in turn domestic prices 
(Rodrik, 2008; Zardashty, 2014). In other words, depreciation of the real 
exchange rate might influence the real prices of imported inputs that are used in 
conjunction with capital goods to produce outputs, and might also affect interest 
rates, which in turn would affect private investment. This could lead firms to 
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revise their expectations of future demand and thus lower investment through the 
accelerator effect (Acosta and Loza, 2005).  
However, on the supply side, devaluation can have a positive impact on 
investment in sectors producing internationally traded goods with high 
competitiveness and high export volumes. In other words, devaluation may 
stimulate investment in the tradable goods sector and depress capital formation in 
the non-tradable goods sector (Montiel, 2011; Todaro, 1977). Furthermore, the 
volatility of the real exchange rate can be used as a measure of uncertainty, which 
in theory will have an adverse impact on investment, if investment is to some 
extent irreversible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1991). 
As shown in Table 7.3, the estimated coefficient for the net effect of the real 
exchange rate in the long run is negative (-0.2091)and statistically significant. In 
the long run, a 1% change in the real exchange rate would cause a reduction of 
about 0.2091% in private investment in Iraq. This result is consistent with studies 
by Bakare (2011) and Naa-Idar et al. (2012) in the context of Nigeria and Ghana 
respectively, which also found a negative association between the real exchange 
rate and private investment. 
This suggests that a depreciation of the exchange rate will have a negative 
influence on private investment. Such depreciation will hinder the acquisition of 
foreign exchange for the importation of the inputs needed for investment. In other 
words, it will increase the cost of imported inputs and raw materials crucial for 
domestic investment in the developing world (see Section 3.4.3). The negative 
sign shows there is a stronger effect from the demand side. This is because the 
economy of Iraq relies heavily on imported capital goods, and because the 
mismanagement of the exchange rate policy in Iraq in the last decades may have 
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been a cause of great concern for investors. Hence, fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate might cause uncertainty for investors, and thereby discourage 
private investment in Iraq. 
The sign of the real interest rate (RINTR) is an empirical matter and 
depends on whether the data support the McKinnon–Shaw hypothesis or 
Keynes’ traditional theory (see Chapter 2). The estimated coefficient has 
the expected sign (negative) and it is statistically significant (-4.0829), 
indicating that a 1% increase in the real interest rate will decrease 
domestic investment by 4.0829%. This result conforms to Keynes’ 
traditional theory of investment. It has been confirmed by various studies 
that the real interest rate captures the cost of financing investment 
decisions. With higher real interest rates, fewer investment projects have 
potential returns high enough to justify borrowing to finance them, and 
therefore private investment is generally unattractive. This result is 
consistent with prior findings (Isaac and Samwel, 2012; Majeed and 
Khan, 2008).  
Since investment is sensitive to the cost of capital, following the 
implementation of monetary policy reforms in Iraq in late 2003, which 
led to an increase in real interest rates, the cost of funding investment 
projects was expected to play an inhibiting role in private investment (see 
Chapter 4). Erden and Holcombe (2006) argued that the real interest rate 
can be a poor proxy for the cost of capital, in light of the severe controls 
on nominal interest rates often imposed by the governments of developing 
countries, which cause real interest rates to simply reflect changes in 
inflation rates.  
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It is well known that macroeconomic stability plays an important role in 
an economy. An economy grows much faster when there is stability in 
economic factors such as inflation and the currency exchange rate 
(Ribeiro and Teixeira, 2001). The inflation rate has been identified by a 
number of empirical studies as an indicator of macroeconomic instability, 
and high inflation generally has an adverse effect on private saving and 
investment. The results in this study show that the inflation rate has a 
negative effect (-0.4832) in the case of Iraq. The variation in inflation is 
also significant in determining private investment levels, indicating that 
uncertainty in the economy is instrumental in decreasing investment, by 
distorting price signals and the information content of relative price 
changes, and increasing the riskiness of longer-term investment (Serven, 
1998). This implies that prudent fiscal policies, as well as disciplined 
monetary policies, are needed to deal with the issue (Montiel, 2011). The 
results obtained here are consistent with a number of prior empirical 
findings showing a negative association between inflation and private 
investment (Ahmad and Qayyum, 2009; Anders and Hemando, 1997; 
Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Pfeffermann and Madarassy, 1999; 
Valadkhani, 2004). However, they are contrary to the findings of Naa-
Idar et al. (2012) on the effect of the inflation rate on private domestic 
investment in the context of Ghana. 
Furthermore, the negative impact of increasing domestic prices will 
reduce the purchasing power of money; as a result, household demand for 
money will rise in order to keep the same purchasing power. It is not 
surprising that high inflation has an adverse effect on expected 
profitability, since high inflation will raise the cost of local production by 
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increasing the prices of resources entering the production process. This 
also implies that local products may be relatively more expensive than 
foreign products.  
As mentioned earlier in Section 5.3, war and political instability have harmful 
effects on private investment, by increasing the riskiness of long-term investment. 
This influence is measured by a dummy variable in this study. In econometric 
theory, the Johansen cointegration test is quite sensitive to the number of dummy 
variables used; therefore, including more than one dummy variable may deplete 
the power of the tests to find the proper cointegrating rank. It was therefore 
preferable to include one dummy variable representing the years of war
12
. The 
dummy variable has a negative and significant coefficient (-0.6886), confirming 
an adverse impact. The results suggest that war is likely to lead to a reduction in 
domestic private investment by about 0.68% in Iraq. Not surprisingly, this 
suggests that the political instability in Iraq may have created a climate that is 
hostile to private investment. A similar negative result has been observed in 
previous studies (Bakare, 2011; Frimpong and Marbuah, 2010; Kehinde et al., 
2012).  
The empirical investigations have produced evidence that reductions in real 
private investment in the context of Iraq are explained by political instability as 
well as the previously mentioned factors. This is due to the fact that, since the 
1980s, Iraq has experienced several wars, and later international sanctions, which 
have led to the deterioration and paralysis of the majority of economic sectors, 
and the isolation of Iraq’s economy from all kinds of trade and business with the 
                                                 
12
 The dummy variable represents the years of war, including the first Gulf War from 1980 to 
1988, the second Gulf War during 1990 and 1991, and finally the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 209 
 
world. This has left the country with a poor quantity and quality of investment, 
leaving it entirely reliant on oil export revenue. 
7.4 Short-Run Dynamics of Private Investment in Iraq 
Similar to Chapter 6, the Johansen-Juselius test results presented in Section 7.3 
showed that the time-series variables were cointegrated. Thus, the VECM was 
employed to examine the short-run dynamics of the explanatory variables. For the 
short-run dynamics, in addition to the macroeconomic variables (including 
RGDP, RPUI, REXR, RINTR, and INFL), two dummy variables
13
 were included 
as exogenous variables in order to identify the effect of the Iran-Iraq War and the 
international sanctions, respectively.  
The results of the VECM in Table 7.4 show that the estimated coefficient of the 
error correction term (ECM-t) is highly significant with the theoretically correct 
sign, indicating that approximately 59% of the disequilibrium in private fixed 
capital formation is corrected in the following year. This suggests a high speed of 
convergence to equilibrium if a disequilibrium shock appears. Thus, the result 
provides further support for the acceptance of the cointegration hypothesis. This is 
because the statistical significance of the coefficient also confirms the existence of 
a long-run equilibrium association amongst the time-series variables.  
Moreover, exploring the determinants of private investment, the latter seems to 
have been affected mainly, in the short term, by public investment, and by DUM2 
that captures the effect of international sanctions. Unlike in the long run, public 
investment crowds out private investment in the short run. 
                                                 
13
 DUM1 represents the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. DUM2 represents the international 
sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1990 and 2003.  
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Surprisingly, international sanctions appear to have had a positive effect on 
private investment in the short run. This result supports the observations made in 
Chapter 4, concerning how the Iraqi government had been forced to establish a 
privatization policy due to the fact that the country had been prevented from 
conducting any sort of international trade or economic business with the world 
during the period of international sanctions. Furthermore, economic reforms were 
adopted in the late 1980s, when the government provided subsidies and tax 
exemption for private sectors such as agriculture, industry and construction, 
aiming to encourage the economy to be self-sufficient. This indicates that the 
international sanctions had a positive impact on private investment. However, 
although the coefficient of DUM1 (Iran-Iraq War) has the expected negative sign, 
which is consistent with economic theory, it is insignificant in explaining private 
investment in the short run.   
Table  7.4: VECM for the Private Investment Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
D(LRPI(-1)) 
0.0039 0.1992 0.0195 
D (LRGDP(-1)) 
-0.7309 0.5289 -1.3819 
D (LRPUI(-1)) 
-0.4392 0.1929 -2.2761 
D (LREXR(-1)) 
-1.303475 0.82729 -1.57559 
D (LRINTR (-1)) 
-0.713706 0.85709 -0.83271 
D (LINFL(-1)) 
-0.020865 0.08418 -0.24787 
D(DUM1(-1)) 
-0.064719 0.14845 -0.43595 
D(DUM2(-1)) 
0.570064 0.19754 2.88588 
ECM(-1) -0.5926 0.1528 -3.8792 
R-squared 0.7015 Sum of squared resid 1.1817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6477 S.D. dependent 0.3979 
S.E. of equation 0.2807 
Akaike information 
criterion -1.6602 
F-statistic 3.5250 Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
As part of the specification model, various diagnostic tests were applied to check 
for any mis-specification in the model. The estimated model passed the diagnostic 
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tests. According to the Q-statistics used to detect serial correlation in the model, 
the null hypothesis is accepted. The P-values for the Q-statistics are more than 
5%, indicating that there is no serial correlation. The F-statistic for the Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation LM test is 1.8, which indicates the absence of serial 
correlation. The Jarque Bera test statistic is 2.38, which confirms that the non-
normality hypothesis can be rejected. The ARCH heteroskedasticity test results 
(F-statistic 0.35, p-value 0.55) show that the estimates are both consistent and 
efficient (Brooks, 2014). 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the second objective of this study by examining the 
macroeconomic factors that influence the private investment function within the 
context of Iraq. The specific objective was to investigate the determinants of 
private investment and their relationships with private investment, more 
importantly examining whether there is a crowding-in or a crowding-out effect 
from public investment. Similarly to Chapter 6, the analysis in this chapter 
employed the techniques of Johansen cointegration and error correction modelling 
to determine the long-run and short-run relationships between the variables.  
The estimated results based on annual data for the period 1970-2010 indicate that 
the real GDP, real exchange rate, real interest rate, inflation rate, and political 
instability are important in explaining domestic private investment in the long run 
for Iraq. The estimated coefficients of the variables that affect private investment 
in the long run all have the expected signs, consistent with the economic theory 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The empirical results suggest that political 
instability (increasing military government expenditure) and the cost of capital, a 
weak currency and macroeconomic instability all exert a negative impact on 
 212 
 
domestic investment. However, increasing GDP, which leads to higher demand, 
has a positive impact on private investment. The empirical results also show a 
complementary (crowding-in) effect coming from government investment, 
although it is statistically insignificant. Confirming various prior empirical 
studies, public investment, particularly in infrastructure projects, raises the 
profitability of private production, while non-infrastructure projects may have the 
opposite effect. However, only public investment and international sanctions are 
significant in the short run. 
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CHAPTER 8 DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN IRAQ 
 
8.1 Introduction  
In developing countries, the rapid growth in public capital over the past few 
decades has been seen as an essential means of accelerating the pace of economic 
growth. In most developing countries, the public sector now accounts for a 
noticeable share of total production and investment (see Section 3.2.3). However, 
the contribution of the public sector to growth has been far below expectations. In 
many cases, the public sector needs large subsidies from the government and may 
impose a significant fiscal burden on the economy, which has led to the 
emergence of the idea that the private sector is much more productive than the 
public sector (Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001a; Sarmad and Mohiuddin, 1991) (see 
also Section 3.3). 
Furthermore, it is discussed in a number of empirical studies that infrastructure 
services in oil-exporting countries are the government’s responsibility. The 
government has a role in infrastructure development and recognises that well-
targeted infrastructure investment generates significant social and economic 
benefits. Infrastructure investment helps to increase productivity and 
competitiveness and the capacity of the private and public sectors to deliver high-
quality services (see Section 3.2.3). Eventually it helps with the establishment of a 
stronger economy, rising real incomes and improvements in community well-
being (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Khan and Kumar, 1997; Majeed and Khan, 2008). 
Additionally, as discussed in Section 7.3, public and private investment may be 
linked by a complementary relationship if public capital provides positive 
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externalities for the private sector. Many channels may be affected: first, the 
availability of economic and social infrastructures may create favourable 
conditions for private investment decisions, by offering essential services to the 
production system both in the short and the long run (transportation, 
communication, education, and so on); second, higher public capital may lead, on 
the one hand, to a boost in total factor productivity and, on the other, to a 
reduction in production costs (through the availability of roads, electrical and gas 
facilities, public transportation, and so on); finally, public investment, by 
increasing total demand, may give rise to profit and sales expectations, 
incentivising private investment.  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, in spite of its potential direct and indirect 
importance for economic growth, only a few studies have been conducted on the 
determinants of public investment in developing countries. The implications for 
policy makers seem to be clear: in cases where public investment has been found 
to have a positive effect on economic growth, public investment should be 
increased in order to boost the economy. Indeed, such policies have been strongly 
supported by politicians and international institutions such as the WB and the IMF 
for many countries (Clements et al., 2003). 
Therefore, following prior empirical studies (Clements et al., 2003; De Haan et 
al., 1996; Saghir and Khan, 2012; Välilä and Mehrotra, 2005), this chapter is 
mainly focused on the determinants of public capital investment, with such an 
investment being an important factor in explaining economic growth on the one 
hand, and in providing positive externalities that impact upon private investment 
on the other hand. The empirical results in Chapter 6 indicate that public 
investment has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. The results 
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in Chapter 7 then show some evidence that a complementary relationship exists 
between private and public investment. These results provide a motivation for the 
current study to develop a further empirical model, based on the various prior 
empirical studies, of the determinants of public investment in Iraq’s economy. 
Another objective of this chapter is to ascertain the indirect impact of oil export 
revenue on private investment. This study argues that oil revenue could provide 
an indirect boost to private investment through its effect on public investment. 
Since the availability of economic and social infrastructure is the government’s 
responsibility in most oil-producing countries, an increase in the level of public 
investment as a result of higher oil revenue will reflect positively on private 
investment (see equation 5.19a).  
Following the pattern of the two previous chapters, the rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the unit root test results (ADF and 
PP). Section 8.3 presents the long-run dynamics of the determinants of public 
investment by employing the Johansen cointegration approach. Section 8.4 
discusses the short-run dynamics of public investment. Section 8.5 provides some 
conclusions.  
8.2 Results of Unit Root Tests – Public Investment Model 
A similar approach is followed to that of the last two chapters, beginning with two 
commonly applied unit root tests, the ADF and PP. Table 8.1 illustrates the 
results; both the ADF and PP show a non-rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicating a unit root or non-stationarity in the time series of two of the variables 
(LRGDPC and LROX) at the level in both the intercept without trend and 
intercept with trend models, while the variable LRGC is found to be stationary at 
the level when including the intercept with trend mdoel. This implies that LRGC 
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is stationary at the level (having no stochastic trend). The null hypothesis can 
therefore be rejected for this variable at the 5% significance level. However, after 
running both ADF and PP on the first differences, all variables are found to be 
non-stationary at the level. The results show that the null hypothesis (suggesting 
non-stationarity of unit roots in the time series) should be rejected for the first 
differences. This implies that all the time-series data of the variables are integrated 
of order one at first, having the same integration level of I(1) for all variables at 
the 5% significance level, except for LRGC which has zero order of integration. 
This means that all of the time series are integrated of order one in the first 
differences at the 5% significance level. 
Table  8.1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for the Public Investment Model  
 
SERIES 
ADF intercept 
without trend  
ADF intercept t with 
trend  
P-P intercept without 
trend  
P- P intercept with 
 trend 
  Level 
First 
differences  Level 
First 
differences Level 
First 
differences Level 
First 
differences 
LRGDPC -2.477 -6.479
** 
-2.449 -6.3391
**
 -2.536 -6.526
** 
-2.508 -6.429
**
 
LROX -2.013 -6.558
**
 -2.632 -6.487
**
 -2.013 -6.639** -2.622 -6.560
**
 
LRGC -1.959 -8.787
**
 
-
3.784
**
 
-8.673
**
 -1.723 -8.979
**
 -3.748* -8.859
**
 
Note: * and ** imply that we can reject the null hypothesis that the time series contains a non-
stationarity or has a stochastic trend at 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
8.3 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test and Long-Run Dynamics of 
Public Investment in Iraq 
Following a similar approach to that used in Chapters 6 and 7, the Johansen 
cointegration test is applied, and the results for the eigenvalue and trace statistics 
are shown in Table 8.2. It can be observed that the cointegrated time-series 
variables have the same common trend. The conclusion of cointegration is 
confirmed by the result of the Johansen procedure, which also reveals (through 
both the trace and max-eigenvalue statistics) the existence of a cointegrating 
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vectors. According to the unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace and max-
eigenvalue), the null hypotheses of non-cointegrating vectors are strongly rejected 
at the 5% significance level against the alternative hypotheses of the existence of 
cointegrating vectors. The results of the presence of cointegrating vectors confirm 
that there exist long-run equilibrium relationships between public investment and 
the explanatory variables.  
Table  8.2: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for the Public Investment 
Model 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Null hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace statistics 
5% critical 
value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.607651  78.08301  63.87610  0.0020 
At most 1*  0.430239  43.46569  42.91525  0.0440 
At most 2  0.315375  22.65181  25.87211  0.1196 
At most 3  0.208106  8.633110  12.51798  0.2042 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Eigenvalue 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
5% critical 
value 
Prob.** 
None *  0.607651  34.61732  32.11832  0.0242 
At most 1  0.430239  20.81388  25.82321  0.1998 
At most 2  0.315375  14.01870  19.38704  0.2529 
At most 3  0.208106  8.633110  12.51798  0.2042 
Note:  (1) Trace statistics and max-eigenvalue statistics indicate two and one cointegrating 
equations, respectively, at the 5% level. (2) * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level. 
(3) ** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
In general, the confirmation of cointegrating vectors implies that public 
investment and its determinants (RGDPC, RGC, and ROX) are cointegrated in the 
long run. The signs of the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables 
meet expectations and are strongly consistent with the economic theory discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 5. They are also statistically significant, except in the case of 
LRGDPC which is found to be insignificant in influencing public investment in 
the long term in the context of Iraq. The normalized cointegrating vector for the 
long-run relationship is given in Table 8.3. 
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Table  8.3: Normalized Cointegration Coefficients for the Public Investment 
Model 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic 
 
LRGDPC 1.15914 1.36143 0.851414 
LRGC 
3.90808 1.14152 3.423578 
LROX 1.79705 0.59838 3.003185 
 
Based on the above result, the cointegration equation can be written as follows: 
LRPUI = 1.159LRGDPC +3.908LRGC +1.797LROX  
With respect to individual coefficients, a large proportion of the empirical 
literature uses GDP or per capita income (PCI) as a proxy for the level of 
economic development in explaining public investment (Clements et al., 2003; 
Saghir and Khan, 2012; Tanzi and Hamid, 1997). The estimated results for this 
variable reveal evidence of positive effects on public investment in the long run, 
in the context of Iraq. The coefficient has a positive sign, although it is 
statistically insignificant. It implies that a 1% increase in LRGDPC is 
accompanied by a 1.16% increase in public investment. 
The results obtained in this study are similar to those obtained in previous studies 
(Clements et al., 2003; Saghir and Khan, 2012; Tanzi and Hamid, 1997), the 
positive coefficient possibly reflecting that countries with higher RGDPC can 
generate greater tax revenues and thus provide higher levels of public investment. 
However, the reason why the estimated coefficient of RGDPC was shown to be 
insignificant in influencing public investment could be attributable to the fact that 
tax revenue is not generally believed to affect fiscal policy in oil-producing 
countries like Iraq. The belief is that taxation is not a good means by which to 
affect government revenue, prices, incomes, welfare and the allocation of 
resources, since increasing taxes might reduce aggregate demand and decrease the 
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profitability of businesses, which would in turn impact negatively on potential 
investment and long-run growth ( see the Wagner’s Law, as discussed in chapter 
3.2.3 ) (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Nwosa Philip Ifeakachukwu, 2013). 
In the above model, the real public current expenditure (RGC) is also considered 
as a way to explain Iraq’s public investment in the long run. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the government’s current expenditure comes under non-productive 
expenditure. This is expenditure on categories such as defence, interest payments, 
law and order, public administration, public health and education, and the 
maintenance of government machinery ( see the Wagner’s Law, as discussed in 
chapter 3.2.3). This sort of expenditure does not create any productive assets that 
might bring income or returns to the government (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
However, this type of government expenditure helps to create a healthy 
environment for economic activity and increases aggregate demand. Due to an 
increasing rate of economic growth, the government may generate income in the 
form of duties and taxes from those with higher per capita income or the owners 
of large businesses. Thus, the theoretical and empirical literature argues, this 
variable exerts a positive impact on public investment in the long run.  
The estimated coefficient of this variable is consistent with the theoretical and 
empirical literature (see Chapters 3 and 5), indicating that current public 
expenditure has a positive effect (3.91) and is statistically significant. This implies 
that a 1% increase in current public expenditure will increase public investment 
by about 3.91% in the long run. A similar positive result was found by Ghassemi 
(1996).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the case of oil-exporting countries, public 
investment is largely influenced by oil export revenue, since a large proportion of 
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government income is obtained from oil exports. In line with this, a positive 
relationship is confirmed between oil export revenue and public investment. As 
shown in Table 8.3, the estimated coefficient for the impact of oil export revenue 
on real public investment in the long run is (1.79). This means that, in the long 
run, a 1% change in oil export revenue will cause an increase of about 1.79% in 
public investment in Iraq. This result supports findings by Saghir and Khan 
(2012) and Ghassemi (1996) for Pakistan and Iran respectively. The empirical 
results in Chapter 6 showed that, since oil export revenue has a positive impact on 
public investment, it may have the same effect on private investment. This is due 
to the fact that public investment is a major way to affect the level of private 
investment in oil-producing countries.  
It has been suggested by various researchers that other macroeconomic variables 
may influence public investment in developing countries, such as external debt, 
fiscal deficit, foreign aid, debt servicing and institutional variables (Clements et 
al., 2003; Sturm, 2001; Tanzi and Hamid, 1997). In our empirical analysis of 
public investment we excluded these variables for two reasons. First, some of 
these variables play an insignificant role in explaining public investment in Iraq. 
Second, and more importantly, there is a deficiency of available data. 
Following a similar approach to that pursued in Chapters 6 and 7, various 
diagnostic tests were applied to check for any misspecification in the model. The 
Jarque Bera test statistic is 2.89, which confirms that the non-normality 
hypothesis can be rejected. The ARCH heteroskedasticity test results (F-statistic 
1.59, p-value 0.21) show that the estimates are both consistent and efficient 
(Brooks, 2014). 
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8.4 Short-Run Dynamics of the Public Investment Model 
Similarly to Chapters 6 and 7, the Johansen-Juselius test results presented in 
Section 8.3 show that the time-series variables are cointegrated. Thus the VECM 
test was employed to examine the short-run dynamics of the explanatory 
variables. The results reported in Table 8.4 show the short-run dynamics and the 
set of short-run coefficients in the VECM. The VECM associates the changes in 
public investment with changes in other, lagged variables and the disturbance 
term of the lagged period. 
The most important result of the short-run model is that the estimated lagged error 
correction term (ECM -1) is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient 
is 0.11, suggesting a slow adjustment process in government investment. 
Approximately an 11% adjustment in the disequilibrium of the previous period 
takes place each year towards the long-run equilibrium. The short-run response of 
the lagged change in government investment is negative, which shows that the 
previous period’s growth in government investment brings about a negative 
change in the government’s investment over the short run. However, the estimated 
coefficient is not significant. 
Similarly to the long-run model, both explanatory variables (LRGDPC and 
LRGC) show positive, although statistically insignificant, impacts on public 
investment. However, the estimated coefficient of oil export revenue is negative, 
while also statistically insignificant. Unlike in the long-term model, in which all 
variables were significant and had the expected signs, none of the explanatory 
variables are found to be significant in explaining the public investment in the 
short run.  
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Table  8.4: Results of Short-Term VECM for the Public Investment Model  
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-statistic 
D(LRPUI(-1)) -0.1870  0.1685 -1.1099 
D(LRGDP(-1))  0.2577  0.6075 0.4242 
D(LRGC(-1))  0.2479  0.2363 1.0495 
D(LROX (-1)) -0.3406  0.3717 -0.9163 
ECM -1 -0.1142  0.0511 -2.2325 
R-squared 0.519 Sum squared resid 17.7559 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4812 S.D. dependent 0.961633 
S.E. of equation 0.6927 Akaike Information Criterion 2.1965 
F-statistic 13.3597 Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
8.5 Summary  
Generally, during 1960-1980, public investment was treated as one of the most 
important factors contributing to economic growth in developing countries. This 
view has gradually changed in recent years. There is some uncertainty about the 
effects of public investment, in terms of whether it induces or decreases private 
investment (see Chapter 3). However, public investment is associated with the 
development of infrastructural support and the provision of public goods and 
services. This kind of government expenditure can be complementary to private 
investment, and can raise the productivity of capital and expand the overall 
availability of resources by increasing output (see Chapters 6 and 7). On the other 
hand, public investment may crowd out private investment. This occurs if public 
investment is enabled by raising taxes, interest rates, and the issuance of debt, or 
if it creates inflationary pressure because of shortages of resources. Furthermore, 
private investment may be crowded out by public investment when the public 
sector produces goods that directly compete with private output (Aschauer, 1989; 
Blejer and Khan, 1984). The crowding-out effect can also occur when the 
distortion of the public sector is too large. 
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Based on the above arguments, it can be concluded that it is important to find out 
which variables determine public investment in the case of Iraq, since public 
investment has a very powerful and large effect on private investment and 
economic growth. Both the level and composition of public investment can affect 
private investment, providing a powerful instrument for encouraging or 
discouraging the latter. As recently pointed out by the IMF and the WB, a better 
understanding of the relationship between public and private investment is also 
crucial for policy makers, if they are to address the objective of accelerating 
economic development (Clements, et al., 2003).  
Therefore, this chapter has addressed the third objective of the current study by 
examining the macroeconomic factors that influence the public investment 
function within the context of Iraq (see Chapter 1). The specific objective was to 
investigate the determinants of public investment in both the long and the short 
term. The analysis was based on the techniques of Johansen cointegration and 
error correction modelling, which provide mechanisms for overcoming problems 
associated with unit roots and time-series data analysis in general.  
The estimated results, based on annual data for the period 1970-2010, indicate that 
both current real government expenditure and real oil export revenue are 
significant in explaining public investment in the long run for Iraq. The 
coefficients of the variables that affect public investment in the long run all have 
the expected signs consistent with economic theory, except for RGDPC which is 
found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results suggest that 
increasing the real per capita income, current government expenditure and oil 
export revenue all have a positive effect on public investment, with the last two 
more significant. However, all explanatory variables are found to be statistically 
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insignificant in explaining public investment in the short run. The short-run 
estimated lagged error correction term (ECM -1) is found to be consistent with the 
theory, as it is negative and statistically significant. 
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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This study has investigated investment behaviour in Iraq and how it relates to 
economic growth. Only a few studies have examined the behaviour of investment 
in Iraq, due to data limitations and difficulties in applying classical investment 
theories. The lack of a relatively open market over the last few decades, the 
absence of asset and money markets, and the fluctuation of the domestic currency 
have been some other deficiencies in this regard. The unavailability of some data, 
such as the real return on private investment, the rates of unemployment and 
employment, and nominal wages, have been other restrictions on the adoption of a 
more reliable macroeconomic model in this regard. In spite of the above 
difficulties, carefully informed by the theoretical and empirical literature this 
study adopted three empirical models to identify major elements influencing 
economic growth and domestic private and public investment in Iraq, as a 
developing country and a member of OPEC, over the period 1970-2010. The 
empirical analyses were based on key studies in developing countries, such as 
Wai and Wong (1982), Aschauer (1989), Mlambo and Oshikoya (2001), Ghura 
and Goodwin (2000) and Greene and Villanueva (1991). For economic growth, 
the studies consulted were Zou (2006), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Mlambo 
and Oshikoya (2001), Sakr (1993) and Ghura and Goodwin (2000). For private 
investment, Serven and Solimano (1992), Havi et al. (2013), Naqvi (2002), 
Sundararajan and Thakur (1980), Sakr (1993), Khan and Kumar (1997), Khan and 
Khan (2007) and Blejer and Khan (1984). Finally, for public investment, the 
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analyses made use of Clements et al. (2003), Saghir and Khan (2012), Tanzi and 
Hamid (1997) and Ghassemi (1996). 
The estimation of macroeconomic models made it possible to identify a number of 
economic policies that are essential for enhancing private investment, targeting 
public investment and ensuring long-term economic development and economic 
stability. These policies will not necessarily achieve the above objectives and 
cannot encourage private investment unless the government enacts relevant 
macroeconomic reforms, which for example, aimed at enhancing the rate of 
foreign investment, ensuring political stability, privatizing nationalized industries, 
structuring public enterprises and improving banking services. A summary of the 
findings of the empirical macroeconomic model estimations is discussed in the 
next section. Section 9.3 summarizes the major economic policies that will be 
needed to enhance private investment and economic development based upon 
those model estimations. It will also answer the following two questions: (1) In 
which sectors will private investment be more effective in order to have a 
maximum effect on economic growth (see Chapter 4)? (2) Which key areas 
should be targeted by public investment so as to enhance its impact on private 
investment and economic growth? The last section suggests a number of issues for 
future studies to tackle. 
9.2 Summary 
9.2.1 Macroeconomic environment in Iraq 
One of the objectives of this study was to review the historical trends of key 
macroeconomic indicators and evaluate the role private and public investments 
have played in Iraq’s performance over the period 1970-2010. The discussion on 
this topic in Chapter 4 suggests the significance of oil in the Iraqi economy. This 
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stems from its role as a major source of government revenue, exports and foreign 
exchange. Also, a major share of national income is derived from the oil sector. 
Consequently, since the early 1950s, most of the macroeconomic indicators have 
been influenced by oil production and oil price developments. These indicators 
include government revenue and spending, real GDP, exports, the current account, 
various monetary variables (the money supply, inflation, the interest rate and the 
exchange rate) and investment. Large oil resources allowed the country to allocate 
a high proportion of its oil revenue for development purposes. A broad 
development plan commenced in early 1950s and lasted until 1961, producing 
multiyear plans with an emphasis on the three major fiscal priorities: agriculture, 
transportation, and communication and construction. The plan proposed a large 
amount of capital investment in the agriculture sector.  
However, in 1968 the political situation changed, as the Baath Party took over 
ruling the country, and introduced different economic and social objectives. 
Nationalization of the oil industry in the early 1970s provided Iraq with a source 
of sustainable financial strength, leading to the adoption of expansionary fiscal 
policies that stimulated economic activity. This led the new government to 
formulate its own mid-term plans. Thus, the first national development plan (NDP 
1970-1974) was established. It followed the same approach as the previous ones, 
by emphasizing the agriculture sector and giving less attention to other important 
sectors such as manufacturing and the development of human capital.    
By the late 1970s, the NDP (1976-1980) had shifted its attention slightly to the 
industrial sector, allocating a large proportion of the government budget to 
capital-intensive industries. This plan’s target was to achieve balanced growth and 
a self-sustaining economy. Despite the centrally planned economy, in which the 
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public sector was the key sector, the government observed the importance of 
creating an investment climate that would attract private investment. This plan 
sharply expanded public current expenditure and capital expenditure, which 
increased aggregate demand dramatically. As a result, in the 1970s, the country 
had an impressive annual economic growth rate of over 10% in real terms, and 
similarly large growth in investment. This reflected highly on the country’s 
standard of living, and allowed the population to enjoy economic and social 
prosperity. The country witnessed middle-income status, with modern 
infrastructure and good education and healthcare systems.  
However, the formulation of NDPs and the financing of investment projects were 
halted when the Iraq-Iran War began in the 1980s. The country encountered major 
challenges in terms of declining oil prices and production, and ultimately oil 
revenue. It was difficult for the government to manage the structural imbalance in 
the economy and the fiscal deficit due to the substantial increase in military 
spending. Oil production almost stopped in the month after the war began, and 
Iraq’s Gulf port facilities were destroyed. All macroeconomic indicators, without 
exception, were affected and Iraq experienced various economic crises in the 
years after the war, such as reductions in economic growth, capital accumulation 
and national income, and increases in the rate of unemployment and poverty.  
By 1987, in the first post-conflict stage, new situations caused by the war forced 
the state to work to enhance the level of private investment, by improving the 
country’s physical and human capital, and increasing the population’s access to 
social services. There was a significant shift in macroeconomic policies, aimed at 
redefining the role of public investment in the economy. The announcement of a 
programme of trade liberalization and privatization represented a further step 
 229 
 
towards promoting private investment performance in other sectors of the 
economy. The key features of the privatization programme included the sale of 
most of the state lands, farms, and the state-owned manufacturing industry to the 
private sector at very low prices. It was expected that privatization would operate 
as an instrument for enhancing the capacity for specialization, the utilization of 
economic resources, and competition in the economy.   
By 1991, Iraqi occupation of Kuwait had caused a new war, which ended in defeat 
by a US-led coalition. This defeat devastated the already weak Iraqi economy, 
damaged the country’s infrastructure, and led to the imposition of strict economic 
sanctions (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2008). The government had failed to overcome the 
economic difficulties of the previous three decades and had even caused other 
problems, particularly following the second Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. As a 
result, the economy experienced an absolute decline in real GDP, and in GDP per 
capita, with a high fiscal deficit due to the interruption of oil revenues and 
increased military spending requirements. Hence, the UN embargo, which 
involved the ceasing of Iraqi exports and the freezing of Iraq’s foreign currency 
accounts, caused many economic difficulties, such as a heavy debt burden, high 
inflation, currency depreciation, a non-responsive private sector, stagnant output, 
and a lack of funds for reconstruction.  
Therefore, the government pursued another approach, financing its operations by 
printing money. This situation caused the money supply to grow much faster than 
the output of goods and services, leading to hyperinflation, with inflation rising 
from 6% in 1989 to nearly 448% in 1994. The Iraqi dinar depreciated from around 
4 dinars per dollar in 1990 to more than 1,700 in 1995. This caused chronic 
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inflation, a depreciation of the local currency, a lack of domestic investment, a 
rise in unemployment, and eventually a drop in living standards.   
In 2003, after decades of conflict and isolation, it was expected that Iraq’s 
economy would start to recover and overcome the effects of its prolonged 
conflicts. Decades of heavy state control over all kinds of economic activity in 
Iraq meant that diversification through increased international trade was sorely 
needed. At the same time, however, the economy was confronted with enormous 
development challenges, necessitating a change in orientation marked by, once 
again, the formal adoption of development plans. Therefore, the government 
introduced and implemented NDP 2005-2007. This plan was established on the 
four key objectives of sustained economic growth, a revival of the private sector, 
improved quality of life, and the establishment of good governance and security.  
However, these efforts have again been hampered by the preceding decades of 
socialist economic policy, which have strongly bound Iraq’s economy to the state. 
Consequently, the private sector today has a limited presence, and the motivation 
for its expansion is barely existent. Because of the state’s long dominance, credit 
systems and access to finance are severely limited, and there is general insecurity. 
As a result, Iraq suffers from unsteady electricity and water supplies, the transport 
system remains underdeveloped, and its agricultural and industrial capacities are 
severely limited. These key challenges must be addressed in order for Iraq to truly 
fulfil its economic potential. 
9.2.2 Empirical analysis  
In recent years, a growing number of studies, including Khan and Kumar  (1997) 
Khan and Reinhart (1990), Khan and Khan (2007) and Majeed and Khan (2008), 
have expanded the neoclassical framework to clarify the role private and public 
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investments have in determining economic growth in developing countries. 
Following these studies, the first objective of examining the comparative effects 
of private and public investment on economic growth in the context of Iraq in the 
long and short run was addressed in Chapter 6. This study developed a simple 
analytical model that included other theoretical determinants of growth, such as 
labour force which used as proxy for human capital, macroeconomic stability and 
the exchange rate, variables that have received extensive attention in the recent 
literature.  
The empirical findings indicated that, although the estimated coefficients of both 
the private and public investment variables showed positive and significant effects 
on GDP in the long run, the coefficient of the real public investment variable was 
greater than that for real private investment. It can therefore be concluded, based 
on the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence, that, in the long run, real 
public investment is more productive than real private investment in encouraging 
GDP growth in Iraq. Thus, any fiscal adjustment that reduces public investment 
implies a reduction in the gross fixed capital formation and a slowdown in 
economic performance.  
The estimated results of the human capital variable strongly supported the Solow 
growth model, suggesting that growth in the labour force has a positive influence 
on economic growth. The findings also suggested that oil revenue has a positive 
and significant effect on economic growth, confirming that a high ratio of oil 
revenue can facilitate economic development as long as the rent is used to 
enhance the level of investment and as long as the foreign exchange rate is 
managed so as to increase the country’s capacity to import the capital goods 
required to build a modern economy. However, the results for economic 
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instability, captured by the exchange rate and the inflation rate, revealed that both 
exert a negative influence on the real GDP in the long run. The conclusion that 
can be drawn is that both variables are inversely associated with investment, 
because they produce high uncertainty in the economy. Thus, poorly managed 
exchange rates and inflation can be devastating for investment and economic 
growth. In contrast to the long-run results, in the short run only public investment 
and the real exchange rate were found to significantly influence real GDP, with 
positive and negative effects respectively.   
The second objective of this study was to empirically assess the impact of 
macroeconomic variables on private fixed capital formation, in order to examine 
domestic investment in Iraq (Chapter 7). The empirical domestic investment 
model was roughly based on accelerator model studies in developing countries 
(among others, Blejer and Khan, 1984; Frimpong and Marbuah, 2010; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991; Karagoz, 2010; Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Wai and 
Wong, 1982; Yin, 2011). 
The choice of explanatory variables for the private domestic investment model 
was informed by the theoretical and empirical studies discussed in Chapters 2, 3 
and 5. According to these studies, GDP, public investment,  real exchange rate,  
inflation rate, real interest rate, credit availability, foreign direct investment, 
foreign debt burden, and economic and political instability are the factors that 
most strongly explain private investment behaviour. Due to institutional and 
structural constraints such as data problems, the absence of well-functioning 
markets, the relatively strong role played by the government in capital formation, 
and economic and political instability, not all of these variables were considered 
in this analysis.  
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In this study, the domestic investment empirical model focused on the key 
macroeconomic variables of GDP, real public investment, real exchange rate, real 
interest rate, inflation rate, and political instability as the most important variables 
influencing private investment in Iraq over 1970-2010. The empirical results for 
the long run showed that increases in real GDP and public investment had 
contributed significantly to increases in private investment. Moreover, the 
analysis revealed that real public investment was positively associated with 
private investment, supporting the crowding-in hypothesis in the long run. On the 
other hand, real interest rate, real exchange rate and the inflation rate were all 
found to have adversely affected private investment. The findings also indicated 
that war and political instability, that had caused increased military expenditure by 
the government and uncertainties, had both been severe obstacles to the attraction 
of private investment. The short-run dynamics, for which the model included two 
dummy variables to capture the effects of the Iran-Iraq War and the international 
sanctions, revealed only two variables as being significant in influencing private 
investment, namely public investment and international sanctions.  
The third objective of the study was to empirically determine the effect of per 
capita income, government current expenditure and oil export revenue on public 
investment (see Chapter 8). Various empirical studies that had already been 
conducted on this issue in the context of developing countries were consulted in 
developing a public investment model for the context of Iraq (Clements et al., 
2003; De Haan et al., 1996; Saghir and Khan, 2012; Välilä and Mehrotra, 2005). 
Since (1) the Iraqi economy was centrally planned for decades and public 
investment played a large role in economic growth, and (2) the results in Chapters 
6 and 7 had confirmed public investment’s positive impact on economic growth 
and private investment, it was essential to identify the key factors that had 
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influenced public investment over the period 1970-2010. Another objective of this 
analysis was to investigate the indirect impact of oil export revenue on private 
investment. This study has argued that oil revenues could provide an indirect 
boost to private investment through its effects on public investment. Since the 
availability of economic and social infrastructure is the government’s 
responsibility in most oil-producing countries, increasing the level of public 
investment should have a positive indirect effect on private investment.  
The empirical findings showed both government current expenditure and oil 
export revenue to have a positive effect on public investment and to be 
statistically significant. However, per capita income was found to be insignificant 
in explaining public investment. The result for oil export revenue implies that it 
has a positive, indirect impact on private investment via public investment. This is 
due to the fact that greater oil revenue will enable the government to spend more 
on social and economic services, which in turn will increase private investment 
and economic growth. In the short run, all explanatory variables were found to be 
statistically insignificant in explaining public investment.  
As recently pointed out by the IMF and the WB (2001a), understanding the 
relationship between public and private investment is also crucial for policy 
makers’ objective of accelerating economic development. In order to address the 
above objectives, the Johansen cointegration and VECM techniques were 
employed, respectively, to assess the long and short-term relationships between 
the variables. 
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9.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
The effects of the oil-driven state development, conflict, sanctions and delayed 
reforms have significantly shaped Iraq’s economy and limited the potential for 
private-sector-led growth over the past 40 years. It has been suggested by 
international institutions such as the IMF and WB that economic growth will be 
difficult to maintain in Iraq without significant contributions from both public and 
private investment through an increased rate of capital investment. This would 
help to increase the national capacity and output, to fulfil domestic needs and for 
export purposes. It is important for Iraq to adopt sustainable policies so as to 
attract both local and foreign investment in the country. Based on the findings of 
the present study, the following suggestions and recommendations can be made, 
for improving the investment climate for both public and private investment, and 
for maintaining long-term economic growth in Iraq.  
I. High-Quality Infrastructure: Infrastructure, transport and 
telecommunications have been devastated in Iraq, due to several wars and 
severe international sanctions over the last four decades (see Chapter 4). 
Thus, public investment should focus on integrating and improving the 
infrastructure, as a key element for improving the investment climate and 
in turn expanding the level of private investment in Iraq. Access to a 
reliable electrical supply, water and sewage treatment, efficient transport 
and modern telecommunication systems are needed to provide incentives 
to the private sector. In line with this, Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) 
indicated that the positive link between infrastructure and private 
investment is particularly strong in countries with a worse stock of 
infrastructure. To expand and rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure, investments 
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must continue to be made, by both the state and the private sector. 
Furthermore, a stable government, legal and regulatory environment will 
help Iraq’s private sector to invest sustainably in infrastructure expansion 
and rehabilitation. Additionally, the state will need to provide support to 
small and medium-sized enterprises, through regulations and incentives 
aimed at improving their competitiveness and potential for productivity. 
II. Public-Sector Reforms: In Iraq, as in any other country, development and 
steady economic growth require a steady increase in total investment, 
private as well as public. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the last four 
decades Iraq’s government has failed to achieve stable economic growth 
due to low contributions to GDP from both private and public investment. 
Economic diversification in Iraq should be linked with the reform of the 
public sector and the development of Iraq’s non-oil private sector in order 
to motivate investment activity as a whole. According to the results 
presented in Chapter 6, public investment has contributed more than 
private investment to economic growth in Iraq. Based on this result, 
government investment should be expanded and directed towards 
productive activities such as agriculture and manufacturing, and to the 
construction of linkages between them. Thus, public expenditure needs to 
be directed towards providing proper physical, technological and financial 
infrastructure in the country so as to put the economy on the path towards 
long-term growth. This will work as a complement to the private sector. 
Eventually, it will enhance the overall level of capital formation, which 
will in turn help to bring institutional stability and improve the general 
performance of the economy, facilitating its integration with the global 
economy.  
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III. Quality of the Public Sector: The estimated results presented in Chapter 
7 reveal that public investment has a “crowding-in” effect on private 
investment in the long run. In order to motivate private investment in Iraq, 
more public investment should be directed towards infrastructure and 
public goods, and public spending policies need to be designed that target 
sectors in which an extra unit of public spending will contribute positively 
to the private sector's expected profitability. This implies that not only is 
the quantity of public investment important in encouraging private 
investment but also the quality. Hence, a rationalization of government 
expenditure can be achieved through a reduction in unproductive and 
wasteful spending, a reduction in unnecessary subsidies on various goods 
and services, and a review of the enormous amount of government 
expenditure currently assigned to public administration. In addition, a 
precise cost-benefit analysis needs to be undertaken to ensure an optimal 
spending policy. 
IV. Good-Quality Institutions: As is well known, Iraq has experienced a high 
number of conflicts and has low-quality institutions (see Chapters 4 and 
5). The state has been unable to provide the institutions required to attract 
foreign and domestic investment. It needs to provide a climate conducive 
to investment by establishing stable macroeconomic reforms, and 
providing adequate legal and institutional arrangements for the protection 
of private property. Investors need to be encouraged to invest due to 
anticipating smooth returns on their invested funds and assurances need to 
be made against the risk of nationalization, dispossession and seizure. This 
implies that facilitating the movement of capital both into and out of the 
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country would have significant benefits for long-term economic growth 
and boost the standard of living.  
V. Political Stability: The results presented in Chapter 7 showed that 
political instability had exerted a negative influence on private investment 
due to the destruction of capital stock and the interruption of production 
processes during times of war and other episodes. Political crises have 
created a hostile climate and a lack of security, which have in turn 
damaged private investment in Iraq. This is apparent when looking at the 
Kurdistan region in the north of Iraq, which has been significantly more 
peaceful, stable and prosperous than the rest of the country, and has 
enjoyed a relatively stable and self-contained economic system. Private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, has thus flourished. In 2010, there 
were over 1,200 private foreign firms in Kurdistan, 730 of them Turkish, 
reflecting the huge volume of trade with Turkey. Additionally, there is 
about $1.5 billion invested in joint ventures between Kurdish and foreign 
firms, and nearly $22 billion has been invested in projects in the region by 
Iraqi investors, mostly Kurds (WB, 2012). Based on the above, political 
stability is a high-priority objective that needs to be achieved in order to 
enhance the growth of Iraq’s domestic investment. The government should 
work to remove or at least minimize the political conflict at all levels in 
the country. By doing so they will encourage investment.  
VI. Monetary Policy Reforms: There is evidence, confirmed by the empirical 
results presented in Chapter 6, suggesting that the cost of borrowing is 
vital for domestic investment. The monopoly power of the government in 
developing countries, including Iraq, gives public-sector investment 
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advantages over private investment when competing over resources. Thus 
it seems that the financing of irregular government expenditure by any 
kind of resources such as oil revenue or interring market as borrower 
reduces the financing available for private investment and in turn causes 
the rate of interest to rise, which crowds out (or discourages) private 
investment. Therefore, policies that reduce the interest rate and the cost of 
financial intermediation, such as tax policies and complex procedures need 
to be considered to facilitate the access to credit. 
VII. Exchange Rate Policies: Based on the results regarding the real exchange 
rate presented in Chapters 6 and 7, policy makers and the central bank in 
Iraq should take steps to ensure the stability of the local currency against 
other currencies. This sort of policy will produce a positive response from 
domestic investment. Thus, this study proposes that pursuing a devaluation 
policy for the domestic currency is not appropriate in the case of a country 
like Iraq, since it is not developed in terms of producing international 
goods. Furthermore, it would increase the cost of capital for the private 
sector. Devaluation of the domestic currency should decrease the demand 
for non-capital imports and increase the demand for domestic products due 
to the higher cost of the imported goods, and thus encourage private 
investment. Finally, a more liberalized exchange regime should be adopted 
to ease international transfers.    
VIII. Achieving Macroeconomic Stability: Macroeconomic instability is a sign 
of the government’s inability to control the economy. The empirical results 
presented in Chapter 6 showed that inflation had an adverse influence on 
economic growth. It has been confirmed by several studies that 
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macroeconomic instability and uncertainty about the future will decrease 
investors’ motivation to grow their projects. Chapter 7’s empirical results 
also indicated that the high inflation rate in Iraq has damaged domestic 
investment activities by increasing the riskiness of long-term investment 
projects since, in high-inflation conditions, investors will prefer to wait 
rather than invest today. In other words, uncertainty about the future has a 
substantial effect on the investment decision and leads investors to adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude. Hence, despite the reforms that have been adopted 
recently regarding this issue, it is highly important that Iraq adopts an 
effective macroeconomic policy that will allow it to maintain an inflation 
rate in the single-digit or low two digit range, in order to reduce the long-
run riskiness and help the private sector to play a major role.    
IX. Rational Management of Oil Revenue: In Iraq, the majority of 
government revenues for economic-related and government expenditure 
are raised through oil revenue rather than alternative financial resources. 
Depending on oil has created problems for successive Iraqi governments, 
due to fluctuating world oil prices. For example, decreasing oil prices in 
2009 forced the government to cut its budget by 25% and fund the deficit 
from the reserves. Most of Iraq’s economic sectors, including agriculture 
and manufacturing, education and health, were influenced as a result. 
Taxation, as a fiscal instrument of government income, is negligible in the 
country’s economy. Thus, the government should minimize its reliance on 
oil revenue by using alternative resources, for example taxation and other 
public revenue, to finance its unproductive expenditure, such as public 
current expenditure. Public investment could also be financed by 
borrowing from either domestic or foreign sources, rather than with oil 
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revenue. Thus, expanding public investment would lead to a fast 
accumulation of public capital and higher non-oil growth.  
X. The Effectiveness of Public Investment: This relies on institutional 
factors, such as the capacity to implement, select and evaluate projects. 
These features are highly associated with the business climate, the 
availability of skilled human capital and corruption. Despite the abundance 
of its oil revenues, Iraq – like most developing countries – has large social 
and infrastructure gaps and faces institutional inefficiencies and absorptive 
capacity constraints in managing its public investments. The positive 
impacts of public investment on economic growth and private investment 
have been confirmed in Chapters 6 and 7. Thus, there is a need to 
effectively manage oil revenues.  
XI. Enhancing the Capacity of the Domestic Private Sector: Due to the 
limited capacity of private investment in Iraq to produce job opportunities, 
the number of workers in the public sector has increased since 2005. The 
government currently provides approximately 60% of full-time 
employment, with high public-sector salaries and benefits draining the 
public budget. This raises the fear that high operational spending could be 
preventing the availability of investment and development funds. Jobs in 
the public sector are typically more desirable than private-sector jobs in 
oil-producing countries, due to the fact that the government has the ability 
to offer better benefits (such as pensions, scholarships, continuing 
education, government-subsidized housing, and a stable monthly income). 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to increase the capacity of private 
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projects in various sectors, in order to minimize the pressure on the public 
sector and the government budget.  
XII. Improving the Quality of Human Capital: Human capital in Iraq is 
underdeveloped (see Chapter 4). Moreover, Chapter 6 revealed that the 
labour force has a positive impact on economic growth. This suggests that 
the human capital in Iraq must be improved through the strengthening of 
educational institutions so as to produce the graduates required by the 
domestic manufacturing sector, the non-oil export trade, and banking and 
financial institutions. The academic research of government departments 
and institutions also needs to be upgraded in order to develop an 
appropriate level of research infrastructure. Currently, Iraq allocates a low 
proportion of its budget to research and development, compared to Asian 
countries such as Singapore, Korea and Japan. Increased spending on 
research and development is necessary so as to address issues related to 
sustainable economic growth and development in the country, including 
emerging socio-economic problems.   
In addition to aforementioned recommendations which based on the 
outcome of the study, some others suggestions have been recommended as 
follow; 
XIII. Good Governance: The low level of private investment in Iraq can also 
be attributed to the poor efficiency of the government in managing the 
economy. Thus, good governance is a highly important factor for 
improving the investment climate in Iraq. Good governance contributes to 
the effective delivery of public services, which are necessary for 
productive business. It has also been confirmed that countries with good 
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governance (low corruption, strong property right) have higher levels of 
private investment than countries with poor governance (Khan and Khan, 
2007; Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 2012; Udomkerdmongkol and 
Morrissey, 2008). 
XIV. Well-Functioning Financial System: Generally, poor performance of the 
financial system is common in developing countries, and this is 
particularly so in Iraq (see Chapter 4). This, in addition to institutional 
development, in order to achieve product and service diversification, the 
financial system has to be developed to ensure capital growth. There is a 
need to develop the infrastructure of the financial system by introducing 
electronic banking and financial services. Financial services need to be 
reformed in order to create an efficient and progressive financial sector. It 
is also important that Islamic banking be allowed to play a role in the 
economy, based on the Islamic legislation and law, to boost credit 
availability to the private sector.  
XV. Integration of Local Industries: As was observed in Chapter 4 (see Table 
4.4), in the 1970s and 1980s key sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, building and construction were highly emphasized by the 
government. This provides evidence that these sectors have very strong 
potential for the diversification of Iraq's economy. Improving the local 
environmental conditions for domestic products, not only for local 
consumption, but also for international business, is crucial. It will also be 
beneficial to increase the capacity of domestic firms to respond to new 
investment opportunities and to expand business associations with foreign 
investors. This will help to increase investment in leading sectors, which 
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will in turn increase investment in other subordinate sectors. For instance, 
the agriculture sector can help to improve the agro-industrial sector by 
providing it with raw materials. Public-sector partners in Iraq countries can 
be motivated to engage more with the private sector, for instance through 
public–private partnership. 
XVI. Target the Private Sector: Finally, a conclusion of this study is 
that the private sector in Iraq can contribute to the areas of priority 
related to the country’s abundant natural resources, its 
geographical location, its tourist attractions and its enormous need 
for reconstruction, and improved health and education services, in 
the following ways: 
(1) Agriculture was once Iraq’s largest sector after oil, but has 
diminished greatly. Only 58% of irrigable land is exploited 
(13.2 million acres of a potential 22.9 million) (WB, 2012). 
Although agriculture currently accounts for approximately 2-
4% of GDP (decreasing from 9% in 2002), and provides 25% of 
overall employment, Iraq continues to import 80% of its food 
supply. According to a recent International Labour 
Organization and United Nations survey, agriculture comprises 
10% of activity by small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
north, 4% in the south, and none in the centre. The potential for 
private-sector-led growth in the agricultural sector is thus 
significant. However, long-term economic growth and 
development beyond subsistence farming will be dependent on 
government stability, a consistently favourable agricultural 
policy and significant infrastructure investment. 
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(2) Iraq’s physical location and resources grant it the potential for 
significantly expanded trade associations. Iraq’s ports in Basra 
Province alone have important potential for growth: 35 million tons of 
goods cross Iraq annually, via Iraq’s borders with Syria, Turkey and 
Europe. This number could potentially rise to 60 million tons. Trade 
with the eastern Mediterranean states is poised to grow as Iraq expands 
its ports and transport infrastructure, especially at the Al-Faw 
peninsula on the Persian Gulf, with an annual planned capacity of 99 
million tons. Consequently, Iraq’s ports hold great potential for major 
private-sector activity and a productive crossroads between East and 
West, with Iraq having the further advantage of significant land trade 
with Turkey, an access point to the European Union. 
(3) With political stability and security achieved, the tourism sector has 
and could become a significant sector in the economy after the oil 
sector, the country having received over 1.5 million international 
tourists in 2010, up from fewer than 900,000 in 2008. The Shi’a holy 
cities of Najaf and Karbala already receive millions of pilgrims each 
year and Najaf was further designated the Capital of Islamic Culture 
for 2012 by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization. Other religious sites, including those of Sunni and 
Christian significance, as well as Iraq’s renowned archaeological sites, 
the greener regions in Kurdistan and the thousand-year-old historical 
monuments and castle in Erbil, each hold substantial potential for 
tourism. Currently, there is a lack of hotels and other tourist 
infrastructure, but this has been a key area for investment and 
continued private-sector engagement. Over $400 million was invested 
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in 2011 alone, with most projects located in Erbil, Mosul, Basrah and 
Najaf. The potential for increased private-sector engagement in 
tourism is thus significant. 
(4) Although the operations in the construction sector are mostly 
conducted by foreign contractors at present, this sector provides great 
potential for private Iraqi firms. 154 senior international business 
leaders surveyed by the Economist Intelligence Unit viewed 
construction as the most favourable non-energy sector in Iraq, with 
over $14 billion of real estate deals and over $6.7 billion of 
infrastructure projects already planned (WB, 2012). The construction 
sector will certainly grow further as it benefits from Parliament’s 2011 
agreement to invest $37 billion in infrastructure, offering significant 
potential to a thriving private sector to get actively involved. 
9.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This study, like any other study, has some limitations. First, it is well known that 
data for developing countries such as Iraq can be scarce or non-existent. Due to 
this deficiency of data, a number of macroeconomic variables such as external 
debt, fiscal deficit, foreign debt and debt services, which are highly related to 
public investment, are excluded from the models. Furthermore, for the same 
reason, this study was unable to identify different types of public investment, such 
as infrastructure and non-infrastructure, to determine which has more influence on 
private investment and growth. Doing so might provide new insights for future 
studies and more effective policies for enhanced economic growth.  
Secondly, although non-economic factors such as institutional quality, governance 
and a secure environment can play a complementary role alongside the traditional 
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economic factors in explaining private and public investment, these variables 
were not considered in this study. This was due to a lack of long-term time-series 
data for these variables. Moreover, the collection of primary data to support the 
analysis and discussion was impossible because of the conflicts and insecurity in 
most parts of the country.  
There are other variables that have been ignored by this study due to data 
limitations, such as credit availability, unemployment, and the balance of 
payments and trade. It would be beneficial if they were included in future studies. 
Including them in our models could make this study’s findings more robust and 
extensive. Furthermore, a comparative study is suggested, between Iraq’s private 
investment and that of other countries, especially those whose economies have 
similar features to Iraq’s. 
The sample period for this study was 1970-2010, which included various 
economic and political transformations in Iraq. Thus, it is important that future 
studies examine the private and public investment model for the period following 
the economic liberalization in 2003, including additional macroeconomic factors 
along with social economic indicators such as quality of institutions, good 
governance, etc.  
Finally, investigating the determinants of foreign direct investment in Iraq since 
the liberalization of its economy would also be recommended. Applying the 
model to the Kurdistan region in North Iraq, where foreign investment has been 
attracted successfully, would be useful.    
 248 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Map of Iraq 
 
 
Appendix B1 
Real Oil and Non-oil Revenue for the Public Budget as a Percentage of GDP 
Years 
Oil  production            
(1,000 bpd) 
Oil Revenue % of 
GDP 
Oil GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ millions 
Non-Oil GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ millions 
1970 1495.8 16.99 1682.14 8218.61 
1971 1618.9 23.22 2458.51 8129.38 
1972 1436.1 16.83 1715.40 8477.09 
1973 1925.8 30.24 3665.57 8456.03 
1974 1849 59.09 7739.74 5358.48 
1975 2058.8 51.63 7734.29 7245.93 
1976 2241.1 51.01 9218.80 8853.73 
1977 2167.4 44.21 8137.17 10268.56 
1978 2384.4 41.86 9109.53 12652.36 
1979 3247 96.58 26047.52 922.37 
1980 2482 71.83 19451.80 7628.53 
1981 872 33.4 7418.79 14793.15 
1982 846 29.63 6510.48 15462.11 
1983 702 25.36 5110.46 15041.20 
1984 867 26.34 5317.38 14870.09 
1985 1085.4 28.13 5677.78 14506.29 
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Appendix B1 
Real Oil and Non-oil Revenue for the Public Budget as a Percentage of GDP 
Years 
Oil  production            
(1,000 bpd) 
Oil Revenue % of 
GDP 
Oil GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ millions 
Non-Oil GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ millions 
1986 1393.5 17.74 3871.99 17954.35 
1987 1717 26.95 7022.05 19033.80 
1988 2095 27.34 7341.11 19510.05 
1989 2260 31.58 7727.42 16741.94 
1990 1596 43.8 10719.40 13754.11 
1991 39 45.3 3756.11 4535.53 
1992 60.7 49.8 5187.74 5229.40 
1993 59.2 53.9 8342.08 7134.88 
1994 60 58.2 8591.64 6170.63 
1995 63.5 64.5 7778.18 4281.02 
1996 88.1 69.8 12595.56 5449.66 
1997 746.6 72.95 16044.67 5949.39 
1998 1417.6 74.93 22224.66 7435.90 
1999 2130.9 74.73 26062.50 8813.05 
2000 2039.8 91.32 32296.30 3069.78 
2001 1710.2 98.94 35797.85 383.52 
2002 1494.6 90.64 30531.90 3152.90 
2003 388.6 92.8 20912.18 1622.50 
2004 1450 96.6 33558.08 1181.13 
2005 1853.2 98.94 35883.51 384.44 
2006 2020.1 92.52 36963.71 2988.42 
2007 2150.3 83.96 34005.90 6496.60 
2008 2280.5 85.39 36870.77 6308.49 
2009 2336.2 68.69 31382.76 14304.77 
2010 2358.1 69.08 33409.53 14954.00 
 
Sources: World Bank (various years); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
(1980; 2003; 2012). 
 
Appendix B2 
 
GDP and GDP Per Capita for Iraq from 1970-2010  
Years  
GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ million 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
US$ 
GDP 
Growth 
% 
1970 9900.75 9917982 998.26   
1971 10587.88 10255904 1022.17 6.94 
1972 10192.49 10599846 952.55 -3.73 
1973 12121.60 10951169 1096.99 18.93 
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Appendix B2 
 
GDP and GDP Per Capita for Iraq from 1970-2010  
Years  
GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ million 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
US$ 
GDP 
Growth 
% 
1974 13098.22 11312304 1147.91 8.06 
1975 14980.22 11684585 1271.27 14.37 
1976 18072.53 12068300 1484.90 20.64 
1977 18405.73 12461337 1464.35 1.84 
1978 21761.89 12859762 1677.78 18.23 
1979 26969.89 13258367 2018.02 23.93 
1980 27080.33 13653358 1970.41 0.41 
1981 22211.94 14045450 1574.57 -17.98 
1982 21972.59 14435914 1519.80 -1.08 
1983 20151.66 14822565 1361.65 -8.29 
1984 20187.47 15202850 1333.60 0.18 
1985 20184.07 15576396 1304.11 -0.02 
1986 21826.35 15941197 1379.82 8.14 
1987 26055.85 16301879 1611.95 19.38 
1988 26851.16 16672907 1624.56 3.05 
1989 24469.36 17073500 1445.55 -8.87 
1990 24473.51 17517521 1408.65 0.02 
1991 8291.64 18009865 463.96 -66.12 
1992 10417.14 18547047 565.60 25.63 
1993 15476.96 19123947 814.23 48.57 
1994 14762.26 19731733 751.88 -4.62 
1995 12059.20 20363138 594.39 -18.31 
1996 18045.22 21017108 860.41 49.64 
1997 21994.07 21693597 1014.17 21.88 
1998 29660.56 22387179 1323.18 34.86 
1999 34875.56 23091408 1506.92 17.58 
2000 35366.07 23801156 1482.39 1.41 
2001 36181.37 24516842 1473.66 2.31 
2002 33684.79 25238267 1334.95 -6.90 
2003 22534.68 25959531 869.56 -33.10 
2004 34739.21 26673536 1305.08 54.16 
2005 36267.95 27377045 1325.61 4.40 
2006 39952.13 28064095 1419.71 10.16 
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Appendix B2 
 
GDP and GDP Per Capita for Iraq from 1970-2010  
Years  
GDP 
(2005=100) 
US$ million 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
US$ 
GDP 
Growth 
% 
2007 40502.51 28740630 1398.54 1.38 
2008 43179.26 29429829 1447.94 6.61 
2009 45687.53 30163199 1487.00 5.81 
2010 48363.53 30962380 1527.03 5.86 
 
Sources:  World Bank, (various years); UNCTAD, (various Years); IMF, (various years). 
 
Appendix B3 
 
Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation, Gross  Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, and Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation at Constant 2005, (1970-2010) 
Years  
GPFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GDFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GPFCF/GDP 
(%) 
GDFCF/GDP 
(%) 
GPFCF 
Growth 
(%)  
GDFCF 
Growth 
(%)  
1970 591.020 490.986 1082.007 5.969 4.959     
1971 568.819 485.865 1054.684 5.372 4.589 -1.043 -3.756 
1972 599.202 535.409 1134.611 5.879 5.253 10.197 5.341 
1973 1232.597 392.473 1625.071 10.169 3.238 -26.697 105.707 
1974 1630.065 258.008 1888.073 12.445 1.970 -34.261 32.246 
1975 2584.590 421.898 3006.488 17.253 2.816 63.521 58.557 
1976 2892.592 582.728 3475.319 16.005 3.224 38.120 11.917 
1977 2875.315 574.180 3449.495 15.622 3.120 -1.467 -0.597 
1978 3820.718 804.310 4625.028 17.557 3.696 40.080 32.880 
1979 4209.044 836.070 5045.114 15.606 3.100 3.949 10.164 
1980 3990.006 975.596 4965.602 14.734 3.603 16.688 -5.204 
1981 7377.152 1584.986 8962.138 33.213 7.136 62.463 84.891 
1982 7234.880 1499.868 8734.748 32.927 6.826 -5.370 -1.929 
1983 4154.160 725.669 4879.829 20.614 3.601 -51.618 -42.581 
1984 2899.732 702.862 3602.594 14.364 3.482 -3.143 -30.197 
1985 2676.314 641.007 3317.321 13.260 3.176 -8.801 -7.705 
1986 2767.452 592.693 3360.144 12.679 2.715 -7.537 3.405 
1987 2683.927 551.553 3235.480 10.301 2.117 -6.941 -3.018 
1988 2730.188 818.951 3549.140 10.168 3.050 48.481 1.724 
1989 2649.721 1812.773 4462.493 10.829 7.408 121.353 -2.947 
1990 2176.854 1825.143 4001.998 8.895 7.458 0.682 -17.846 
1991 641.366 270.662 912.028 7.735 3.264 -85.170 -70.537 
1992 1206.026 108.021 1314.046 11.577 1.037 -60.090 88.040 
1993 1493.018 425.100 1918.118 9.647 2.747 293.536 23.797 
1994 471.437 203.164 674.601 3.194 1.376 -52.208 -68.424 
1995 342.616 79.002 421.619 2.841 0.655 -61.114 -27.325 
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Appendix B3 
 
Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation, Gross  Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, and Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation at Constant 2005, (1970-2010) 
Years  
GPFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GDFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GFCF 
(US$ 
Millions) 
GPFCF/GDP 
(%) 
GDFCF/GDP 
(%) 
GPFCF 
Growth 
(%)  
GDFCF 
Growth 
(%)  
1996 157.953 44.246 202.199 0.875 0.245 -43.995 -53.898 
1997 507.183 60.009 567.192 2.306 0.273 35.627 221.097 
1998 755.184 132.250 887.434 2.546 0.446 120.384 48.898 
1999 800.826 98.680 899.505 2.296 0.283 -25.384 6.044 
2000 1178.658 101.771 1280.429 3.333 0.288 3.133 47.180 
2001 2483.571 201.711 2685.283 6.864 0.558 98.201 110.712 
2002 1783.822 386.970 2170.792 5.296 1.149 91.844 -28.175 
2003 3048.876 404.567 3453.443 13.530 1.795 4.547 70.918 
2004 2425.195 183.364 2608.559 6.981 0.528 -54.676 -20.456 
2005 6731.009 186.356 6917.366 18.559 0.514 1.632 177.545 
2006 7909.823 175.473 8085.297 19.798 0.439 -5.840 17.513 
2007 3230.053 15.263 3245.316 7.975 0.038 -91.302 -59.164 
2008 7537.519 190.562 7728.082 17.456 0.441 1148.533 133.356 
2009 5182.098 378.756 5560.854 11.342 0.829 98.757 -31.249 
2010 8689.493 560.567 9250.060 17.967 1.159 48.002 67.683 
 
Sources: Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COST), (1984; 1991; 
2006; and 2010); UNCTAD (various years). 
 
Appendix B4 
 
Population and Labour Size in Iraq over the Period of 1970-2010 
Years 
Population 
(thousands) 
Population 
Growth  
Labour Size 
(thousands) 
Labour 
Growth 
1980 13653.36 2.979 3107.368 
 1981 14045.45 2.872 3215.115 3.467 
1982 14435.91 2.780 3353.177 4.294 
1983 14822.57 2.678 3459.174 3.161 
1984 15202.85 2.566 3547.808 2.562 
1985 15576.40 2.457 3656.006 3.050 
1986 15941.20 2.342 3768.517 3.077 
1987 16301.88 2.263 3855.556 2.310 
1988 16672.91 2.276 3933.504 2.022 
1989 17073.50 2.403 4022.436 2.261 
1990 17517.52 2.601 3842.067 -7.728 
1991 18009.87 2.811 3842.067 3.515 
1992 18547.05 2.983 3990.482 3.863 
1993 19123.95 3.110 4152.894 4.070 
1994 19731.73 3.178 4323.191 4.101 
 253 
 
 
Appendix B4 
 
Population and Labour Size in Iraq over the Period of 1970-2010 
Years 
Population 
(thousands) 
Population 
Growth  
Labour Size 
(thousands) 
Labour 
Growth 
1995 20363.14 3.200 4497.2 4.025 
1996 21017.11 3.212 4682.629 4.123 
1997 21693.60 3.219 4871.171 4.026 
1998 22387.18 3.197 5060.77 3.892 
1999 23091.41 3.146 5249.892 3.737 
2000 23801.16 3.074 5437.231 3.568 
2001 24516.84 3.007 5596.349 2.926 
2002 25238.27 2.943 5752.673 2.793 
2003 25959.53 2.858 5908.614 2.711 
2004 26673.54 2.750 6067.018 2.681 
2005 27377.05 2.637 6265.636 3.274 
2006 28064.10 2.510 6475.789 3.354 
2007 28740.63 2.411 6703.32 3.514 
2008 29429.83 2.398 6928.685 3.362 
2009 30163.20 2.492 7177.92 3.597 
2010 30962.38 2.650 7451.771 3.815 
 
Source: UNCTAD, (various Years). 
Appendix B5 
Data Sources : 
1. World Bank data base (http://www.worldbank.org/) 
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development data base 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx) 
3. International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org) 
4. CBI Quarterly Bulletin, selected issues: 1980, 1990, 1994, 2005, and 2010. 
5. International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org). 
6. World Bank data base (http://www.worldbank.org/). 
7. COST annual reports:1984, 1991, 2006, and 2010. 
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